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OFFICER SELECTION IN THE REICHSIJEHR, 1918-1926 
INTRODUCTION
Few institutions have exerted greater influence on a society 
and culture than the military in Germany. As leaders of the army, the 
officer corps held an unequalled position in the nation. The officer 
corps determined its own rule in the state, and to a great extent affected 
the milieu within which it functioned. Officer selection was, therefore, 
a vital concern to both the military and to the civilian governments of 
the Weimar period.^ To the civilians, it was the key to the democratiza­
tion of the army; to the military, the selection process was a means with 
with to maintain their power and privileges in society. Ultimately, the 
military triumphed and retained an ideological homogeneity in the corps 
based upon conseri'atism and the traditions of the past. Because of its 
continued importance in German society, the officer corps of the Reichs- 
wehr has been of particular interest to many historians. Indeed, many 
scholars have pointed to the role of the army in the do'.mfall of the 
Weimar Republic and have connected the demise of democracy in Germany 
with the selection of officers whose attitudes were hostile to a liberal 
parliamentary governmental system.
The interaction between the military and the civil government 
in Germany has been thoroughly investigated. Among the better known 
works detailing the political relations between the army and Weimar
1
2governments are H. J. Gordon, The Reichswehr and the German Republic, 
1919-1926, F. L. Carsten. The Reichswehr and Politics, Gordon Craig,
The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640-1945, and John Wheeler-Bennett,
The Nemesis of Power. In dealing with officer selection in the Reichs­
wehr, these authors all agreed that the selection process produced highly 
efficient leaders with regard to technical military matters; that the 
majority of officers hated the Republic; and, as F. L. Carsten vjrote,
that "the officer corps in its old form and with its old methods of
2
selection . . . survived the crisis of revolution." Since officer 
selection was a secondary concern to the primarily political interests 
of these studies, it consequently received insufficient attention.
Because of the attention devoted to political relations, other 
significant problems related to officer selection have lacked adequate 
analysis. In particular, prior studies have failed to examine the con­
tinuity in the attitudes and values of the officer corps from the past 
and failed to clarify what the highest military leaders, principally 
Hans von Seeckt and Walther Reinhardt, wanted for the army and the nation. 
In addition, the possibility of significant change in the officer selec­
tion system of the Reichswehr received scant consideration, although the 
contemporary suggestion of change caused grave disturbances throughout 
the leadership of the corps. Lastly, the political studies failed to 
demonstrate the effects that officer selection had in shaping the char­
acter of the Reichswehr in spite of the agreement that the attitude of 
the army had a distinct bearing on the demise of the Weimar Republic.
Tlie Purposes and Objectives of This Study
The primary purpose of this study is to describe in detail how 
Reichswehr officers were selected during the 1918-1926 period. Corollary 
objectives were to determine who was responsible for the formulation of 
selection policies, and to clarify to what extent the procedures were 
instrumental in producing an anti-republican officer corps. To accom­
plish these ends, it was necessary to examine secondarily a number of 
other important problems. Included was the question of command authority 
in the hierarchy of the army as it related to training programs for offi­
cers and officer candidates, and a discussion of the military leadership's 
efforts to regain independence over their otm affairs after the imposi­
tion of civilian controls in military affairs at the end of hostilities 
in 1918.
To arrive at meaningful conclusions, it was necessary to isolate 
the phases in the development of the officer corps in Weimar Germany.
The evolution of past traditions, which still influenced officers in the 
1918-1926 period, was vital to an understanding of the officer's atti­
tude toward the nation, the profession of arms, and the republican form 
of government. Similarly, the selection, education, and training proc­
esses for officers also influenced the final product— the Reichswehr 
officer. The actual evolution fell into several stages: the November
Revolution, November 1918 to January 1919 during which time the civilian 
government sought alternatives to the prior military system; the demobil­
ization of the Imperial Army, January 1919 to June 1919 when internal 
disorder and external threats to Germany's borders required the survival 
of the officer corps to counter these disturbances; the forced
4reductions of personnel after the acceptance of the Versailles Treaty 
from June 1919 to March 1920, resulting in the so-called Kapp Putsch and 
the resignations of Gustav Noske and Colonel Walther Reinhardt who here­
tofore worked to bring the army and nation closer together; and finally 
the period from March 1920 to 1926 which brought solutions to the prob­
lems of the officer corps under the leadership of General Hans von Seeckt. 
Within these stages occurred the conflicts and events which shaped the 
officer corps and the Reichswehr into the form and character they pos­
sessed until the end of the Republic in 1933.
The Officer Corps in the Weimar Republic
During the early years of the Weimar Republic, serious disputes 
arose within the highest ranks of the officer corps. These quarrels 
split the corps into several factions which competed with each other over 
control of officer selection, the legitimate succession to the former 
regime in the military command structure, and the future independence of 
the military from civilian control through the implementation of a unified 
and centralized command and administrative system for the Reichswehr.
Many of the difficulties the officer corps endured came from the manner 
in which the first World War terminated. The oft-maligned attitude of 
the majority of the officers that the war was not over contained a grain
3
of truth. It did not technically end with the armistice but with the 
acceptance of a permanent peace treaty. Thus doubts and uncertainties 
relating to the continuation of careers and to the political position of 
the army in the new state magnified the problems within the corps. The 
intra-corps conflicts and the retention of a contingent organization 
composed of units with varying degrees of autonomy from Prussia, Bavaria,
5Saxony, Württemberg, and Baden prevented the establishment of a common 
front within the military to press for their objectives.
While the army and officer corps remained divided even after 
March 1920, the civilian government also experienced deep divisions over 
military matters and policy. Although the majority of political parties 
in the Weimar system favored military reform, the internal disorders and 
external threats during the early months of the Republic turned the 
attention of the Reichstag from alterations in the military system to 
cooperation with the remnants of the Imperial Army. The civilian govern­
ment regarded many of the problems of the army as internal matters to be 
handled by the experts in the army command. Democratization of the army 
and officer corps was a long-sought objective of many German political 
parties who believed a change in the philosophy of the military could 
be brought about by the democratic and non-discriminatory application of 
selection criteria to officer candidates of all social strata. Civilian 
politicians failed to realize that alterations in the attitude of the 
army and officer corps could not be obtained through the selection system 
alone, but also required a reorientation of officer education. Without 
substantial reform in the latter, the introduction of officer candidates 
into the corps from differing social groups meant little. The educa­
tional and training programs for officers and officer candidates in the 
Reichswehr moulded the future military leaders to fit the requirements 
of the establishment while teaching them the fundamentals of their pro­
fession. The ideals of a democratic and republican-minded army came to 
naught because tradition-oriented officers such as General von Seeckt 
directed the vital training and educational programs of the Reichswehr
6in the spirit of the past. As a result, they produced officers who 
served the German state, not the German Republic.
NOTES FOR THE INTRODUCTION
^References to the importance of the officer corps in determining 
the attitudes of the army as a whole are common. Among the most notable 
are F. C. Endres, "The Social Structure and Corresponding Ideologies of 
the German Officer Corps before the World War," in Archiv fur Sozial- 
wissenschaft und Sozial Politik, vol. 58, 1927, pp. 282-319, translated 
by S. Ellison, (Washington, B.C.: Department of Social Welfare and the
Department of Social Sciences, Columbia University, project no. 165-97- 
6999-6027, Works Progress Administration), p. 308; "Der Offizier macht 
die Truppe, und wie ist, so ist die Truppe," hereafter cited as Endres, 
"Social." See also Otto-Emst Schiiddekopf, Das Heer und die Republik 
(Hannover/Frankfurt am Main: Norddeutsche Verlagsanstalt o. Goedel,
1958), p. 61, hereafter cited Schiiddekopf, Heer und Republik, and 
Ekart Kehr, Der Primat der Innenpolitik, ed. by Hans-Ulrich Web1er, 
Friedrich Meinecke Institut, Der Freien Universitat Berlin (Berlin:
Walter de Gruyter and Co., 1965), p. 236, hereafter cited Kehr, Primat. 
Such influence applied basically to higher ranking officers as shovm by 
the comments of a former officer, Moriz Faber du Faur, who compared the 
role of a subaltern to that of a screw in a machine. Moritz Faber du 
Faur, Macht und Ohnmacht (Stuttgart: Hans E. Guenther Verlag, 1955),
p. 89. "Auf den Gang das Diensts hatte man als subaltern Offizier keinen 
Einfluss. ... Die Rolle war nicht anders als die einer Schraube in einer 
Machine," hereafter cited Faber du Faur, Macht und Ohnmacht.
^Carsten, F. L., The Reichswehr and Politics, 1918-1933 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), p. 33, hereafter
cited Carsten, Reichswehr. See also Gordon Craig, Tlie Politics of the 
Prussian Army, 1660-1945 (New York: The Oxford University Press, 1955),
p. 380, hereafter cited Craig, Politics ; H. J. Gordon, The Reichswehr 
and the German Republic, 1919-1926 (Port Washington, New York: The
Kennikat Press, 1972 reprint), p. 193, hereafter cited Gordon, Rexchwehr; 
and John Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Power: The German Army in
Politics 1918-1945 (New York: The Viking Press, 1967), p. 98, hereafter
cited IvTieeler-Bennett, Nemesis.
■>
See Schiiddekopf, Heer und Republik, p. 19, from the Denkschrift 
of Major, i.G. von Botticher, March 3, 1919, who wrote that in psycholog­
ical terms, the war was not, and could not, be over if it ended in defeat 
for Germany.
CHAPTER I
THE PRUSSIAN ARMY
The Reichswehr of the Weimar Republic evolved from foundations 
laid nearly three-hundred years before in the Brandenburg-Prussian army. 
All the important features of the army's character, its traditions, its 
service ethos, its officer selection system, and the exclusive nature of 
its leadership were firmly rooted in the seventeenth and eighteenth cen­
turies. Because an attachment to the ideas and institutions of the past 
continued to be strong throughout the history of the Prussian-German 
officer corps, the old methods of personnel recruitment and modes of 
thought endured almost intact into modem times. While the officer 
corps of the Reichswehr achieved a high technical proficiency, its 
orientation toward the past produced an atmosphere in the corps which
did not correspond to the ideals of the Republic.
The Formation and Growth of the Prussian Army
The creation of a standing array in Prussia began in the
mid-seventeenth century when the Hohenzollerns ruled over widely sepa­
rated territories in East Prussia, Cleves-Mark, and Brandenburg.^ The 
Elector of Brandenburg, George William (1619-1940), relied upon the army 
of the Holy Roman Emperor and his ora diplomatic adroitness for the 
protection of his possessions. In a time of general European war and
8
9civil strife in the Germanies, this was an error of nearly fatal
consequences for the Hohenzollern dynasty. George William was unable to
keep the lands of the Electorate from being invaded, crossed, or occupied
by foreign armies, and his domain became a primary battleground during
2
the Thirty Years War. As a result of the dynasty's experiences during 
the Thirty Years War, the Great Elector, Frederick William (1640-1688), 
sought to build a standing army of his oivn to protect his lands from
3
domestic disorder and foreign invasion. Frederick William concluded 
that alliances were good, but an army of his own was even better because 
it was more reliable. Besides, as the Great Elector wrote, "a lord is 
of no consequence if he does not have means and troops of his ovm."^
The basic problem facing George William in securing an army 
responsive to his wishes had been the refusal of the Estates of his lands 
to grant money for raising troops except in their o\m provinces under 
the command of their own officers.^ Furthermore, he tried to recruit an 
army in Brandenburg, but failed as few of his subjects volunteered to 
fight. In their stead, the Elector secured mercenaries, but these troops, 
called Soldatesca or Landesknechte, were rabble from the gutters of 
Europe, undisciplined and incapable of effective combat.^ Worse yet, 
these forces regularly pillaged and terrorized the lands they had been 
hired to protect. By 1640, when Frederick William inherited the Elector­
ate, it was clear beyond any doubt that his father's methods had cost the 
Hohenzollerns dearly in subjects, prestige, and security. For these 
reasons, the Great Elector sought to insure that the dynasty would never 
again be without a reliable army of its own.
10
A major step in securing a royal Prussian army was Frederick 
William’s agreement with the Brandenburg aristocracy entitled the "Recess 
of 1653" (Landtagsabscheid). The Recess provided the Elector with the 
resources to build an army while in return the nobility secured greater 
control over the tenants on their lands. By this arrangement the landed 
gentry encouraged their younger sons, the Junkers, to join the army of 
the Elector as officers. To many of the untrained and uneducated nobil­
ity, this appeared attractive as the inheritance system in the Electorate 
provided nothing for the younger sons. Many simply remained on family 
lands, reduced to the indignity of being supported by those more fortu­
nate in order of birth. Unlike other lands where positions in the offi­
cialdom and clergy were unavailable to young aristocrats, the Protestant 
church in Brandenburg had few ministers and the royal administration was 
small and local in nature.^ The Recess of 1653 thus offered the oppor­
tunity of a career with honor and dignity to persons who thereafter owed 
their place in society directly to the monarch. In subsequent years, 
the same arrangement included all of the Elector’s domain and in East 
Prussia provided monetary subsidies for the landed estates. Thus a 
process evolved by which the monarch ensured personal control over his 
army, its finances, and its officer personnel. It was not, however, 
completed during the lifetime of the Great Elector. The array still had 
many foreign officers and the king continued to employ mercenary colonels
g
contracted to raise regiments. The process begun by Frederick William 
proved to be only the beginning of a more lengthy development by which
9
his successors built a royal army without Condottieri forces.
11
Frederick William I (1713-1740), the first soldier-king, 
continued the centralization of the administrative, fiscal, and officer 
selection processes under the personal direction of the crown. In the 
development of the Prussian officer corps, his principal contribution 
lay in the establishment of a common bond between the .throne and mili­
tary aristocracy which in time became virtually indissoluable.
Frederick William I accomplished this when he became the first Prussian 
monarch to wear military dress on a regular basis and by functioning 
actively as the army's highest ranking offic e r . T h e  king personally 
designed a plain, light-blue uniform jacket, thereafter called the
"King's Coat" (Kbnigsrock) , and adopted a lifestyle of service to the
11state for his officers to emulate.
With the monarch's example, service in the army evolved into an
obligation for the nobility (Standespflicht) and gradually assumed a
12hereditary nature. The concept was further strengthened by the notion
held by both the nobility and the monarch that the upper class was the
only part of society qualified to become army officers. Increasingly,
the aristocrats sought membership in the officer corps as a profession
13
which in time they came to dominate.
The centralization of power over the army and the state reached 
completion during the reign of Frederick II (1740-1786). Autocracy 
attained its zenith in the Hohenzollern domain as Frederick personally 
became the final arbiter of all questions in the nation, serving as the 
first officer in the army and as the first servant of the state. Build­
ing on the precedent established by his father, he gave the aristocrats 
exclusive right to become officers during this period. In Frederick's
12
words, the Prussian aristocracy was a "race so good that it deserves to 
be protected in every w a y . H e  purged the officer corps of most com­
moners, preferring to employ foreign aristocrats rather than members of
the Prussian middle class to whom he allotted the task of building the
15state's economic and financial strength. These non-noble elements in 
society, he felt, did not possess the proper temperament to lead men 
into battle.
Prussian society under Frederick the Great remained relatively 
static and semi-feudal. His success on the battlefield, however, fos­
tered an admiration of military force as a means to further state aims 
that was accepted by Prussian society in general.Prussia was a 
"Soldier's and Bureaucrat's State (Soldaten und Beamten staat)"; a 
Machtstaat, in which administrative an;’ military efficiency became united 
with traditional notions of political obedience to the divinely ordained
1 17ruler.
The Prussian Reform Era, 1807-1819
The Frederickian system, however, lasted only twenty years
before its destruction in the Prussian military debacles at Jena and
Auerstadt in 1806. The aristocratic officer corps in which Frederick
placed his undying confidence failed utterly on the battlefield as many
nobles fled or surrendered without a fight. Because of the disgraceful
performance of the bulk of the officer corps, Frederick William III
(1797-1840) began to adopt policies which permitted non-nobles, and par-
18
ticularly the middle class, to become officers. The King empowered a 
royal commission to investigate the records of officers suspected of 
dishonorable conduct during the war and cashiered those deemed culpable
13
19in the defeat. Directed by Schamhorst, with assistance from 
Gneisenau, Grolmann, Clausewitz, and von Boyen, the commission suggested 
far-reaching changes in policy to the King regarding the officer corps.
It sought to break the monopoly held by aristocrats on entry into the 
officer corps and to establish education (Bildung) and performance
20
(Leistung) rather than birth as the criteria for officer selection.
The King, who still recalled with disgust the behavior of his 
officer corps in 1806, accepted the new regulations proposed by the com­
mission and ordered them implemented throughout the military establish­
ment. The reforms, however, did not alter the attitude of the majority 
of aristocratic officers who conceded that while problems did exist, 
there was nothing wrong with the system as a whole. They bitterly 
resented the new regulations which they saw as a threat to their tradi­
tional prerogatives and to the social structure of the nation.
The era of the Napoleonic Wars witnessed other important 
developments in the officer corps. In view of Prussia's ever widening 
role in opposition to the French, continued demands for additional per­
sonnel outstripped the number of officers available from the aristocracy 
alone. After Christmas of 1813, in the period knoim in Germany as the 
War of Liberation (1813-1815), liability for military service in Prussia 
became universal and positions in the officer corps were theoretically 
open to all citizens. Beginning at the time of the French retreat from 
Russia, the Prussian Landtag created a territorial militia, the Landwehr, 
to augment the regular army in its effort to expel Napoleon's forces 
from Prussia. On December 30, 1813, the Prussian General Yorck, on his 
own authority and without royal consent, separated his forces from the
14
French and proclaimed their neutrality by the Convention of Tauroggen.
Shortly thereafter, the East Prussian Landtag ordered the mobilization
of all able-bodied men from eighteen to forty-five years of age to serve
21in the Landwehr to protect the province from French reprisals. In
February, 1814, the Prussian government appealed to classes formerly
excluded from military service to form volunteer Jager detachments and
22in March extended the call throughout the kindgom. For the first time 
in Prussian military history, volunteers fought beside regulars, and to 
the chagrin of the aristocrats proved their worth in battle. The Land­
wehr permitted Prussia to maintain a large army in the field throughout 
the remainder of the war. Field Marshal Bliicher later commented that 
"With the Landwehr battalions, it went in the beginning only so-so; but
once they had tasted plenty of powder, they did as well as the battalions 
23of the Line." The Landwehr became an object of pride for the middle 
class and one of scorn for the officer corps of the regular army. Fear­
ing competition from middle class Landwehr officers, the command echelon 
of the standing army made vigorous efforts in subsequent years to dissolve 
or to alter substantially the form of the Landwehr. It was far too 
democratic in nature for the traditionalists who considered the liberal 
views of many Landwehr members as a threat to the status quo in Prussia. 
After the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815, the King of Prussia showed 
less interest toward additional reforms in either the political or mili­
tary spheres. The reform era ended in 1819 with the resignation of War 
Minister von Boyen, a member of that royal commission which had played 
such a vital role in the rebuilding of the Prussian army.
15
Between 1820 and 1848 the old military aristocracy returned to 
prominence and abrogated much of the work of the reformers in favor of 
the system which had existed before 1806. The officer corps became 
predominantly noble again, and the military elite made stringent efforts 
to make the corps safe from corrupting ideas by reverting to selection 
methods designed to preserve the social and ideological homogeneity of 
the past. The traditionalists recognized a real threat to their position 
in the rise of liberalism in Germany because the middle class now demanded 
a share in the decision-making processes of the government. However, the 
monarchy backed the old elites in the army and bureaucracy, resolutely 
opposing political reform of any kind.
Tlie Challenge of Revolution
The first substantive external threat to the sinecure of the 
officer corps came, with the revolution of 1848. Liberal members of the 
Frankfurt Parliament demanded reforms of far-reaching consequence in the 
army and officer corps. They wanted the corps opened to talent, the 
abolition of exclusive cadet schools and academies, as well as the 
establishment of parliamentary control over the army by the "introduction 
of soldier’s councils, election of officers, [and] the abolition of 
saluting.These programs proved impossible to realize, but the threat 
of the liberal-sponsored reforms increased the opposition of most offi­
cers to liberalism and heightened their distrust of politics in general.
For conservative Prussians, the revolution lent credence to the 
idea that the officer corps was the only reliable bulwark in the nation 
against social upheaval and increased the determination of the government 
and military hierarchy to shield the corps from outside influences. This
16
attitude affected officer selection policy by limiting candidates to
those of proven "character"; if not nobles by birth, then "Nobles of
25Conviction" (Adels der Gesinnung). Officers who entertained liberal
opinions found promotion slow and complained bitterly about the constant
26
surveillance and thought control in the regiments. More important 
still, the 1848 episode turned many educated, middle-class youth away 
from possible careers in the army or politics and toward other pursuits 
in business, the professions, or the academic world. The source for 
future officer candidates were thereby limited mainly to the nobility 
who tightened their grip on officer selection to ensure that no chal­
lenge to their supremacy arose again. Prussian conservatives, especially 
East Elbians, reacted to the liberal challenge with the attitude that 
there existed innate conflict between rural and urban segments of society. 
They associated the rural background with a conservative character and
spirit; the urban with liberalism, industrialization and intellectual- 
27ism. It was a classic encounter of good and evil to the nobility, a
struggle by the divinely ordained triad of throne, altar, and sword
against forces bent on their destruction.
This point of view persisted among conservatives and aristocrats
throughout the 1850s and 1860s even though the rapid increase in the
size of the Prussian army necessitated recruitment of officers from
classes heretofore excluded from regular service. The nobility as a
class could no longer meet the ever-increasing demands for officer per- 
28sonnel. Various innovations, such as enlisting young men directly out
of the senior classes at cadet schools, proved ineffective in solving 
29the problem. Persons likely to be of conservative character, sons of
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the clergy, teachers with university degrees, lawyers, and doctors
gained admission to the ranks of the officer corps because their entry
30was not considered to be a disadvantage to the corps. Yet the social 
prejudices of the aristocratic officers remained unchanged. They 
believed the officer corps attracted the sons of merchants by the pros­
pect of rapid promotion and the lack of a more promising career else­
where, rather than from a sense of duty or "calling." Conservatives such 
as Edwin von Manteuffel, head of the Military Cabinet in the 1850s, 
objected to the middle-class officers because he felt such men probably
held liberal notions and because he believed in the Frederickian tenet
31that the middle class lacked the proper military spirit.
GROWTH OF THE PRUSSIAN ARMY^^
Year Size
1678 45,000
1740 • 81,000
1763 149,000
1805 180,000
1815 •. 391,000^
1859 151,000
1862 210,000
1868 313,000
^187,500 Landwehr.
Problems relating to officer personnel grew even more acute in 
the mid-1850s because of losses incurred in the Danish and Austrian wars. 
The absorption of Landwehr officers into the regular army did not suffice 
to produce the officers necessary for the expanding army. The only solu­
tion to the persistent lack of officers was the withdrawal of barriers
18
to commissions for middle-class candidates. Because of the spectacular
military victories of the Prussian army and the rising prestige of the
officer corps in the eyes of the middle class, much of the Prussian
bourgeoisie, rather than opposing the ideas of the nobility in uniform,
considered the officer the first citizen of the state. Prussian burghers
tried to become "the faithful image of the regular officer, if not in
origin, then in manners, political attitude, and social outlook. To
enter the privileged corps became the ambition of the sons of the middle
class who would aspire to at least the dignity of a commission in the 
33reserve." Now the Prussian middle class joined the aristocracy in 
viewing military service in the officer corps as a highly respected and 
desirable profession.
The Officer Corps as ^ Profession
The Prussian officer corps retained many characteristics of its 
feudal heritage, being corporate and based upon a small, socially homo­
geneous and cohesive group in society. In the beginning, individual 
knights composed the majority of its members. These persons were autono­
mous rulers within the bounds of their landed estates and became heredi­
tary nobles by the terms of the Recess of 1653 under the suzerainty of
34the Elector of Brandenburg. Cementing this relationship was an 
emerging bond of service to the king on the part of the Junkers and a 
common interest in maintaining the established social order. As a result 
of this commitment, a group consciousness developed among the nobility 
concerning their role in society and that of a military officer in 
particular.
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In structure, the officer corps showed "traces of the guild
system inherited from the days of the Landsknechte: and the whole was
combined with the no less essential chivalric concept of loyalty—
35loyalty owed by vassals." These ties between the lord and vassal, 
monarch and officers, were firmly and permanently secured with the adop­
tion of the Kbnigsrock by Frederick William I, and thereafter by his 
officers, as an outward sign of common interest, appearance, and lifestyle. 
Homogeneity and solidarity were further evident in the fact that no 
officers, except the Generals, wore badges of rank or other marks of 
distinction to separate them from their colleagues. Each officer felt a 
sense of group identity that resembled membership in a large, but close- 
knit family. To seal the compact with the king, and his peers, the 
officer swore an oath on the monarch's flag (Fahneneid) binding him "for 
the rest of his life to be a faithful servant of His Majesty."
The development of a professional ethos began with the medieval 
concept of an "organic society," created by divine ordinance in which 
each part has specific duties to perform. This doctrine, endorsed by 
the church and supported by temporal and secular rulers alike, became 
the philosophical basis for a stable social structure in which the upper 
strata maintained a permanent ascendancy. The central figure for the 
officer corps was the king, not a particular territory or national con­
cept. Later, with the demise of the Emperor and Kaiserdom, the focal
37point became the "Fatherland and not the State." Every officer, as a 
result of his personal oath of loyalty, and in accordance with his spec­
ial position in the state and society, enjoyed a proximity to the center 
of power in the nation and possessed a direct link to the monarch in the
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fora of a personal audience (Immediatgesuch) regardless of his age or 
38rank. In every respect, the army belonged personally to the king, and
39his officers played the role of paladins. They identified their inter­
ests with those of the monarch which made any challenge to his person or 
possessions an individual challenge to each officer as well. The officer 
corps began, thereafter, an evolutionary sequence which culminated in
the establishment of the corps as a closed corporation and the general
40acknowledgment of its meiribers as the first estate in the nation. It 
existed within a special framework in Prussian society, in a world of its 
own. Yet its influence reached all other strata of society in a signifi­
cant manner.
The emergence of a service-oriented ethos provided the
foundation for the officer's life and a perspective toward his vocation.
This played a vital part in establishing a common ideological base for
those who entered the corps for a life-long career. The profession of
arms was appropriate in dignity and honor for their station in society
41and was thus more than an occupation. The French word Devoir, used
earlier in reference to the rights and duties of medieval guildsmen also
came to be used to describe the profession of amis in the eighteenth
42
century. In the latter case, the term denoted high moral duty, dynas­
tic loyalty and social status, as well as the acknowledged rights and 
duties of those in the military profession.
The Germans employed the word Beruf for the same idea, but it
also referred to the "calling" of a person to a specific profession. It
imparted a more noble quality to the selection of a career and gave the 
Offizierberuf a higher station than a guiIdsman or artisan. Beruf also
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possessed a religious character related to the "Lutheran emphasis of a
divine ’calling' and upon reciprocal privileges among m e n . O t h e r
interpretations likened it to a summons to the priesthood, or in Cal-
44vinist terms, to the vocation of the pre-determined elect. The voca­
tion of a military officer, and later that of war itself, became the 
ultimate objective of this elite group. It gave meaning to their
existence (Daseins) and was the foundation of their reason for being
45 ’(Soseins). This, combined with the personal oath to the monarch
formed the moral-ethical basis for the Prussian officer's philosophy of
life/*
Another important concept lay in the German word Gesinnung.
This referred to "character" or more specifically to the acceptance of 
the philosophy and behavioral patterns expected of the Prussian military 
officer. It was an integral part of the group norm of the professional 
officer and included proper personal bearing, social attitudes, rever­
ence for tradition and, in later years, a conservative political outlook. 
The nobility considered such qualities inbred in their class— a contra­
diction, however, was the fact that these values were taught at the 
predominantly noble cadet schools as part of the educational curriculum—  
and these attributes served to maintain a homogeneous philosophy among 
the members of the officer corps. Gesinnung connoted particular senti­
ments, convictions, and a way of thinking which encompassed as part of 
its meaning additional moral and ethical qualities. The concept also 
included consciousness of duty, prerogative and status, as well as an 
awareness of peer expectations which resembled the purity and purpose of 
a medieval knight embarking upon a holy quest. Acceptance of the
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Offizierberuf and the adoption of the proper Gesinnung constituted a 
visible sign of the character required of professional officers. Char­
acter, in this sense, was a standard determining factor in officer 
selection throughout the history of the Prussian army.
Contributing to the exclusive nature of the officer corps was 
the idea of a "Noble comradeship" (Adelgenossenschaft) among its members 
who possessed a sense of honor derived from medieval times. The Officer's 
Code of Honor (Ehrenkodex) held the corps together as a cohesive unit.
This self-regulating de facto common law preserved the exclusive position 
of the officer corps in the state by underlining the difference between
the military and the civilian population and by claiming for the corps a
47higher sense of honor. The Code of Honor became the focal point of
the individual officer's spirit (Geist) and the personal honor of each
48member became an integral part of that of the corps. In later years,
honor achieved such importance that in 1860 Prince Frederick Karl of
49Prussia placed it above duty and even loyalty to the king. Frederick 
the Great valued the maintenance of honor above all else in his officers 
and described honor as a "moral compulsion which forced them, out of 
respect for themselves and their calling, to bear hardship, danger, and 
death without flinching and without expectation of r e w a r d . S u c h  
devotion, Frederick believed, could only be found in the feudal nobility 
and not in any other class. He expressly denied that these feelings were 
a part of the middle-class mentality. To the king, that class was driven 
by material, rather than moral, values and "were too rational, in moments 
of disaster, to regard sacrifice as either necessary or commendable."^^
It therefore became the primary goal of the officer selection process
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prior to World War I to choose only candidates whose character assured 
the maintenance of the honor and philosophy of the corps.
Officer Selection to 1870
Prior to 1870 officer selection underwent constant revision in 
technique yet remained much the same in philosophy. After 1814, there 
was not one officer corps, but two— the active officer corps of the 
regular standing army and the reserve officer corps based upon the 
Landwehr. Initially, the two corps differed in character, philosophy, 
and selection procedures, but the army reforms of 1860-61 synthesized 
the bodies into one entity. Until that time two military elites existed 
in Prussia: being remarkably similar in philosophy after the 19th mid­
century, while different in social composition.
The traditional method of selecting officers in the Prussian 
army was by regiment as it was in the Imperial army and later the Reichs- 
wehr. This paralleled the recruitment practices of the medieval Condot­
tieri and survived with remarkable continuity until well into the 
twentieth century in Germany. In the system, each regimental commander, 
usually a Colonel, received a lump sum payment to raise a regiment which 
thereafter was considered his private property. The Colonels usually 
recruited only a small percentage of the contracted number of men and
kept for himself what money was saved by not maintaining the unit at full 
52strength. Each Colonel selected the officers for his regiment, and 
those so chosen owed their primary allegiance to him rather than the 
person contracting the services of the unit. The Great Elector changed 
this by curtailing the mercenary leader's right to commission junior 
officers. He required new appointees to enter a contractual agreement
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(Kapitulation) which assured their responsibility directly to his 
53person.
As the standing army grew, successive rulers brought the 
mercenary leadership under greater control, especially in the realm of 
officer selection. Frederick William I extended a royal veto over com­
missions by regimental commanders and introduced a system of ranks
54determined by seniority. Ranking superiors still appointed sub­
ordinate officers, but the nomination of higher officers, principally 
of staff grade, the king reserved for h i m s e l f . T h e  new seniority 
system, called the Ancientitat, was a combination of tradition and new 
incentives to make the profession attractive as a lifelong career.
The Ancientitat followed the concept of equality for each person of 
equivalent rank in the military hierarchy. In practice, it meant that 
the longer an officer served, the higher his rank. The system existed 
in lieu of promotion by merit so that the longest tenured candidate among 
those qualified invariably received advancement with the acquiescence of 
his comrades.Thus evolved the importance of the Kapitulation or com­
mission date which often determined the final consideration for promo­
tions in the corps. This reliance upon seniority produced an over­
abundance of elderly officers in the Prussian army by the beginning of
the nineteenth century and led to the commonly held notion in the corps
58that the oldest officer was the smartest and most capable. However, 
in spite of the rising popularity of military service among the Prussian 
nobility, and the incentives introduced by the monarchs to recruit more 
personnel, the constantly expanding army required officers in a quantity 
which aristocratic volunteers could not fill.
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During the reign of Federick William I, additional measures to
enlist more native officers in the Prussian army brought positive results.
Cadet schools were one source, but the aristocracy required the extreme
course of initiating "lists of young nobles between 12 and 18 and he [the
59king] personally chose those to be admitted. . . . "  From this period 
emerged the procedures by which candidates became officers— either as 
cadets who served one year as ensigns after graduation (Fahnriche, or 
Kornets in the cavalry) before their permanent commissioning as second 
lieutenants or as regimental cadets (Fahnenjunker) whose military train­
ing took place while serving as special non-commissioned officers while 
serving in the regular army. For the latter course, the candidate had 
to achieve the rank of ensign in order to be promoted to second lieu­
tenant.^^ The traditional assignment of the Fahnrich or Komet during 
the period before their commission was as special subaltern officers 
who were flag and standard bearers in b a t t l e . E a c h  regiment, however, 
still initated the selection procedure. With the introduction of the 
Canton system, each unit received a recruiting district so that often 
officers or officer candidates enlisted on their own estates in order to
oversee their ovm peasant-soldiers in the same manner they had as civil- 
62ians. The persistent lack of officers in the Prussian army led, as
early as the Infantry Regulations of 1726, to the establishment of
conditions under which non-commissioned personnel received promotion to
63
subaltern positions.
The firs'" substantive changes in the technique and philosophy 
of officer selection came on August 6, 1808, when Frederick William III 
enacted new procedures entitled "Regulations for making Appointments to
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Vacancies among Ensigns and for the Selection of Officers for the 
Infantry, Cavalry and Artillery." Noble birth declined in importance 
as a qualification for officer candidates. The new regulations recog­
nized that those characteristics considered by the nobility to exist 
only in their estate were less vital than educational background and 
technical expertise. With the adoption of the new criteria came a 
struggle between conservative traditionalists and reformers, a struggle 
revolving around the primacy in officer selection of "mind" or "charac­
ter."^^ The royal ordinance stated in part that
Applications for commissions will in the future be considered 
only on the grounds of attainments and education in times of peace, 
and on grounds of outstanding bravery and general outlook in times 
of war. It follows that every Prussian who possesses these quali­
fications can aspire to the highest military posts of honor. All 
advantage hitherto enjoyed by the Estate in the array are hereby 
abolished and all men, regardless of their origins, shall have the 
same duties and rights. 5^
The selection process involved two major principles— that of the 
selection of officer candidates through personal application to the regi­
ment of their choice, and on the basis of need with the Ancientitat as a 
guide from which to select ensigns for promotion.Selection was pri­
marily through an evaluation of professional expertise, social position, 
and physical ability for persons with the proper educational background. 
Candidates from the civilian sector of society applied as officer aspir­
ants in their Canton and then underwent consideration by the regiments 
for possible election as Fahnenjunker. T h e  monarch still claimed, in 
theory, a free hand in the selection process, but in most instances he 
left the final decision to each regiment.
The reformers in 1808 intended basic alterations in the 
traditional selection procedures and in the philosophy supporting the
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system. They wanted to end practices whereby Junkers in their early 
teens served as corporals until they could be commissioned.^^ In contrast, 
the officer aspirant now had to wait until age seventeen to enter the 
service, after, and only after, offering adequate proof of his proper 
educational background. He then spent not less than three months in the 
ranks before taking a regimental examination for admission to the officer 
corps as an ensign.Limitations also existed in the numbers of posi­
tions open to new personnel. The allotment for each cavalry regiment per 
year was fourteen ensigns and eight each for the infantry. The new 
process required the successful completion of a second examination before 
the candidate's actual promotion to lieutenant. A special board in Berlin 
conducted the examinations and the reformers originally intended to sub­
ject all officers to testing before promotion to higher g r a d e s , T h e  
military school system underwent a reorganization to complement the more 
rigorous requirements, providing basic courses to candidates for commis­
sions, while the War Academy (Kriegsakademie) provided a more advanced 
curriculum.
In spite of these changes, the king still appointed a small
percentage of officers to the corps based on the older concept of charac- 
72ter. Acceptance of the new selection criteria and philosophy varied
considerably in the officer corps. Until mid-century the reforms aroused
vehement opposition from many ultra-conservatives who saw in the changes
the eventual destruction of the corps and of the close personal relation-
73ship between the king and his officers. Still very much alive was the 
old Frederickian notion that the middle class was unsuited for the art of 
war.^^ Representative of this view was Frederick Ludwig von der Marwitz
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who recorded his dismay over such alterations in tradition and argued 
that he
would put more faith in wartime in the son of a poor landowner or 
officer, who suffers in want in his manor or garrison, than in the 
son of a rich man who owes his wealth to speculation or, indeed
to bankruptcy.75
Such objections made little impression on the king who allowed 
further concessions in the heretofore sacrosanct realm of officer selec­
tion as the need for personnel grew rapidly during the War of Liberation. 
One of the major changes in the existing system occurred with the creation 
of the Landwehr which accepted middle-class volunteers without the 
restrictions that prevailed in the regular army. These units provided 
officer replacements after the battles of Gross-Gorschen and Bautzen 
depleted the officer corps of the standing army. Eventually, the Landwehr 
included thirty-eight infantry and cavalry regiments.The primary 
difference between the selection method for officers in the standing army 
and the Landwehr regiments was the election of officers up to the rank of 
Captain by the troops in the l a t t e r . T h i s  created a second officer 
corps that operated under different procedures from the regular amry. It 
involved new methods of officer selection and a system of creating 
reserve officers which was not bound to the traditions dear to conserva­
tive aristocrats. The system which ultimately evolved allowed volunteer 
service for one year with a Landwehr regiment followed by a commission in 
the reserves.
Entering the service at their own expense, the one-year 
volunteers (Einjahrige) provided their own uniforms, equipment, and cost 
of maintenance and lodging. To qualify required proof that the volunteer 
had completed the examination for the sixth year at a Gynmasium or
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Realschule. Each individual chose his service branch and regiment, but
they were not compelled to live in barracks, attend military lectures or
78drill as an ordinary recruit. Einjahrige normally spent their active 
service year as non-commissioned personnel, attended a war school and 
received their commission as a reserve officer upon completion of the
course. Many Einjahrige viewed this route as the initial step toward a
79commission in the regular army. This process required completion of 
the officer's examination, and election by the officers of a regiment to
the officer's mess. The former reserve officer then received a full
80commission in the regular army. This system provided the majority of 
reserve officers in the Prussian army in the years between its inception 
and the merger of the officer corps of the Landwehr and the standing army 
in 1860-61.
The reforms of the early 1860s sought to produce a centralized,
institutionalized reserve system and to assimilate many Landwehr officers
into the ranks of the more socially elite regulars. After a few years,
this proved successful and the former Landwehr identified with the regular
army officer and resembled them in outlook on society, economics and 
81
politics. The enhanced prestige and social rewards of the regular army 
also played a prominent role in the Landwehr officer adopting the values
and attitudes of his new peer group. During this period, the criteria for
officer selection became standardized as it appeared throughout the life 
of the Empire. If the candidate possessed the satisfactory educational 
requirements, he entered the corps as an ensign, or from outside the
establishment as a regimental cadet. In either case, a request to be
considered as an officer candidate went to the officer in charge of
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recruiting for that particular regiment. There followed an investigation 
of the family's background and of the political activities of not only 
the applicant but his family and associates as well. The final consider­
ation was the family's social position and the father's occupation. If 
all reports appeared satisfactory, a unanimous vote of the officers of 
the regiment elected the candidate to the officer's mess and began the 
process leading to a commission as a second lieutenant. Promotion to 
ensign still preceded appointment as a commissioned officer. To achieve 
this, the candidate had to be between the ages of seventeen and twenty- 
three, possess a diploma from a secondary school, a cadet school, or have 
successfully completed the ensign's examination. The military authorities 
also required a certificate of conduct, adaptability, and proficiency 
from the candidate's regiment after six months' service.
Appointment as a regular officer entailed attendance at a 
Kriegsschule unless the candidate was enrolled in, or graduated from, a 
university. Completion of the officer's examination was essential in 
either case. Each candidate needed to attain the classification of 
Selekta from cadet school, a favorable endorsement from his troop unit, 
and be elected to the officer's mess. At the time of commissioning, the 
candidate had to be twenty-three years of age, unmarried, a German by 
birth, and physically qualified for active service. Further examinations 
tested the candidate's proficiency in the German language and literature, 
three other languages— usually Latin, Greek, English, French or Russian—  
history, geography, and mathematics. Graduates of institutions of higher 
learning had the option of substituting physics and chemistry for one 
language.
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Officers for the reserves now came from the regular army except
in certain circumstances where Einj ahrige fulfilled additional requirements
to enter the regular officer corps. This entailed obtaining a certificate
(Obersekundareife) after six years at a secondary school and entitled the
aspirant to one year of service instead of the normal two or three. At
the end of the year, during which superior officers constantly monitored
the candidate's performance, a decision on his qualifications to enter the
reserve officer corps was madd. Satisfactory progress during the time
required promotion to lance-corporal (Gefreiter) and preferable to full
corporal (Unteroffizier). Successful candidates then volunteered for a
special officer training course. Upon completion, if the volunteer passed
the examination administered at that time, he officially became an officer
candidate (Offizieraspirant). Thereafter followed participation in two
technical exercises, first as a non-commissioned officer and then as an
officer. Election by the officers of the recruiting district (Kreis)
completed the process and, upon the approval of the Military Cabinet, the
82
person received a commission in the name of the king as a lieutenant.
The principal objective of this extremely arduous process was the protec­
tion of the homogeneity of the officer corps from corruption by the wrong
83social and political elements.
Due to the failure of the Prussian Diet to pass increases in 
the army budget in the early 1860s, the army hierarchy sought to remove 
personnel matters from possible civilian interference by designating 
officer selection as part of the competency of the Military Cabinet. Since 
1849-50 the War Minister had controlled the selection process, but could 
be questioned in certain military matters by parliament.The Military
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Cabinet was not subject to any such accountability or restrictions from 
any source other than the king. Officer selection, therefore, became an 
important sector of the Military Cabinet's activities and was tightly regu­
lated according to the wishes of its perennially conservative members.
The reorganization of the army which began in 1860-61 produced 
other changes in the military establishment designed to meet persisting 
demands for trained personnel. The new regulations for commissions which 
came in October 1861 added further to the hue and cry of the conservatives 
who opposed any change whatsoever. By that ordinance, all candidates had 
to present a certificate to confirm that they had attained the Prima 
classification (senior status) in a Gymnasium or Realschule and were able 
to pass examinations in the subjects required in the upper classes of such 
institutions. Many officers protested that the order signified the begin­
ning of an embourgeoisement of the army and, as a result, the edict was 
never executed as intended.The military hierarchy recognized, however, 
that many cadets from the military school system performed far below the 
new standards set for officers. Subsequently, the military made efforts 
to upgrade the educational curriculum of cadet schools.The basic cri­
teria for officers remained constant until the wars in 1864, 1866, and 
1860 created major officer shortages which could not be overcome other than
by the admission of candidates with reliable social and political backgrounds
87from heretofore excluded middle-class elements.
Sources of Personnel for the Officer Corps to 1870
Frederick the Great was the first King of Prussia to initiate a
totally aristocratic officer corps in Prussia, allegedly on the French 
88model. The sociological composition of the corps thereafter remained
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predominantly noble until the mid-nineteenth century when the process of
industrialization brought changes to the social sphere in Germany which
were incongruous ■ with the remaining feudal aspects in the German political
structure. The officer corps, in spite of its reactionary traditionalism,
was not able to resist modification entirely because the social order and
the military system in Prussia were so closely bound together that a
89change in the one had a profound effect on the other. After 1850, the 
growth of the population in general far outstripped that of the nobility 
as a class and the percentage of aristocrats in the officer corps declined 
as more and more officers from the middle class entered the profession.
The leadership of the officer corps, however, remained in the hands of the 
aristocracy.
Within the corps were different groups of the nobility which
ranged from the East Elbians who differed considerably in philosophy and
values from those of the western provinces, to aristocrats of foreign
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extraction and those raised to nobility from the lower classes. East 
Prussians, for the most part, were uneducated and crude, possessing the 
austere qualities traditionally associated with the Prussian officer. The 
better educated westerner was more attuned to influences from other 
intellectual and philosophical sources, and consequently more flexible.
The foreign-born officer most often resembled the westerner, but a number 
came from areas of eastern Europe more backward than Prussia. Officers 
raised to nobility were a heterogeneous lot, running the social and edu­
cational scale from former non-commissioned personnel to foreign-trained
91men such as Schamhorst and Gneisenau. By far, the East Elbian Junkers 
were the most influential because of their loyalty and close association
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to the throne. However, all showed similar attitudes based upon their 
membership in the elite segment of society and were examples of a nobil­
ity of convictions regardless of their social origin. Despite its powerful 
position and great influence at court and notwithstanding the homogeneity 
of its present members, the officer corps could not prevent alteration of 
its social composition because of the nation's rapidly growing population 
and the constant pressure within the expanding military establishment for 
leadership personnel.
The reorganization and enlargement of the army in the 1860s
began to erode the upper class' hold on the corps by widening its social 
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base. In 1861, according to Karl Demeter, bourgeois elements comprised 
20 percent of the total officer corps, but less in the highest command 
positions (see following table).
Strongly represented in the Guards and cavalry regiments was the 
nobility of birth because such units held the greatest prestige. The 
choice of service branch was of great concern to aristocrats, especially 
the East Elbians. For example, the rank of Captain in the cavalry appealed 
to the nobility because in that branch officers bore the distinctive 
title of Rittmeister. This made it possible to tell from a glance at his
94calling card that he belonged to the "right" branch of the officer corps.
Many aristocrats did not want to be promoted to Major because as such the
95cavalry-man was not clearly recognizable. A few nobles condescended to
serve in the field artillery, but not in the heavy artillery due to the
complicated calculations in gunnery or in the engineers due to its many
96technical problems- These were left to the middle-class officer. Each 
regiment had its o^m social prestige and those held in highest esteem were
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THE PRUSSIAN OFFICER CORPS IN 1861
Total Commoners App. %
Generals of the highest command 33 0 0
Lieutenant-Generals 36 2 .056
Major-Generals 60 6 10
Colonels - Infantry 77 6 7.8
Cavalry 18 2 11
Artillery 14 8 57
Engineers 6 5 83
Quartermaster Corps 1 1 100
Lieutenant-Colonels - Infantry 85 9 11
Cavalry 21 0 0
Artillery 20 15 75
Engineers 7 6 86
Majors - Infantry 395 57 14
Cavalry 105 8 7.5
Artillery 67 42 63
Engineers 34 26 76
Quartermaster Corps 9 5 55
997 198 20
Percentages for the subaltern ranks for 1861
Nobles Commoners App. %
Infantry - Guards 95 5 7.6
Line 67 33 49
Cavalry - Guards 100 0 0
Line 95 5 7.6
Artillery- Guards 16 84 153
Line 16 84 153
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sought by wealthy middle-class officers who often adopted an extravagant
lifestyle and earned for their regiments the reputation "that only well-
97to-do men could afford to serve in them."
In social composition, the Prussian officer corps exhibited a 
gradual change from the total dominance by the nobility in the eighteenth 
century to the increasing entry of the middle class in the 1860s. Many 
middle-class volunteers had their first military experience in the Land­
wehr during the War of Liberation and pointed with pride to the accomplish­
ments of the many units of citizen-soldiers. With the end of the war, 
however, the aristocrats once again successfully pressed the king for a 
return to the pre-war system. This began in 1819 and continued throughout 
the following years until the early 1860s when an extensive enlargement 
and reorganization of the army began.
The social composition of the officer corps remained stable and 
predominantly aristocratic after the Napoleonic Wars because middle-class 
officers went into the reserves or Landwehr. Such a commission still 
assured the officer of more status than his non-military peers, but did 
not require full-time service and abandoning a civil career. Continued 
expansion in the army as a result of the army reforms of 1860-61 rendered 
it impossible to bar the middle class from the active officer corps 
indefinitely. While change in the social character of the corps slowly 
eroded ^ way the solely aristocratic character of the institution, no 
perceptible difference in philosophy or ideology developed. For the 
future, however, the trend toward a larger participation in the officer 
corps for the middle class had been established. Equally important for 
the period before 1870 was the growth of Prussian military customs and
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tradition which continued to he extolled during the Empire and on into 
the Reichswehr era. It was, more specifically, to the Frederickian 
example that the traditionalists in the officer corps turned during Weimar 
as a pattern for the future post-Republic authoritarian state.
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CHAPTER II 
THE IMPERIAL ARMY
The Imperial army constituted a vital historical link between 
the Prussian army and the Reichswehr. Despite the addition of troops 
from other German states to those of Prussia in 1871 to create the 
Imperial army, the Prussian army retained its separate identity. The 
Imperial army became an extension of the army of the kind of Prussia. 
Because Prussia dominated the Empire politically, the new Kaiser's armed 
forces underwent a thorough Prussianization in many technical military 
aspects such as training and the standardization of weapons as well as in 
the administrative and command organs, officer selection techniques, and 
military philosophy. Structurally, the military system was federal, 
divided into contingents which possessed special rights and command rela­
tionships with the Prussian-dominated Reich authorities. Although Prus­
sian aristocrats still held the majority of higher command positions in 
the army, the lower ranks of the officer corps continued to change in 
social composition due to a steady influx of middle-class officers. Yet 
the prestige of the military profession rose further and the ever expand­
ing size of the army created additional positions which the middle class 
eagerly sought.
Notwithstanding the dominance of Prussia, the complete
Prussianization of the army could not be accomplished. The south German
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contingents in the Imperial system refused to discard their own traditions, 
fearing that in a process of assimilation they would lose their identi­
ties. This provided the basis for a continuing conflict over the special 
rights and prerogatives accorded to the Lander by the constitution of 
1871. Southern particilarism persisted into the post-World War One years 
and played a considerable part in the retention of a contingent system 
for the Reichswehr in the Weimar constitution of 1920.
The Imperial period spawned other conflicts which served to 
split the officer corps of the Reichswehr. These dealt primarily with 
the internal command relationships in the officer corps, the nature of 
the officer selection process, and the authority of Reich military offi­
cials in administrative and command matters involving contingent members. 
For the civilian government, the most difficult problems came from 
attempts to establish controls over an institution whose traditions and 
historical place in German society accorded it a position responsible 
only to the king. The latter struggle continued throughout the days of 
the Empire and on into Weimar period breeding hatred and distrust between 
the military establishment and the civilian parliamentarians.
The Creation of the Imperial Army
The Imperial army was the product of a re-alignment of the 
political and military relations originally established by the Germanic 
Confederation. After 1848, the Confederation split into two military 
groups: those north of the Main River led by Prussia and those to the
south led by Austria. Military contingents from the various states 
thereby came under the supervision of each of the major powers.^ Prussia 
sought to cement relations with its northern neighbors through military
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conventions and by the end of 1861 had agreements with six states.
Another six states adopted the Prussian educational system, which included 
military training in the Prussian method, and identified their interests
3
closely with Prussia. The Prussian military, in fact, dominated the 
forces of these states after 1867 and looked upon them as their own.
The approach of war in 1866 between Prussia and Austria destroyed 
the Confederation's military structure. Along with Bavaria, Württemberg, 
Baden, and Saxony, many smaller states throughout Germany opposed Prussia. 
Nonetheless, the war ended in total disaster for the Hapsburgs and their 
allies. As the victor, Prussia had a free hand in determining new polit­
ical relationships and used this power to secure complete hegemony in
4
northern Germany. Those states north of the Main River which had fought 
against Prussia were annexed outright as the Prussians asserted that the 
rights of these states were forthwith superseced by the right of Germans 
to unity and national self-determination.^ The other states north of the 
Main River became members of a North German Confederation.
The defeat of Austria made Prussia the supreme power in central 
Europe.^ Even though the vanquished states in the south could have been 
afforded the same treatment as those in the north, Bismarck declined to 
annex these areas for fear of provoking another war. Instead, the four 
major states were linked to Prussia by defensive alliances compelling the 
armed forces of those Lander to act in concert with Prussia's in case of 
war with a third party. Prussian leadership in the arrangement came 
through the king of Prussia being commander-in-chief of the combined forces 
which were in appearance a united German army.
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During this period, the Prussian army augmented its forces with 
troops from the annexed states which now came under the direct control of 
the Prussian king and his military establishment. For the southern states, 
the facade of military conventions served to camouflage the reality of 
Prussian superiority. Such an agreement with Hesse-Darmstadt came in 
February, 1867, and resulted in the complete integration of Hessian 
troops into the Prussian army.^ Hessian forces remained in a division of 
their own, however, under the direct command of the king of Prussia.
Saxony signed a like accord the same month, but those with the other 
states— Bavaria, Wiirttemburg, and Baden— resulted from the Franco-Prussian 
War.G
In 1871, Bismarck used the constitution of the North German
Confederation as the basis for a new German constitution. It defined the
powers of the Reich and its member states in military matters, and sought
to unify the armies of the individual contingents by placing them under
9
the command of a Reich authority. Because the rights of the Reich super­
seded those of the states, the Lander were subordinated to the Prussian 
contingent which possessed the real decision-making and command power.
The constitutional arrangements attempted to assure compliance and to 
establish parity in weapons, training and officer qualifications among the 
contingents through the inspection authority of the K a i s e r . T h e  duty 
of the Kaiser, according to the provisions of the constitution, was
. . .  to see to it that all formations of the German Army are 
complete in numbers and prepared for war, and that uniformity in 
organization, armament, command, and the training of men is main­
tained, as well as the qualifications for officers.
Other articles in the 1871 constitution directed the formation of 
a federal array from state contingents under the command of the king of
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Prussia as the Confederation Field Commander (Bundesfeldherr). The 
constitution required the adoption of common armaments, command struc­
ture, training methods, and officer selection methods following the 
Prussian model. Prussian military officials, acting as representatives 
of the Confederation Field Commander and also as representatives of the
Kaiser and Reich, ensured compliance by the inspection of other contingents
14at their pleasure. Further, the Bundesfeldherr received the right to 
nominate the highest commanders of all contingents, officers and fortress 
commandants, and they in turn had to swear the Fahneneid to him. The 
commander-in-chief had the additional prerogative to select and place any 
officer in any of the forces under his c o n t r o l . T h e  constitution 
required the non-Prussian forces to act in concert with the Bundesfeldherr—  
always the king of Prussia— to protect the freedom of the Reich in military 
matters. To ensure complete control over the system, the Prussian War 
Minister also served as Reich War Minister during hostilities.^^ In war, 
this secured a united military effort under Prussian leadership as well 
as the implementation of a common policy, which in reality benefited 
Prussia. One of the primary reasons for the adoption of a contingent 
system, along with placating the south, was that it paralleled the pseudo­
federated structure of the Reich itself. In reality, both the civil and 
military systems were heavily weighted in favor of Prussia.
The enlarged scope of operations in the Reich resulted in an 
expansion of Prussian military offices. Serving the Kaiser directly, the 
Prussian War Minister was superior to the war ministers of the other
states by terms of the constitution and the Reichmilitargesetz of
18November 23, 1874. The Prussian Military Cabinet assumed authority
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over officer selection and assignments under the direct supervision of
the Kaiser, and possessed the same responsibilities within the Imperial
army as the Prussian War Minister and General Staff did for the Prussian
contingent. The senior officer in the army also held at the same time
the post of general adjutant to the Kaiser and influenced the head of
state not only from an advisory standpoint, but also on a personal basis
as part of the camerilla around the throne. It was obvious in spite of
the outward appearance of a federated army that the Prussian contingent
19possessed a vastly superior position in the military establishment.
The 1871 constitution granted certain military privileges to 
the south German states. These fell into three categories: superior
rights (Hoheitsrechte), which the member states held at the time of uni­
fication and permitted each to have its o\m constitution and in many cases 
special military rights or authority; special membership rights (besonderen 
Mitgleidschaftrechte), which for Prussia included the institution of 
Kaiserdom (Kaisertum) for its monarch, and for Bavaria, Württemberg and 
Saxony, a permanent seat on the Bundesrat military committee; special 
superior rights (besonderen Hoheitsrechte, also called Reservatrechte), 
which denoted areas of special competence for the states. In the latter
category, separate military agreements between Prussia and individual
20states delineated the specific terms of these rights. Further constitu­
tional concessions to the Lander permitted individual contingents to name
officers under certain circumstances, although the nomination of generals
21
and other high command personnel remained a prerogative of the Kaiser.
As one of his federal prerogatives, the Kaiser compelled the states withi 
the system to adopt Prussian military law while Württemberg and Saxony
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were further required to publish and implement Prussian military
22
ordinances as their own through the offices of state commandants. Only
Bavaria retained the right of independent initiative to issue military 
23orders. The Imperial army system was thus based upon constitutional 
and special contractual rights which fixed the structure, organization, 
and authority of the military establishment and its member contingents.
The special competence accorded by the constitution permitted 
each state to preserve certain distinguishing features of its pre­
unification form. Each of the four major contingents, Bavaria, Saxony, 
Württemberg, and Prussia, retained their national flag, cockade, rank 
markings and distinctive colors as well as exclusive recruiting privileges 
within the s t a t e . T h o s e  states not provided with special rights— only 
Bavaria, Saxony, Württemberg and Baden possessed these— were completely 
under the domination of Prussia and the Prussian War Minister in Berlin. 
Officers who commanded the contingents served the king of Prussia as 
commander of the Prussian contingent and the Kaiser as commander of the 
Imperial army. The former heads of state in the south retained only
nominal commands, and these derived from the individual military conven-
25
tions and the constitution.
Each of the military conventions between the Reich and the 
southern states differed somewhat. The convention with Baden, concluded 
on November 25, 1870, gave that state the status of an independent unit 
within the Prussian contingent. A separate Badenese military structure 
and command authority remained, but only under the direction of Prussian 
officers and as part of a federal unit. In the agreement, the army of 
the Grand Duke of Baden became part of the Royal Prussian Army. Badenese
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regimental numbers were changed to Bund numbers to eliminate conflict
with traditional Prussian numbers and all officers, as well as officer
candidates, military doctors, and administrative personnel swore the
Fahreneid to the king of Prussia. The reserves took their oath to the
Grand Duke of Baden, but in most military matters Baden was simply a
26contingent member of the Imperial army.
The convention with Württemberg, dated November 25, 1870, made
the Royal Württemberg Army part of the German Confederation (Deutsche
Bund) with its own army corps. As Bundesfeldherr, the king of Prussia
commanded the corps which retained its own flag and rank markings. A
special oath for the contingent read
I swear that during my service time as a soldier I will loyally 
serve His Majesty the King, obediently serve the Confederation Field 
Commander and war laws and will be a brave and honorable soldier. So 
help me God.
Officers served the Royal Württemberg Army Corps through the king of 
Württemberg who was a subordinate in military matters to the king of 
Prussia. Officer qualifications were the same as in Prussia, and Württem­
berg officers were required to serve up to two years in the Prussian army.
The convention also provided for special inspection rights for the king
27of Prussia to certify that the agreement was properly Implemented. As
a result of the foregoing stiplations, the Württemberg contingent, along
with the Saxon, ultimately became more integrated into the Imperial system
28than did the Badenese or Bavarians.
Bavaria entered into its pact with the North German Confederation
on November 23, 1870. The accord had a dual character, the first part
securing Bavarian adherence to the constitution of the confederation and
29
the second regulating military relations between Bavaria and the Reich.
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Under the latter agreement, Bavaria maintained the right to initiate
military law and ordinances: Bavarians served exclusively in their own
contingent, and the Bavarian Army served the king of Bavaria in peacetime
30and the Confederation Field Commander in war. Bavaria, for the most 
part, retained a greater autonomy than any other member of the federation 
in military terms and kept very much alive a special particularism which 
accentuated the differences between Bavaria and Prussia in other areas 
as well.
As a result of its federated nature, and the special rights 
accorded to member states in varying degrees, the Imperial German Army was 
far from being an integrated body. The federal system permitted the evo­
lution of a dual arrangement whereby member states followed their own
31traditions and customs. If the goal was to create a Prussian-dominated
system, it succeeded, but the wounds suffered from the unification process
were in no way healed. The Prussianization of parts of the Imperial Army
was successful as young men from the other contingents did at times
"imitate the speech, gait, and moustache of their Prussian counterparts,"
32but it did not unite north and south in soul and spirit. The differences 
between the two remained, though they were temporarily submerged during 
the years following unification when the prestige of the army soared to 
unprecedented heights.
The Officer Corps in Imperial Germany
With the unification of the nation, the militaristic spirit of 
the Prussian Junkers spread throughout the entire Reich until ultimately 
the military point of view became entrenched in the minds of many Germans. 
The pre-World War One period, however, also witnessed the rise of internal
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army rivalries in the uppermost echelons of command which endured into 
the Weimar era. Conflicts developed because of the independent status of 
the War Ministry, the General Staff, and the Military Cabinet within the 
system. Many functions of these military offices overlapped in spite of 
the fact that the War Ministry theoretically controlled the others in 
peacetime. Each of the rivals sought to increase the power of their 
office at the expense of their opponents.
During these years, the military gained an increasing independence 
over its own affairs, freedom from civilian interference in military mat­
ters, and later from even having to explain military decisions or polity 
to parliament. After 1883, all personnel matters, which included officer 
selection, came under the jurisdiction of the Military Cabinet. This 
effectively removed matters of internal administration and policy which 
the command echelon did not want to become general knowledge from parlia­
mentary discussion. Thereafter, the Prussian Minister of War, who was the 
only officer regularly appearing before parliament, simply brushed aside
awkward questions concerning personnel and command policy stating that
33these were beyong his competence. The military establishment increased 
during these years in both size and in influence in the state until it 
became Germany's most powerful institution.
Even as the officer corps and army grew, divisions in Germany 
society widened between the military and civilian sectors, between the 
lower middle class and workers on the one hand, and the merging nobility 
and upper middle class on the other. This occurred because upper bour­
geois officers, themselves an elite of education and wealth, adopted the 
aristocratic concept of society rather than a middle-class view and
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. . • enthusiastically and even overzealously adopted the 
traditions of the nobility which dominated society. . . . They 
propagated the existing ideologies in the army of the Prussian 
nobility with the systematic thoroughness for which Germans are
notorious.34
Intense efforts to maintain a maximum homogeneity of attitudes in the 
officer corps included a stringent exclusion of elements from the lower 
middle and working class considered to be dangerous to the social and 
political status quo. Following the trend which began in the pre­
unification years, entry into the officer corps for the educated middle 
class was no longer difficult. With the adoption of the nobility's atti­
tude toward society by the upper middle class, the military profession 
became attractive to many people of formerly moderate political views.
They came over to the conservative camp and wholeheartedly supported the 
military establishment as well as the existing social and political order.
Throughout the Wilhelmine years, both the officer corps and the 
army underwent continuous change. In the last decades of the century, the 
recruiting base became more urban as many rural workers left the country­
side for the new industrial centers and added to the rapidly swelling 
ranks of the proletariat. The industrial revolution transformed large 
segments of the agricultural work force— esteemed in conservative minds
for its subservience— into an industrial work force whose subsequent
35demeanor was hostile and aggressive. However, the aristocracy and offi­
cer corps still clung to their support of a static, feudal society which 
had no place for the industrial worker. In turn, the workers viewed the 
army as a tool of repression in the hands of an exploitative class and 
the majority of German society looked with fear and alarm at the growth of 
the socialist movement. Hostility between the workers and the military
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became more pronounced after the legalization of the Social Democratic 
Party in 1890 and its growing success in the following years. Much of 
the ill-feeling of the army toward the SPD came in part from the anti­
military rhetoric employed by the party, its pacifism, and its socialist 
program which called for a complete alteration of the present social 
system.
Throughout the pre-war years, the officer corps continued to view
the worker as an alien in society, untrustworthy, and holding opinions
dangerous to the state and status quo. The officer corps also continued
to be estranged from the working class because most young workers seldom
36had the education required to enter its ranks. Enrolling workers into 
the army became unavoidable later due to continuing military expansion, 
but the "officer corps was terrified by the spectre of a mass army con­
sisting of Social Democrats who would disobey and turn their weapons
37against the existing state." As a result of the unwillingness of the 
upper classes to concede a valid place in German society to the working 
class, the conservatives and military establishment gave their adversaries 
no hope of redressing their grievances toward the state as long as the 
Imperial system endured. The result was continuing criticism of the 
existing order by the workers and continuing efforts by the establishment 
to secure its position from the threat of the lower classes.
By the end of the nineteenth century, the influence of the army 
on German politics and society increased to the point where critical 
questions in the Reich's domestic and foreign affairs required at least a 
consideration of the wishes of the military. The Prussian officer corps, 
around which the whole system revolved, again became exclusive in social
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composition and ideology and, according to a former German general,
38Prussia was a "State of military functionaries. . . . "  The military
establishment grew so powerful and influential in Imperial Germany that
it rivaled the power of the Kaiser who complained in 1914 that
If people think that I am the Supreme Commander, they are 
grossly mistaken. The General Staff tells me nothing and never 
asks my advice. I drink tea, go for walks and saw wood which 
pleases my suite. The only one who is a bit kind to me is the 
Chief of the Railway Department [Groner] who tells me all he does 
and intends to do.39
By the third year of the war, however, even the Kaiser had been eclipsed
by the power of the military as the High Command under Hindenburg and
Ludendorff became the head of the Imperial government.
Officer Selection in the Imperial Army
After the creation of the Empire, the addition of officers from 
the state contingents failed to solve the chronic personnel shortage of 
the officer corps. Many of the problems became more acute as the Prussians 
attempted to coordinate the activities of the five other officers corps 
which were under the control of the Kaiser and Prussian War Minister.
Each had varying customs and traditions, separate officer selection cri­
teria, and different degrees of particularist sentiments. At the end of 
the century, officer selection changed slightly in philosophy and to a 
significant degree in its social limits to the detriment of the social and 
cultural homogeneity of the pre-unification period. The attitude of many 
officers regarding the necessary qualifications to enter the corps changed 
perceptibly. General von Loë wrote that "neither title nor riches can 
give one the right to hope to become an officer, but an innate feeling for 
duty, education, and the aristocracy of c h a r a c t e r . A n  Erlass of
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William II on March 29, 1890, expounded further on this theme and stated 
that
The rise in the people's level of education makes it possible to 
widen the social circles from which recruitment to the corps of offi­
cers can be considered. It is no longer nobility of birth alone that 
can claim the privilege of furnishing the Army with its officers: 
Nobility of character has at all times inspired the corps of officers 
and must be maintained without dimunition. But this will only be 
possible if officer-cadets are drawn from quarters in which the 
nobility of character is the unquestioned ideal. As I see it, the 
future of My Army lies in the hands not only of the offspring of the 
country's noble families and the sons of My worthy officers and civil 
servants, but also in the hands of the sons in whom respectable bour­
geois families have planted and cultivated a love for their King and 
Country, a warm feeling toward the profession of arms and a sense of 
Christian morality.41
The controversy over whether or not to admit middle-class 
candidates into the officer corps was rather muted by this time as the 
expanding army required all the officers it could find. There existed no 
other source to meet the demands other than the educated middle class 
whose conservative-minded sons possessed "nobility of character." This 
segment of society was far from homogeneous as the upper strata contained 
wealthy bankers, merchants, and industrialists. Along with a number of 
persons from the professions, and a number of government civil servants, 
this group constituted the upper middle class or Grossbürgertum who stood 
closer to the nobility in philosophy regarding society, politics, and the 
military, than did the lower middle class (Kleinbürgertum). The interests 
of the aristocracy and the upper middle class coalesced in efforts to 
maintain the monarchy, to obtain economic protection for their estates 
and businesses, and to shield the established social order from the rising 
power of the working class. Therefore, in the words of Karl Born, the 
upper strata of the middle class provided acceptable candidates for 
commissions in the officer corps, and encouraged the nobility and
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42Grossbürgertum to merge into a single elite. Even the reserve officer 
corps appealed to the middle class which saw in a reserve commission a 
substitute for ennoblement. The real significance of the wider social 
participation in the officer corps lay in the consequent penetration of 
military values into civilian life and particularly the militarization of 
the middle class. The strong bourgeois aspiration to enter the ranks of 
the social elite also resulted in an ignominious aping and exaggeration 
of the modes of thought, the manners, and even the vices of their aristo­
cratic brothers in arms.
Despite the increased enlistments from the middle class, various
branches of the services, notably the infantry, suffered from an acute
shortage of officers. In 1902 no less than fifty-six Prussian infantry
regiments failed to attract a single officer aspirant.In  spite of the
desperate need for leadership personnel, the War Minister feared that too
large an increase in the size of the army would lead to a democratization
of the officer corps due to the necessity of admitting '"unreliable’
bourgeois elements, thus weakening an institution whose self-appointed
44
role was the preservation of a monarchical and conservative state."
Thus, on the eve of the First World War, the officer corps of the Imperial 
German Army did not possess sufficient officer personnel to withstand the 
losses of a protracted war and, at the same time, to retain its pre-war 
character. The bourgeois officers who entered the corps were never a 
threat to the social and political status quo in any way, yet the social 
composition and character of the corps changed during World War One when 
it became necessary to admit substantial numbers of hastily-trained 
secondary school graduates from the lower middle class. The criteria by
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which these officers qualified for commissions bore little relation to 
the standards of the past because the situation simply precluded adher­
ence to traditional principles. Losses suffered during the early months
of the war seriously accentuated personal problems, particularly among
45pre-war commissioned officers in combat leadership positions. An 
aristocratic nucleus, however, still held the key decision-making posi­
tions and determined policy on the basis of traditional concepts. By 
1916, many of the pre-war commissioned officers received transfers from 
front-line combat duty to staff duties where a shortage of personnel also 
existed. Most of the replacements for these officers were young, war- 
commissioned men, not thoroughly imbued with traditional attitudes.
The corps thereater lacked its former close-knit character and the 
Imperial army fought most of the war with reserve and Landwehr officers.
These were augmented by officers who knew only the front and developed
47there quite a different mentality from the professional soldier.
Throughout the 1870-1914 period, officer selection criteria for 
the Imperial army— adopted virtually toto from the Prussian army—  
changed little from that of the reform era of 1807-1819. The basic 
requirements still focused on education and performance, and would remain 
so throughout the Reichswehr years. Procedures of entry also remained 
constant, being through individual regiments as a Fahnriche or Fahnen- 
junker. Despite the ever-growing demand for officer personnel, the 
military hierarchy persisted in maintaining overt discrimination against 
various social and economic groups. Prior to the First World War, much 
of the lower class could not enter the corps due to prejudices against 
certain occupations. Jews were excluded on religious-racial grounds and
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Social Democratic workers for political reasons. Even the bulk of 
middle-class candidates who earned commissions found that social inequal­
ity in the corps remained strong. The aristocratic members expected and 
still received deference.
The Social Composition of the Imperial Army
Prior to 1914, educational and social barriers prevented entry
into the officer corps of persons outside the nobility or the middle class
of an "aristocratic character.While commoners served in certain
branches of the service from as early as the eighteenth century, only the
nobility of birth were considered suitable for the cavalry or guards
infantry regiments. The hussars, artillery and engineers were exceptions,
being deemed only "half soldiers by the old Prussians and therefore, also
49common men were admitted to their ranks." The military establishment 
despised civilians as petty and made no distinctions between scholars, 
professional men, or less talented members of the middle class. The 
majority of professional soldiers vastly underestimated the potential and 
aspirations of the bourgeoisie in the military service and did not under­
stand them.^^ For the middle class in Imperial Germany, the officer corps 
was the subject of envy and adoration. "To be a 'knight' was for the 
middle class German . . . the zenith of happiness. Military rank and
achievement tended to become obsessions with the bourgeoisie as a whole
52and the "absolute standards for judging a man."
Many noble officers, however, preferred "stagnation in the size
of the army to the acceptance of officers with 'inferior' family back- 
53ground." The officer corps in practice excluded persons of humble 
occupation: the professions of a candidate and his father were a vital
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concern and those whose duties required any personal contact with
54clients or customers could not become even reserve officers. Likewise, 
political affiliation was important, as were the activities of relatives 
and friends. Persons with undesirable opinions, or connections— free 
thinkers, most liberals, and especially Social Democrats— found themselves 
disqualified under the guise of not possessing the proper moral qualifi­
cations.^^ Racial qualifications, according to some former officers, did 
not exist in the Imperial army, yet it was expected that each officer 
aspirant "had received the Protestant or Catholic baptism. Both the 
regular and reserve officer corps excluded Jews by simply not electing 
them to regimental mess or refusing them entry into officer training 
programs.If a Jewish candidate remained adamant about a career in the
army, one of the easiest ways "to show ’character’ and therefore stand a
58good chance of selection was to get baptised."
In the contingent elements of the Imperial army, the noble 
character of the officers corps ended much earlier than in Prussia. In 
Saxony, which was closely associated with and under the control of Prus­
sia, a bourgeois predominance evolved as follows;
THE SAXON OFFICER CORPS, 1808-1908
Year Noble Bourgeois
1808 863 347
1818 415 344
1888 450 576
1898 600 2,497
1908 572 3,284
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Many officers in southern Germany were less dogmatic about social and 
exclusiveness than those from parts of Prussia. Differences between men 
in rural and urban districts were simply not as pronounced.The local 
aristocracy preferred, in the cases of Bavaria, Württemberg and Baden, 
to study law and enter the state administration rather than to pursue a 
military career. As a result, the contingents from these Lander possessed 
a larger number of officers from lower social origins than did the Prus­
sian corps.Bavaria in particular had many officers from the middle
class because the nobility showed little inclination for military ser- 
62vice. About one-half of the total number of officers in the Royal
Bavarian Army were sons of officers and higher civil servants, followed
by sons of professionals such as doctors, law’yers, clergymen, landowners,
and factory owners.Higher command positions, from the time of the
Thirty Years War contained many noblemen, many being foreign-born from 
64France and Italy. The subaltern ranks, lieutenants, ensigns, and 
comets, did not come from an exclusive military aristocracy as in Prussia, 
but in many cases were veteran non-commissioned officers, originally 
pikemen and halbardiers. By the late 1860s, the social composition of 
the Bavarian officer corps was already predominantly middle class and 
did not change over the years of the existence of the Imperial army.^^
THE BAVARIAN OFFICER CORPS, 1799-1893
Year Noble Bourgeois
1799 260 279
1811 902 1,341
1883 959 5,310
1893 1,122 7,390
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In the neighboring state of Württemberg, the composition of the Royal 
Württemberg Army officer was similar to Bavaria with only a slight pre­
dominance of nobles after 1871, possibly due to its less autonomous 
position under the constitution and as a result of its military agree­
ments with Prussia.
The trend toward more middle-class commissions which began in 
the nineteenth century in the majority of German states continued in the 
immediate pre-World War One years. Although the rate of change in 
Prussia was slower than in the other armies during the Imperial period, 
by 1914 the bourgeoisis dominated there also. Even though the non-noble 
predominance in the army was established beyond a doubt, the control of 
the army remained in traditional hands. Further, the militarization of 
the middle class, particularly in Prussia, meant that the values and 
outlook held by professional officers did not change substantially with 
the altered social composition. The traditions of the Prussian army 
became those of the bulk of the Imperial army and as such survived into 
the Weimar era. Thus, a strong thread of continuity existed between the 
armies of the kings of Prussia through the Kaiser's army and ultimately 
to the Reichswehr where it significantly affected the attitude of the 
officer corps toward the state, the military profession, and the 
governmental system.
The Officer Corps and World War One; A General Overview
By 1914, the army and officer corps had become the most powerful 
institution in Germany. Scarcely any facet of domestic or foreign rela­
tions lay beyond the influence of the military establishment and a large 
part of the nation's resources were geared to support the army or
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military-connected projects. From the turn of the century onward many 
officers privately believed that a general European war was inevitable.
The result of this calculation was the Schlieffen plan developed from 
1890 to 1905, the General Staff's preoccupation with a preventive war, 
and the notion that Germany had to fight for world power or be destroyed. 
Because the ideas of the military had become generally accepted by a 
majority of Germans, and had combined with a growing nationalistic spirit, 
society as a whole readily accepted the outbreak of war with little 
thought of the carnage or other results which could ensue. To the bulk 
of the nation, the army represented the elite of their society and the 
officer corps stood as a warrior caste, superior to other men, whose 
values and judgments were accepted without question.
The officer corps stood at the apex of its influence in German 
society during the pre-war years, but the war brought additional authority 
to its leaders exceeding even that of the Kaiser. William II, little by 
little, became "the prisoner of his paladins. . ." and in August, 1916, 
conceded governing power to the military represented by Hindenburg and 
ludendorff.However, the policies of these military leaders led to 
unrestricted submarine warfare, provoked America's entry into the war, 
made far-reaching claims on France and Belgium, precluded a peace settle­
ment with Tsarist Russia, and forced the Bolsheviks to accept the 
annexationist treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The military’s actions did not 
improve Germany’s chances for victory, but increased both the sacrifices 
required to support the war effort and the resolution of the Allies to 
deal harshly with Germany at the end of hostilities.
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The officer corps entered the war supremely confident that the 
conflict would be short and victorious, a fitting tribute to a military 
machine which had not lost a war since 1806. Yet, when it became obvious 
Germany could not win the war, the military leadership sought a way out 
for themselves. In September, 1918, the Supreme Command informed the 
government that the army was "no longer in a position to conclude the 
war in a positive sense by a feat of arms."^^ Germany tottered on the 
brink of total destruction, and for the military the spectre of defeat 
brought desperation, particularly when confronted with the Allied refusal 
to negotiate with the Imperial regime. The Allies' policy actually saved 
the officer corps' public image and self-esteem by preventing the parti­
cipation of the military establishment in the signing of the armistice 
or the acknowledgment of defeat. This fell to the civilians who played 
little part in bringing about the debacle, but bore the brunt of the 
blame after the war. As General Grcner later wrote, the High Command 
"deliberately adopted the position of refusing responsibility for the 
armistice and all later steps. In a strict legal sense, it did so with­
out justification, but to me and my associates, it was vital to keep the 
armor shining and the General Staff free of burdens for the future. . .
All of Germany was stunned by an armistice request after four 
years of news about nothing but victories, and thus "the truth and reality 
of German military defeat was a bitter pill to swallow for a people that 
had been educated to look upon the soldier as the highest ideal in 
s o c i e t y . T h e i r  hopes of glory dashed, the officer corps felt its very 
existence threatened by the possibility of the creation of a government 
whose ideas were diametrically opposed to the traditions and ethos of the
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corps. The officer corps desperately cast about for some way to secure 
their position in the midst of the chaos and disillusionment of November, 
1918. Little did they expect that their old opponents, the Social Demo­
crats, would contribute materially to survival of the corps virtually 
intact in tradition and spirit.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER II
^EmsL Huber, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte, seit 1789, Band 
III, "Bismarch und das Reich" (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer Verlag, 1963),
p. 401, hereafter cited Huber, Verfassungsgeschichte.
^Ibid., p. 562.
^Ibid.
4
Ibid., p. 581.
^Ibid., p. 583.
^Ibid., P- 563.
^Ibid., P- 986.
^Ibid., P* 993.
9
Ibid., PP. 796
10G^rover Platt, '
dissertation. State University of Iowa, 1941, p. 48, hereafter cited 
Platt, Army in German Life.
^^Rudolf Horsey, Die Obereste Reichsverwaltung unter Bismarck, 
1876-1890, Band III (Munster: Aschendorffsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1957), 
pp. 230-232 and p. 237, hereafter cited Horsey, Reichsverwaltung.
12Huber, Verfassungsgeschichte, p. 818.
13Ernst Huber, Dokumente zur deutschen Verfassungsgeschichte,
Band II, "1851-1918" (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer Verlag, 1964), p. 238,
hereafter cited Huber, Dokumente. See also Horsey, Reichsverwaltung, 
p. 226.
^^Huber, Dokumente, p. 238.
^^Horsey, Reichsverwaltung, pp. 227-228.
^^Huber, Dokumente, p. 264.
68
69
^^Ibid., pp. 352-346. The author states here in his commentary 
that in this case, the Wehrgesetz of November 9, 1867, became the 
Reichsgesetz in 1871, augmented by military conventions with the indi­
vidual south German states.
18Ibid., p. 995 contends that the Kaiser's command authority as 
well as the unity of military law, penal codes, jurisdiction, training, 
and service liabilities created a unified army. However, he fails to 
consider the attitudes of the contingents toward the system which so 
favored Prussia and above all the circumstances of the creation of the 
Empire which meant that Prussia, in fact, imposed its conditions upon 
the other states as a victor in war, not as an equal bargaining or 
negotiating such an arrangement.
19Huber, Dokumente, p. 997.
20
Ibid., p. 994.
^4bid., p. 995.
22Jacques Benoist-Mechin, Histoire de I'Armee Allemande, I, 
de la Reichswehr a I'Armee Nationale (1918-1919) (Paris XlVe: Editions
Albin Michel, 1936), pp. 195-196, hereafter cited Benoist-Mechin,
Histoirie I.
23Ibid., p. 195; and Huber, Verfassungsgeschichte, p. 908, where 
the Prussian contingent composed of troops from twenty-three states and 
a number of free cities are listed.
24
Huber, Dokumente, pp. 261-264.
^^Ibid., pp. 261-264.
26Huber, Verfassungsgeschichte, p. 999.
27Huber, Dokumente, p. 264ff.
O O
Ibid., p. 264.
29Huber, Verfassungsgeschichte, p. 995.
30
Ibid., pp. 994-995.
31Otto Pflanze, Bismarck and the Development of Germany (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 409.
32
Vagts, Militarism, p. 12.
^^Craig, War, p. 125.
70
^^Endres, "Social," p. 10. See also Ralf Dahrendorf, Society 
and Democracy in Germany (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1965), p.
211 from Wolfgang Zapf, Wandlungen der deutscher Elite, 1919-1961 
(Munich: publisher unknown, 1965), p. 43; Sheehan, "Conflict," p. 79
from Robert Michels, "Zum Problem der Zeitlichen Widerstandfahigkeit des 
Adels," Problème der Sozialphilosophie (Leipzig: publisher unknown,
1914), p. 151; and Karl Bom, "Structural Changes in German Social and 
Economic Development at the End of the Nineteenth Century," in Sheehan, 
ed.. Imperial Germany, p. 25 who writes that "This upper Burgertum was 
gradually "feudalized" at the end of the nineteenth century. In its 
attempt to climb to the top of the social pyramid, the upper Burgertum 
searched for a way of life that would confirm its membership in the elite, 
an5 thought that this was to be found in the tradition-rich life-style of 
the nobility. . . .  A further indication of this feudalization is to be 
seen in the fact that more and more sons of factory owners and merchants 
chose an army officer's career. . . .  The feudalization of the Gross- 
biirgertum did not come merely from social ambition but also from a shared 
political interest," hereafter cited Born, "Structural Changes."
35Walter Struve, Elites Against Democracy (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1973), p. 63, hereafter cited Struve, Elites.
36Ulrich Czisnik, Gustav Noske: Bin Sozialdemokratischer
Staatsmann (Gottingen: Musterschmidt Verlag, 1969), p. 81.
37V. R. Berghahn, Germany and the Approach of War in 1914 (New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1973), p. 16, hereafter cited Berghahn, Germany
and the Approach of War.
38Blummentritt, "Sociology," p. 10.
39Michael Balfour, The Kaiser and His Times (New York: W. W.
Norton and Co., 1972), p. 357, hereafter cited Balfour, Kaiser. See also
Schmadeke, Kommandogewalt, p. 18 where the author agrees that the Kaiser 
had no real influence in military matters.
40
Kitchen, Officer Corps, p. 50.
^^Demeter, Officer Corps, p. 25. Slightly different versions of 
this same Erlass are found in Craig, Politics, p. 235 and Struve, Elites, 
p. 64.
^^Born, "Structural Changes," p. 26.
^^Berghahn, Germany and the Approach of War, p. 8.
44Kitchen, Officer Corps, p. 36.
^^Friedrich Rau, Personalpolitik und Organisation in der 
vorlafigan Reichswehr... Die Verhaltnisse im Bereich des Gruppenkommandos 
4 bis zur Bildung des Ubergangsheeres (200 000 Mann-Heer). Inaugural 
Dissertation, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universitat, München, 1970, p. 122, 
hereafter cited Rau, Ubergangsheeres.
71
^^Generalleutnant a.D. Schwatlo-Gesterding, "Das Reichswehr," 
in Franz von Gaertner, ed. , Die Reichswehr In der Weimarer Republik 
(Darmstadt: Fundus Verlag, 1969), pp. 105-106, hereafter cited
Schwatlo-Gesterding, "Reichswehr."
^^Ibid., p. 106.
^^Ibid., p. 107; and Demeter, Officer Corps, p. 47.
49Platt, Army in German Life, pp. 73-76.
^^See Blummentritt, "Sociology," p. 5.
^^Endress, "Social," p. 45a. See also Kehr, Primat, p. 61.
Kehr states here that academics were considered second class soldiers and 
could only attain reserve non-commissioned officer status.
52
Endress, "Social,” p. 8.
53
Kitchen, Officer Corps, p. 119.
^^Berghahn, Germany and the Approach of War, pp. 7-8.
^^Endres, "Social," pp. 18-20. See also Blummentritt, "Sociology," 
p. 5 where he recalled from his ovm experience that only documents relating 
to the father and mother were required and not on the grandparents as 
before.
^^Kehr, Primat, p. 62; and Kitchen, Officer Corps, p. 40.
^^Blummentritt, "Sociology," p. 11.
C O
Kitchen, Officer Corps, pp. 41-42.
59Demeter, Officer Corps, p. 34.
°^Ibid.
^^Endres, "Social," pp. 16-17; and Blummentritt, "Sociology," 
p. 5 where the author wrote that south Germans were considered more 
liberal and democratic than Prussians and the social circles their officers 
represented much broader.
62Rosinski, German Army, p. 15.
63Demeter, Officer Corps, p. 34.
^^Ranke-Gesellschaft, "Führungsschicht," p. 103.
^^Demeter, Officer Corps, p. 34.
^^Ibid., p. 40.
72
^^Ibid., p. 44.
68Wheeler-Bennett, Nemesis, p. 12. SEe also Pinson, Modern 
Germany, p. 318 who described Ludendorff as the real ruler, especially 
in domestic affairs during the latter war years.
^^Hans Fried, The Guilt of the Germany Army (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1943), p. 35, hereafter cited Fried, Guilt.
^^Wilhelm Groner, Lebenserinnerungen (Gottingen: Vandenhoek &
Ruprecht, 1957), p. 466. See'also Carsten, Reichswehr, p. 6.
^^inson. Modem Germany, p. 345.
CHAPTER III
THE NOVEMBER REVOLUTION
In the autumn of 1918 changes in the Imperial German 
government converted the nation into a temporary constitutional monarchy 
for the purpose of securing more favorable terms in the forthcoming 
peace settlement. General Wilhelm Groner replaced General Ludendorff as 
First Quartermaster General, while Prince Max of Baden became the new 
Chancellor. The Reichstag also lessened the prerogatives of the Kaiser 
considerably in military affairs and made the War Minister responsible 
to the civilian government. This meant that the minister now reported to 
the Reichstag on such matters as officer selection which the military 
establishment heretofore controlled.^
The new civilian government faced monumental problems. A 
restoration of domestic peace and order became the first priority for the 
government, followed by the establishment and maintenance of civilian 
control over the military. In both spheres, the socialist-led government 
had initial success because the leaders of the army cooperated. The com­
mand hierarchy did so to prevent radical revolution in which the army 
might be substantially altered as an institution, and because the officer 
corps itself suffered from internal divisions regarding the command 
structure of the peacetime army. The size and composition of the future
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army and officer corps also remained in doubt, and questions regarding 
both produced contention within the corps during the immediate post-war 
years.
With the end of the war came a period of uncertainty for the 
military and civilian leaders of Germany. Each group expected changes, 
but the form the army and government would ultimately assume and the per­
sons who would determine the choice of alternatives were not clear at the 
time. Many officers feared for the continued existence of the corps in 
the new state and lamented the fact that the destiny of the military 
establishment was in the hands of a republican, civilian regime. The 
officer corps did survive, but not without serious disputes regarding 
political control over the army, both between the military commanders and 
the civilian government, and among factions within the military itself. 
Much of the concern of the army leadership stemmed from the mutual hos­
tility between the Social Democratic Party and the military, and from 
the fact that the SPD-led government now appeared to have the power to 
make whatever changes it desired. The outlook for the continuation of 
the military in its traditional form seemed doubtful indeed.
In spite of the foreboding atmosphere for the army during the 
immediate post-war months, no substantive changes resulted from proposals 
for reconstructing the military establishment. There existed no consensus 
particularly among the socialist parties, on military policies. The army, 
consequently, remained basically intact in structure and retained a large 
degree of control over its own affairs.
Much of the conflict which plagued the government at the end of 
1918 stemmed from the chaos accompanying the collapse of the old regime.
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In this period, the violence-prone radical socialists and Spartacists 
sought to initiate a complete overturning of the German political system. 
Worker's and Soldier's Councils, many in existence since early November, 
multiplied rapidly and challenged government authority. By the time of 
the abdication of the Kaiser on November 9, 1918, a smooth transition to 
a new regime was impossible. It was, in fact, the army which brought an 
end to the Empire by withdrawing its support of William II. Nevertheless, 
the armistice, the military defeat, and the creation of the Weimar Repub­
lic merged in the minds of the majority of the officer corps as acts of 
treachery by civilian politicians.
In Munich, the Independent Socialist Kurt Eisner declared the 
creation of the Bavarian Democratic and Social Republic on November 8,
1918. Eisner did not attempt to socialize Bavaria, but awaited support 
in the Bavarian Diet which did not materialize. Rule by the Independent 
Socialist faction (USPD) ended with Eisner's murder on February 21, 1919, 
but the success of the "Reds" there appeared to threaten the entire nation. 
Much of Germany seemed to be in chaos at the instigation of the radical 
left which earned all socialist parties the undeserved reputation among 
rightists as revolutionaries destroying the nation on orders from Moscow. 
For the Majority Socialists, this was far from the case, but the identifi­
cation of the party with attempts to destroy the Fatherland tarnished the 
SPD image. Further, the chaotic situation led many Germans to view the 
army and officer corps as the only force able to restore order and protect 
the nation from dissolution.
The proclamation of a Bavarian Republic and the readiness of the 
Spartacists to form a radical socialist republic forced the Majority
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Socialists to proclaim a German Republic prematurely. Most Social 
Democratic Party leaders wanted to place the question of the form of 
government for Germany before a constituent assembly, but the. chaotic 
situation and the threat of the Spartacists to form a government of their 
own caused the SPD to seek an alliance with the Independents before 
matters got out of hand. On November 9, 1918, Friedrich Ebert organized 
a new cabinet of socialists, the Council of People's Representatives, 
with three Majority Socialists and three Independents. This government 
later received the approval of the National Congress of Worker’s and 
Soldier's Councils, which was elected in December 1918, but it was at best 
an uneasy coalitiion. Majority Socialists supported the remaining struc­
tures of the old regime and desired a legitimate succession through a 
National Assembly and new constitution. The Independents, however, wanted 
to-govern through the Worker's and Soldier's Councils. Cooperation between 
the two factions lasted briefly under the co-chairmanship of Ebert and 
Haase, but serious disagreements, in particular over the government’s 
relations with the old Imperial army, soon ended the partnership and pro­
duced lingering animosities in each camp. After the split with the 
Independents, the SPD joined with the German Democratic Party and the 
Catholic Center Party to form the Weimar Coalition. The national govern­
ment thereafter adopted a moderate political course and no single party 
ever possessed the power to govern unilaterally until the National 
Socialist period.
Political Parties and Military Affairs in the Weimar Republic
In terras of influence on military affairs, none of the political 
parties in Imperial Germany ever had a strong position because the Reich
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did not possess a true parliamentary system which would permit civilians 
to impose their will on the military-bureaucratic establishment. Further, 
most Germans regarded military affairs as the concern of experts— the 
General Staff and Military Cabinet. Thus, the officer corps experienced 
little difficulty in retaining its traditional position with the acquies­
cence of the great majority of Germans until the collapse of the Empire 
in 1918.
The events of November 1918 brought the Social Democrats to power
in Germany before the party could develop a program for dealing with the
military establishment. For the SPD in the Empire, the army was an
internal enemy (inneren Feindes) which should be eliminated in favor of 
2
a militia system. References to this notion appeared regularly in the 
party's programs; for example, at Gotha in 1875, point three called for 
the creation of a Volkswehr to replace the standing army and it appeared
3
again in the Erfurt Program of 1891. At the same time, however, in the 
Lassallean tradition the SPD wished to preserve the structure of the state 
for its own use rather than to destroy and rebuild it. The expanding 
power of the party seemed to indicate this might be possible in the early
4
decades of the twentieth century. In these years the SPD sought also to 
demonstrate by its patriotism and willingness to defend the Fatherland if 
attacked that it had a place in German society. The results of this 
effort were clearly illustrated by its vote to support war on August 4, 
1914.^
The years of waiting and planning were of little practical value 
for the situation in which the SPD leadership found itself in November 
1918. Many of the problems which emerged after the fall of the monarchy
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were not foreseen. Heretofore, socialist politicans assumed that the 
creation of a republic would bring recognition of their authority from 
the military in the manner of any other governmental change— for example, 
a change of ministries or the appointment of a new chancellor. The party 
expected continuing political divisions, but not the violence which 
occurred. The German historian, Friedrich Meinecke wrote in November, 
1918, that "The Republic is the form of government which divides us 
least," but the trend in the Weimar Republic was one of lasting and deep­
ening divisions.^ With the exception of a few years, crisis was the rule 
from 1918 to the end of 1923, and the nation witnessed the passing of ten 
governments. Under these conditions, it proved impossible to achieve the 
stability necessary to implement changes in the relations between the 
military and civilian spheres of society.
Since the Republic was constantly assailed from within and 
outside its borders, the parties supporting a parliamentary form of gov­
ernment were diverted from reconstructing the military establishment to 
a frantic search for peace and order. Weimar political parties also 
suffered from their own timidity, a legacy of the old regime, which 
encouraged the growth of parties and political mentalities more attuned 
to opposition than governing. ^ The lack of experience in the daily 
management of governmental affairs further limited the effectiveness of 
many republican parties and politicians.
The democratic forces in Germany were without a clear conception
g
of how to organize civil-military political relations. They believed 
that the military had a place in society, but what required alteration 
was the inequality of opportunity for entry into the army and officer
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corps. Thus the complete destruction of the military establishment and 
the officer corps was not considered feasible during the Weimar years. 
Instead most democratic parties preferred an opening of the ranks of both 
to all German citizens and the democratization of the military's value 
system.
In assessing the military attitude of the Social Democrats, the 
Austrian socialist, Julius Deutsch, once wrote that "Nothing seems plainer
9
than the position of the Social Democratic Party toward militarism."
The delusion that the party had a concrete military policy survived in 
the rhetorical demand for the destruction of the standing army and its 
replacement by a militia system, when in fact the party no longer regarded 
this as possible.The SPD's attitude toward the military, therefore, 
was contradictory between word and action, and contrary to the party's 
historical opposition to the standing army.
Notwithstanding the cooperation between the Majority Socialists 
and the officer corps during the early Weimar period, the bulk of the 
army still considered the Social Democratic Party an anathema and "another 
Jewish Plot" because of the party's espoused doctrines of Marxism, inter­
nationalism, pacifism, and atheism. The army felt that since the 
members of the Council of People's Representatives and lawmakers were 
pacifists and the sworn enemies of militarism, the leaders of the Republic
"would have with joy destroyed the army and replaced it with a militia or
12'Red People's Army.'" The Majority Socialists did not wish to do so, 
as the High Command of the army well realized, but it proved to be a very 
effective means with which to arouse anti-government sympathies in the 
officer corps. The loyalty of the army in a crisis remained in doubt and
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this effectively intimidated the civil authorities into softening their
stand on military affairs. Many SPD leaders recognized the tenuous
position of the government early in the contest. Philipp Scheidemann's
comment to the National Assembly on October 7, 1919, referred not only
to the military, but to the political right in general. "The enemy,"
13Scheidemann stated, "stands [on the] right."
The SPD in the beginning sought to preserve the throne and
monarchy in favor of a legislated socialism and did its utmost to prevent
14revolutionary violence. The moderate Majority Socialists feared a 
"second revolution" on the Bolshevik example^^ and Friedrich Ebert 
resolved from the outset not to become the "Kerensky of the German Revol­
ution."^^ The leaders of the Majority Socialists considered the govern­
ment of November 1918 to be transitional until the election of a national 
assembly to determine the nation's future. They argued that the mandate 
of November 9, 1918, was "for peace and democracy, not proletarian dic­
tatorship."^^
The Majority Socialist position on the revolution caused the
radicals of the Independent Socialist Party (USPD) and the Spartacists to
accuse the SPD leadership of betraying the revolution and to prepare for
an armed insurrection. These groups opposed the military establishment
in its entirely, particularly the officer corps, and wanted to follow the
18
example of the Russians and create a class army of the proletariat.
The future Freikorps commander, Colonel Wilhelm Reinhard, reported a con­
versation with the USPD representative Baake who told him on December 16,
1918, "The Prussian officer corps belongs on Golgotha, then things will 
19be betterJ" The official party program of the USPD, drawn up in March
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1919, reflected this attitude and called for;
1. The complete destruction of the old army
2. The destruction of the Freikorps
3. The disarming of the middle class
4. The creation of a Volkswehr (a working class militia)
5. The election of officers by the troops of that army
The more radical Sparticist faction went even further. They 
demanded a complete restructuring of German society and especially the 
army. Their program of 1918, devised primarily by Karl Liebknecht and 
Rosa Luxemburg, called for the disarming of the police, military officers, 
and non-proletarian soldiers whom they classified as representatives of 
the nobility in the class struggle. The Spartacists supported the crea­
tion of a worker's militia and an elite force of Red Guards to provide a 
new military system and prevent counter-revolution. Further, they sought 
to revoke the command authority of Imperial officers, permit the troops
to elect their own officers, and end servile obedience on the part of the 
21
German soldier. The official party newspaper. Die Rote Fahne (The Red 
Flag) accused Ebert, Schiedemann, and Hoske as early as February 5, 1919, 
of being enemies and "wanting to put their feet on the proletariat's 
neck.
Within the moderate parties, confusion reigned supreme. The 
Berman Democratic Party (DDF), an outgrowth of the older Progressive Party 
in the nineteenth century, followed a traditional liberal stand and favored 
a republic and parliamentary, constitutional government. Their party pro­
gram of 1919 called for the adoption of a militia system to replace the 
standing army, but they questioned the possibility of creating new armed 
forces considering the present political situation. The DDP was suspicious
of both the Left and the Right which reduced the effectiveness of the party 
23
in the Reichstag.
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The German People's Party (DVP), which formed in December 1918 
from part of the old National Liberal Party, was committed to parliamen­
tary government though it was not yet a strong supporter of the new regime. 
Through the Kolnische Zeitung, the DVP accused the SPD of repeating errors 
from the past in cooperating and making concessions to the military to 
secure their oim position.The DVP supported the efforts of Gustav Noske 
to restore order in Germany and although it favored army reform, the party 
believed, however, that this could not be accomplished overnight and as a
result accepted much of the old army as the only solution until the crisis
. 25 years passed.
During the Weimar period, the Catholic Center Party (Zentrum)
had the support of a majority of Catholics from all over Germany and a
close connection with the particularist Bavarian People's Party (BVP).^^
Officially, the party supported the government in the name of freedom, but
always remained flexible. The Zentrum concluded alliances to the right or
27left to secure religious freedom for its members. This earned the party
the reputation of being opportunistic and caused it to be labelled the
28"Chameleon" of Weimar politics. The non-divisive nature of the Center 
Party's major ideals, in fact, held its voters together as a cohesive group 
and the Zentrum consequently returned a large number of deputies to the 
Reichstag with regularity. Through the party newspaper, Germania, the 
Zentrum identified with democracy, Christianity, and proposed that a mil­
itia be created to ensure that the army did not become an instrument of 
religious oppression. They further demanded that party literature be 
permitted in army barracks, especially in Bavaria, which conflicted with
the orders of the Reichswehr leadership who forbade such during most of 
29
the period.
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On the right of the political spectrum was the German National
People's Party (DNVP), whose roots lay in the old German Conservative
30Party and the Prussian Conservative Party. The Weimar party was a con­
glomeration of groups from the right who officially joined together to
31form the DNVP on November 24, 1918. Geographically, their strength 
came from the agrarian East Elbian provinces— East Prussia, Pommerania
32and Brandenburg— and the Evangelical parts of West Prussia and Silesia. 
Socially they were the great landowners, civil servants, farmers, aca­
demics, jurists, financiers, clergy, conservative middle-class workers 
33and employers. The party as a whole was monarchist and oriented toward 
a restoration of some kind. Its counterpart in the south was the Bavarian 
Middle Party (BMP) and after the war both contained large numbers of dis­
charged officers and soldiers whose complaints found an outlet through
34conservative politicians. The DNVP favored retention of the old mili­
tary system and close connections between conservatism, the Evangelical 
church and old Prussia, all of whom supported the officer corps. These 
factors made the DNVP an opponent of any change in the military establish­
ment. During the Weimar period, the party favored conscription and the
35continuation of the traditional Prussian military framework. The DNVP
was militantly anti-democratic and anti-republican as evidenced by the
comments in a Party Day Speech in May 1919 where the new governmental
system was referred to as the "God accursed and damned Republic" (gottes-
36verfluchten und Verdammten Republik) . Even as late as February 1921,
the party newspaper, Kreuzzeitung, wrote in terms of the old expression
37"Forward with God and King and Fatherland."
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From the USPD to the DNVP, therefore, the relationship between 
the political parties and the army during the Weimar Republic varied from 
cooperation to open hostility. However, only the DNVP and Zentrum, accord­
ing to the military, served any useful function because they supported 
conservatism and the traditional values of the past. The army regarded 
the parties on the left with open hostility even though its leaders often 
worked with the Majority Socialists to defeat more radical revolutionaries. 
Politics and politicians still had no place in the family of the elite of 
the nation and the professional military officer believed, as had his 
nineteenth century counterpart, that parliament's concern with military
affairs, was "a presumptuous interference with his own particular province—
38with his oim private affairs, as it were." In reality, the parties could 
do little toward reforming the army in the early years because no single 
group held a majority in the parliament which would allow it to carry out 
such a program unilaterally. Until 1920, all parties felt a need for the 
military's protection against the radical left although there was consid­
erable interest in a militia system in Germany. However, after the June 
1920 election in which the Majority Socialists lost heavily, a coalition 
government emerged with the parties still too fragmented and too distrust­
ful of each other to cooperate effectively on military reform. By that 
time, given the general political conditions, particularly the government's 
relations with the new military hierarchy, significant reform was virtually 
out of the question. The real question for the officer corps, that of 
continuity or change under the new governmental system, had been answered 
almost at the birth of the Republic by the Groner-Ebert Pact of November 10, 
1918. This agreement guaranteed the survival of a large part of the
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Imperial officer corps, but the degree of independent power the military 
hierarchy might retain was yet to be determined.
The Groner-Ebert Pact
The gravity of the domestic situation in November 1918 paved the
way for an accord between the Majority Socialists and the officer corps.
Friedrich Ebert hoped to get the assistance of the Imperial High Command in
restoring order to the domestic scene in Germany. On November 10, 1918,
Ebert concluded an agreement with General Groner, representing the High
Command, because the Chancellor felt he had no choice but to enlist the
39help of the officer corps to secure the National Assembly. The High Com­
mand decided to cooperate with the government in the fight against 
radicalism and on the evening of November 10, Groner telephoned the Reich 
Chancellory to advise Ebert that the army would stand by the government.
In return, the High Command and officer corps expected the support of the 
government in dealing with the extreme left. Ebert accepted Groner's offer 
of an alliance. In view of the strained relations between the Majority 
Socialists, Independent Socialists, and Spartacists, he hoped to gain the 
upper hand for the government in the event of a civil war. Groner later 
wrote that the pact allowed the officer corps, as bearers of the German 
military tradition, "to find its feet in the new situation. The moral and 
spiritual power which had collected in the Prussian-German officer corps 
over the centuries had to be preserved, in this instance, for the army of 
the f u t u r e . T h e  collapse of Kaiserdom, he continued, deprived the 
officers of the basis of their existence, their loyalties, and their sense 
of direction. They had to be given an objective for which to strive in 
order to restore their self-confidence.
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The motive for the High Command's concluding the accord was to 
gain a share of power in the new state for the officer corps and the army. 
If the plan succeeded, Groner believed, "then we would have rescued into 
the new Germany the best and strongest element of old Prussia, despite 
the revolution.Initially, concessions were necessary because develop­
ments in the army and in the German domestic scene made the command 
authority of the army tenuous. The real task of the High Command, accord­
ing to Groner, was to contain the revolutionary movement and render it 
harmless to the military establishment.
On December 8, 1918, Chancellor Ebert received a statement from 
Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg on the army's view of the domestic situ­
ation. It outlined the demands of the High Command and began
If I address myself to you as follows, I am doing so because 
I have been told that you are a loyal German and love your Father­
land more than anything else. . . .  In this sense I have allied 
myself with you to save the nation from threatening d is a s t e r .42
The letter stated that if the army was to remain a usable instrument of 
power in the hands of the government, the authority of its officers would 
have to be restored and politics eliminated from its ranks. This neces­
sitated a decree from the government which clearly stipulated that the 
right to issue military orders rested solely with the commanding authori­
ties (Kommandobehorden) and that for the maintenance of discipline the duty 
to salute was of decisive importance. Hindenburg further demanded that the 
Soldier's Councils be completely eliminated and replaced by councils of 
trusted men (Vertrauensrate) to perform liaison duties between commanding 
officers and other ranks in order to make known any wishes or complaints of 
the troops. Hindenburg also made a number of political demands including 
the convening of a national assembly at the earliest possible date and
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On December 12, Chancellor Ebert and Deputy Haase, the co-
chairmen of the Council of People's Representatives, signed the "Law for
the Creation of a Volunteer Volkswehr" to raise troops for the defense of 
49
the Republic. The law, which resulted from one of the few instances of 
cooperation between Independent and Majority Socialist factions, attempted 
to implement a long-time dream of the socialists, a popular militia. The 
creation of such a force was a basic part of the anti-military ideology 
of the German socialists and appeared in all their party platforms as a 
replacement for the standing army. The law read as follows:
1. For the maintenance of public order and security a volunteer 
People's Militia is created.
2. Tlie authority of these detachments is derived from the Council 
of People's Representatives.
3. The Volkswehr is under the command of the Council of People's 
Representatives.
4. Only volunteers will be enlisted.
5. The members will select their own officers and non-commissioned
officers.
5. Each volunteer will be obedient to the elected officers.
7. Volunteers must be at least 24 years of age, in good physical
health and have long, irreproachable front-line service.
8. Each has a probation time of twenty-one days; if qualified, the
volunteer can serve six months. 0^
Execution of the law fell to the Prussian War Minister General Scheüch,
who published it the next day as a War Ministry directive countersigned
by the Undersecretary of the Army Gohre.^^ It proved difficult, however,
to find republican officers for the Volkswehr. By February 1919, only
some 600 men had enlisted while other volunteer formations such as the
52
Freikorps, privately recruited by former monarchist officers, flourished.
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Noske tried unsuccessfully to recruit reliable workers to serve
in the Volkswehr. Not only were the workers themselves uninterested, but
their leaders overtly opposed the plan and the SPD newspaper Vorwarts
refused to publish recruiting advertisements. The Majority Socialist
press throughout Germany also adopted this position, undermining the pro-
53gram at its inception. Surprisingly enough, even with this handicap,
republican troops did exist, although not as part of the Volkswehr. At
the beginning of 1919, the government recruited two regiments, called
Liebe and Reichstag in Berlin. The Eiserne Brigade (Iron Brigade) of
1,200 men fought under Noske’s command at Kiel, and in Württemberg,
Landwehr Lieutenant Paul Hahn formed a number of security companies to
54protect the state from disorder. These proved to be exceptions to the 
lack of interest among workers or liberal-minded soldiers in republican 
armed forces.
Recruitment for the Volkswehr continued to languish during the 
next months. On July 17, 1919, Defense Minister Noske in desperation 
issued an edict creating a new government sponsored association designed 
to select non-political officers for the army according to strict military 
qualifications. The edict also stated that while in the past a Social 
Democrat could not become an NCO or occupy any leadership position without 
renouncing republican ideals, now this would no longer be the case.^^
The purpose of the Republikanischer Führerbund was to embue the armed 
forces, and the officer corps in particular, with a republican spirit. In 
this manner, Noske hoped eventually to democratize the army and the mili­
tary establishment in general.However, his plan to create a Republican 
Officer's League also failed. Noske admitted that the League was no help
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in securing officer appointments because among those candidates of 
republican sympathies few were really able officers according to the 
performance standards of the Defense Ministry, civilian government, or 
the military i t s e l f . T h e  former Undersecretary for the Army, Albert 
Grzesinski, wrote of the failure to create a republican army that two 
major obstacles prevented the realization of plans to democratize the 
military: the revolutionary provisional government and the mentality of
the working class. Neither the leaders of the revolution nor the rank 
and file of organized labor were able to conceive of an army radically 
different in spirit and organization from that of the Imperial army. This 
criticism Grzesinski also applied to Defense Minister Noske although the 
minister tried without success to initiate the drafting of young social­
ist workers into the Reichswehr. According to Grzesinski,
Organized labor resolutely refused to lend its support in the 
reconstruction of the army. The workers were weary of playing 
soldiers. . . . Very few realized the importance of the Reichswehr 
in the new state, and that it was their duty to assist in laying the 
foundations of a people’s state. The workers neglected this parlia­
mentary duty. As a result, the life of the young republic was fore­
doomed at its in c e p t io n .58
Grzesinski believed also that Gustav Noske, as Defense Minister, boro a 
part of the responsibility for the failure to secure republican forces. 
Noske's culpability, the former Undersecretary wrote, was in "his unwill­
ingness to adopt an organizational pattern basically different from that
of the past [which] proved to be of far-reaching consequences and finally
59the undoing of the democratic regime."
One of the primary reasons for the lack of concrete programs to 
reorganize the army in the early Republic was the existence of Worker's 
and Soldier's Councils which challenged the authority of Imperial officers
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and sought a reconstruction of the army on their own terms. Radical 
members of the lower ranks formed Soldier's Councils in the east as early 
as 1917 and in the west, many councils appeared in rear command areas 
during the withdrawal from occupied territory. With the urging of far- 
left propaganda, the Soldier's Councils took command of some formations, 
elected their own officers, and issued orders to the troops. Their 
presence threatened the command authority of the regular officers to the 
extent that the military hierarchy considered the councils a serious 
challenge to the survival of the army.
Due to the interference of the Soldier's Councils, control of
returning units from the front proved more difficult than either the
government or High Command anticipated. The majority of soldiers simply
wanted to go home and have nothing further to do with the army.^^ General
Groner reported to the government on December 14, 1918, that the situation
had become serious enough that
the influence of local Worker's and Soldier's Councils induces whole
units to enforce their departure out of turn. All authority of the
officers and non-commissioned officers is being undermined by the 
propaganda of the Independents and Spartacists. The High Command is 
powerless as the government does not counteract this. If the author­
ity of the state is not established, the army must disintegrate.
The Worker's and Soldier's Councils ultimately controlled enough 
areas to convene a general congress in Berlin from December 16 to 21, 1918. 
This Congress, as well as the numerous councils which already existed 
across Germany, was a source of great concern to both the Majority Social­
ists and the High Command. The Majority Socialists distrusted the councils 
and feared that they might get out of hand following the Russian example.
At the Congress, the common front of the Majority Socialists and the
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Independent Socialists collapsed. The Majority Socialists dominated the 
Congress and decisively defeated the proposal to implement a council 
form of government for the nation. Most of the members of the Congress 
supported a national constituent assembly instead, and the date for its 
election was set for January 19, 1919. With this defeat, the radicals 
walked out.^^ The Congress then went further by passing a resolution 
delegating power to the existing government ministers until the national 
assembly met. In the interim, a central council, the Zentralrat, would
carry out the work of the councils and act as the supreme executive and
policy-making body in Germany.From this point forward, council govern­
ment on the Soviet, style was a dead issue because the Majority Socialists
controlled the government apparatus and soon had the support of the army 
to maintain themselves in power.
For the military, the most important act of the Congress was the 
passage of a list of demands known as the "Hamburg Points." Inspired by 
the socialist deputy from Hamburg, Walter Lampl, they sought far-reaching 
changes in the military which, if implemented, would have destroyed the 
old, traditional system. They read as follows:
1. The power of command over the army and navy rests with the 
government under the control of the Executive Council (Zentralrat). 
In the garrisons the power of military command is exercied by the 
local Worker's and Soldier's Councils in constant cooperation with 
with [those exercising] the highest power of command. . . .
2. As a symbol of the destruction of militarism and the abolition of 
servile discipline it is decreed that all badges of rank be 
removed and no weapons carried off duty.
3. The Soldier's Councils are responsible for the reliability of the 
units and the maintenance of discipline. . . .
4. The removal of former epaulettes, N.C.O. stripes, etc., cockades, 
shoulder straps, and bayonets falls exclusively within the com­
petence of the Soldier's Councils and not of individuals. . . .
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The Congress demands the abolition of all decorations and 
insignia of honor of the nobility.
5. The soldiers elect their own leaders. Former officers, who 
enjoy the confidence of the majority of their unit, can be 
re-elected.
6. Officers of the military administration and officials with the 
rank of officer may remain in their positions, in the interest 
of demobilization, if they declare they will not undertake 
anything against the Revolution.
7. The abolition of the standing army and the formation of a 
People's Militia (Volkswehr) are to be speeded up.^^
The command hierarchy of the army viewed not only the Hamburg Points with
alarm, but also the fact that the Majority Socialists, with whom they had
made a pact of cooperation, participated in the Congress and did not
repudiate the radical's demands.
Predictably, the military High Command and officer corps reacted 
negatively to the Hamburg Points. The whole affair, in the eyes of the 
corps, resembled Order Number One which began the dissolution of the 
Russian army in 1917 by transferring officer's authority to councils. 
General von Seeckt sent an official protest to the government on 
December 19, 1918, from the High Command stating that the officer corps 
would not remain loyal if the demands were accepted.Hindenburg also 
issued a complaint, reminding the government of their pact by stating 
"Now as before, the Army supports the Government and expects it to carry 
out its promise to preserve the army."^^ With the support of the army at 
stake, the Majority Socialists had no intention of implementing a program 
which would have exposed them to the threat of the radicals in the council 
movement. They wanted to end the interference of the councils, but had 
to proceed carefully. Although the Hamburg Points were never disclaimed 
by the SPD, they received no real consideration. The Majority Socialists
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had no other plans to secure the manpower needed for the defense of the 
Republic. The first challenge by the radicals to their control material­
ized soon after the defeat at the December Congress.
The Independents and Spartacists, already embittered by the 
moderation of the revolution, took to the streets to win by force what 
they had not accomplished by political means.Continued disagreement 
with the Majority Socialists over the nature of the revolution resulted'on 
December 28, 1918, in the resignation of Independent Socialists from 
positions within the revolutionary government. This left the field open 
to the Majority Socialists who formed a second Council of People's Repre­
sentatives composed entirely of its own faction and publicly indicated 
their willingness to protect themselves from extremists by any means 
necessary. The means in this case were the remnants of the Imperial 
army under the direction of the old officer corps with whom Ebert had 
concluded an alliance on November 10, 1918.
The episode of radical control in Bavaria combined with
continuing disorder throughout the nation made it seem that the altema-
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tives in the situation were national existence or radical revolution.
The armistice itself contributed to the problem by providing for an
immediate evacuation of German occupied territory within fifteen days
which gave the government little time to arrange the orderly return and
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demobilization of the army. As a result, the Majority Socialists were
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forced to modify their position on a number of measures.
The Volunteer and Freikorps System
To meet the threat of continuing civil violence, the government 
initiated the use of paramilitary volunteer units in late 1918. The most
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common of these organizations was the Freikorps, raised independently
by military leaders of varying ranks from the troops of the Imperial army.
This process began with an Erlass on November 15, 1918, from Prussian War
Minister General Scheuch creating a new army command area (Armee Ober-
kommando) "Homeland East" (Heimat Ost) to help maintain peace and order
internally but more importantly to protect Germany’s borders with Poland,
Czechoslovakia, and R u s s i a . T h e  number of paramilitary formations
expanded rapidly and eventually grew larger than the Reichswehr. Most
numerous were the border guards (Grenzschutz) in the eastern and later
the western provinces which came under the direction of the High Command.
Active officers, known as Kreiskommissare, raised these units on orders
from the High Command to protect specified areas. Another system, the
so-called "time-volunteers" (Zeitfreiwilligen), evolved in late 1918 and
contained many former soldiers and Hochschule students under the control
of the local military recruiting district. The Kreiskommissare also had
access to weapons for distribution to all the Verbande of their area.
These units included the Grenzschutz East and West, Heimatschutz, Land-
schutz and many similar organizations, all under a central authority
(Zentralstelle) controlled by the High Command,
The second of the paramilitary systems was that of a civil guard
(Einwohnerwehr, termed E-Wehr) based upon Noske's Erlass of September 11,
1919, to strengthen Reichswehr formations through civilian volunteers
attached to regular army units. These originally had police functions
and were to maintain law and order under the direction of the Kreis-
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kommissare or district military councils (Kreisrate). The government 
created a central office to control the E-Wehr units who were
95
theoretically subordinated to the Minister of the Interior, but in
79practice took their orders from military authorities. The E-Wehr was
strictly a civilian defensive organization while the Zeitfreiwilligen
were Soldats exerces (drilled soldiers) contracted for three-month periods
and specifically intended to reinforce the Reichswehr in case of trouble
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by absorption directly into regular army regiments. A smaller, but
distinct group within the conglomerate of paramilitary formations was
the Technische Nothilfe; technical assistants such as engineers, chemists,
students and other volunteer workers under the command of the Corps of
Engineers who maintained indispensable services— water, gas, electricity,
81and transportation— during internal disorders. The existence of these 
units was the subject of great alarm to the Interallied Control Commis­
sion. The Commission's protest in September 1919 concerning organiza­
tions of a paramilitary nature resulted in their apparent dissolution 
after the formation of the 100,000-man army in 1920. The volunteer units, 
however, were re-constructed during the Ruhr crisis of 1923 by General
von Seeckt who proposed that the system be used to mobilize twenty-one
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additional Reichswehr divisions in case of war with France.
Another military-oriented organization of importance, although 
supposedly outside the realm of direct military control, was the Stahlhelm, 
founded by Franz Seldte on December 25, 1918. The Stahlhelm was closely 
connected with the ultrarightist German National People's Party. In the 
organization were many former officers and soldiers in paramilitary units 
who maintained links with the old army and its traditions under an anti­
democratic, monarchist philosophy. Within the Stahlhelm itself were 
subsidiary groups of the far Right who followed the general lead of the
96
parent organization and the DNVP. In time, these associated groups had
a membership larger than the Reichswehr. They were all hostile to the
Republic and supported efforts to return the army and officer corps to
its previous status in the nation.
The Majority Socialists ultimately formed a paramilitary
organization of their own in February of 1924. At its peak, the
Reichsbanner-Schwarz-Rot-GeId had some three million members, but was
four years too.late in providing an alternative to dependence on the old
83army for the defense of the Republic. It was clear to many Social 
Democrats by 1920 that the government-sponsored program to recruit demo­
crats for the army was a failure. The SPD had by far the largest single 
following in the early days of the Weimar Republic, but most workers had 
no interest in further fighting or in the army which they considered alien 
in a socialist state. Many working-class persons believed that since the 
government was in the hands of the Majority Socialists, the army simply 
had to acknowledge and obey the new administration. The more astute among 
the former opponents of the military establishment realized that the new 
regime was totally without the means to force compliance with their wishes 
and thus sought to create a military force from the working class. Since 
that proved impossible, as was the rapid recruitment and training of such 
a force to the level of effectiveness of the standing army, the Majority 
Socialists felt no alternative existed but to enlist the old army to
protect the government and nation in a situation which required immediate 
84attention.
In spite of the government's dependence on the old army for 
protection, the civilian leaders of the Republic did possess a modicum of
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power in their ability to appoint officers or officials to certain 
positions within the command echelon of the army, in particular, the 
important post of Prussian War Minister. It was precisely such an 
appointment which provided the government with an opportunity to improve 
civil-military relations in the early Weimar years, and even to obtain 
the cooperation in military affairs of the army’s new senior officer. 
Colonel Walther Reinhardt.
The Inner-Military Disputes
The inner-military conflicts which developed after the First 
World War stemmed from a combination of immediate and long-range questions 
vital to the future of the army and officer corps. Because these problems 
remained unsolved during the November Revolution, the following months 
produced an atmosphere of impermanence involving both the civilian govern­
ment and the military. A number of temporary measures adopted by the 
government servec only to protract the problems. The major difficulties 
within the army itself appeared in the form of a three-sided factional 
dispute for control of the nation’s military forces among the Imperial 
High Command led by General Groner, the General Staff under the influence 
of General von Seeckt, and the new Prussian War Minister Colonel Reinhardt. 
At this crucial moment, the leaders of the High Command and General Staff 
sought not only to retain their traditional powers, but also to meet the 
challenge posed to their command authority by the Soldiers’ Councils, and 
to deal with the efforts of the new government to secure parliamentary 
control over the military establishment. It was the dispute over command 
authority, however, that remained the most troublesome to the military.
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particularly when the High Command, General Staff, and Prussian War 
Minister all contrived differing plans for the reorganization of the army.
A sharp conflict erupted because there were no plans or policies 
established to deal with the situation of a lost war and major reorganiza­
tion, other than a return to the peace time status provided in the Imperial 
constitution. The lack of clear-cut alternatives or concrete directions 
meant that the transitional period would be a stormy one for the army, 
particularly since the command structure of the Imperial army remained 
intact. This produced an overlapping of authority and functions between 
the war time and peace time military hierarchies. Complicating the 
situation was the fact that none of the factions— the High Command, the 
General Staff, and. the Prussian War Minister— would voluntarily relinquish 
their powers.
A second major problem faced by the military hierarchy was that 
of parliamentary control over the army. Such control lasted briefly dur­
ing Reinhardt's tenure as Prussian War Minister and Chef der Heeresleitung, 
but Seeckt later returned the army to its former independence in the 
state structure. The objectives of the officers representing the High 
Command and General Staff factions coincided in attempts to direct the 
reorganization of the army themselves, to preserve the traditional 
philosophy of the officer corps, and to secure an independent position for 
the military within the decision-making apparatus of the new government.
It was a contest in which the personalities of the two major contenders, 
Reinhardt and Seeckt, were of significance because of their differing 
conceptions of the role of the army in the new Germany.
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Reinhardt’s selection for the post of Prussian War Minister was 
controversial in the army from the outset. His activities from January 
1919 to March 1920 in the formation of policy for the War Ministry and 
later as the head of the army leadership (Chef der Heeresleitung) produced 
further conflict within the officer corps. The sequence of events which 
brought Reinhardt into office began with the battle on December 24/25, 
1919, at the Marshall in Berlin between the government troops of General 
Lequis and the radical Volksmarine Division assisted by civilian revolu­
tionaries. In this contest, the failure of government forces demonstrated 
clearly that the far left posed an immediate threat which the new regime 
wa s hard pressed to counter. The Prussian War Minister, General Scheuch, 
resigned as a result of the battle and, as was customary, nominated a 
successor. But to the shock and chagrin of the old guard in the High 
Command and General Staff, the choice was not the man senior in rank and 
length of service as required by the traditional criteria of the
Ancientitat. Instead, Scheuch chose an outsider and non-Prussian, the
85Württemberg Colonel Walther Reinhardt. Confirmation, of course, still 
rested with the civilian government.
At the time of his nomination, Reinhardt was chief of the army 
demobilization department, and he was not personally known by most members 
of the Zentralrat under whose competence the final decision rested. The 
Council requested that Reinhardt meet with them in their regular session 
of December 31, 1918, to answer questions regarding his views on a number 
of subjects as one of several candidates under consideration. General 
Groner, representing the interests of the former High Command, as well as 
his own, supported Colonel von Feldmann, and the Social Democrats
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themselves discussed the possibility of appointing a man from their own
, 86 ranks.
Defense Minister Noske had worked with Reinhardt on demobilization 
problems and praised the Colonel’s outstanding performance in the phases 
thus far completed. However, Noske raised the question of whether or not 
the position of War Minister should be occupied by a civilian rather than 
a military man. In his view, any future War Minister from the military 
had to give complete assurance of loyal cooperation with the civil author­
ities. Reinhardt, he continued, never tried to conceal the fact that he 
was not a Social Democrat and had, in fact, told Noske quite frankly that
he considered himself a "convinced monarchist" who would, however, do his
87duty as War Minister without opposition to the government. A letter 
from Reinhardt to the Zentralrat outlined the Colonel's terms for 
acceptance of the position and included:
1. The War Minister will be accountable solely to the Council of 
People's Representatives and not to the Central Committee of the 
Worker's and Soldier's Councils [as demanded by the Hamburg 
Points].
2. The highest command authority will rest with the Council of People's 
Representatives through the Prussian War Minister.
3. In regard to the Hamburg Points, rank badges, cockades, shoulder 
boards with numbers or stripes and war decorations were still 
considered indispensable to the army.
4. The fate of the standing army should be determined by the National 
Assembly.
5. Those officers who remain in service must swear loyalty to the 
government.
6. Under no circumstances was the election of officers through the 
Worker's and Soldier's Councils to be permitted.
7. The Worker's and Soldier's Councils were to assist with the 
maintenance of discipline and nothing e l s e .88
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Reinhardt entered the session after the presentation of his
letter and informed the Zentralrat that he was of the opinion that the
continuing crisis in the nation offered little time for deliberation. The
Colonel then assured the Council that he wanted to be a loyal official.
Ebert returned to the question of a civilian or military man for the post
and, as the chairman of the Council, stated that he favored the latter
89along with the appointment of Colonel Reinhardt. In the matter of 
administrative competence, Ebert continued, the manner in which Reinhardt 
handled the demobilization indicated proficiency and organizational
90
acumen. In those areas, "Colonel Reinhardt is the acknowledged expert."
Ebert concluded that he believed the Colonel was the right man for the
position and the fact "that he comes from south Germany is also an
91advantage for us."
The Council also recognized that the Worker's and Soldier's
Councils constituted a serious barrier to unity of command in the army.
Reinhardt concurred that the councils indeed interfered with unity of com­
mand and that such multiple authorities were of a highly questional nature. 
Representative Lampl, author of the Hamburg Points, declared that in his 
opinion a military man should be War Minister and the fact that Colonel 
Reinhardt was not a Social Democrat should not disqualify him. Compromise
was possible on certain matters, Lampl continued, but the primary concern
92was command authority. Several deputies expressed agreement with 
Reinhardt’s view that the election of officers was impossible and even 
Lampl conceded that the Hamburg Points were not the foundation of a new 
army. Reinhardt then withdrew from the room and a vote of 14 to 3 con­
firmed his appointment as Prussian War Minister with only the deputies
93from the Soldier's Councils casting negative votes.
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Reinhardt's assignment became effective on January 3, 1919, and 
he accepted it "only after having made sure of the approval of Field
94Marshal von Hindenburg and his retiring predecessor, General von Scheuch.'
Contrary to later statements by Groner, Hindenburg supported Reinhardt
for Prussian War Minister, and later for the post of chief of the army
leadership, because of the excellent manner in which the Colonel handled
the demobilization process and particularly the question of pensions for 
95retiring officers. The appointment of Reinhardt as Prussian War Minister 
raised few objections from the political parties. Only the USPD complained 
of a lack of debate on the nomination. The decision was generally 
accepted as a fait accompli.Repercussions from the military came pri­
marily from the High Command clique led by Groner, who bristled with
97indigation when his candidate was not selected.
Since Reinhardt's selection was a break with the tradition of
advancing the highest ranking officer with the longest service time,
98criticism of the appointment was unavoidable. Reinhardt was well aware 
of the difficulties which might arise as a result and therefore requested 
that he not be promoted to General, which as a rule should have accom­
panied his new assignment, preferring to remain a Colonel during his tenure 
99in office. Indeed, the problems Reinhardt anticipated began soon after
his appointment and signaled the beginning of a bitter vendetta against
the Colonel by Groner and other officers who felt their prestige had been
damaged by the affair. Reinhardt's subsequent cooperation with the
civilian government and attempts to steer a middle course between the
radical Left and traditionalists on the right made him a villain for both 
100camps.
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A number of officers expressed confidence in the new War
Minister and pledged their loyalty and cooperation to him. Van den Bergh,
later a General, wrote in his memoirs that the choice was legitimate and
Reinhardt was the best qualified for the post.^^^ Additional support
came from Generals von Scholler of the 8th Army Corps, von Bieberstein,
and von Bockmann of the Garde-Korps of the Prussian army who stated that
no better representative could be found than Reinhardt. Even General
von Seeckt expressed his confidence that "in these fateful hours the
interests of the Prussian Army find themselves in strong and reliable 
102hands." Nevertheless, Reinhardt endured opposition and harassment 
from those who could not adjust to the challenge to their traditional 
rights and position. His efforts to combat discontent within the officer 
corps were not successful although he played a major role in the recon­
struction of the army. Reinhardt was faithful to his promise of loyalty 
to the civilian government, and the military establishment remained under 
the authority of civilian officials as long as he held office.
The Command Authority Question
In reality, the organizational structure of the Imperial army 
itself was the key to many of the disputes in the Reichswehr period. 
Relationships within the army hierarchy were ambiguous and, in some cases, 
had led to bitter conflicts in the past. The command structure in the 
Empire had a tripartite organization consisting of the Prussian War Minis­
try, charged with administrative, political and logistical questions; the 
Military Cabinet which dealt with officer selection and policy; and the
General Staff, responsible for planning and operations. Under the Empire
103all were directly subordinate to the Kaiser. The chain of command
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which existed at the time of the armistice survived in theory until the 
Treaty of Versailles returned the army to a peace time status. In reality, 
the war time High Command retained many of its functions although it had 
little left to command.
The second highest officer in the military hierarchy after the 
Chief of the General Staff was the war time office of First Quartermaster 
General. This position originally dealt with engineering, entrenching, 
and camp construction. In the late 1750s, the personnel of the First 
Quartermaster General’s staff entered the fields of operations and intel­
ligence and by the 1880s ceased any true quartermaster functions. Instead, 
the First Quartermaster General became the representative of the Chief of 
the General Staff and directed all matters pertaining to the sub-sections 
of that organization as well as individual army staffs. Gradually the 
position accumulated responsibilities until the First World War when 
Ludendorff, as First Quartermaster General, shared the function of con­
ducting operations equally with the commander of the field armies. 
Theoretically, the person holding this position was equal in authority 
to the head of the army during war time and it was precisely this situa­
tion which gave rise to the conflict between Reinhardt and Groner over 
command authority.
Groner served as First Quartermaster General after Ludendorff's
ouster shortly before the close of hostilities and would have been the
head of the army until the peace treaty if the Empire had remained 
104intact. The fact that the Empire no longer existed failed to deter 
Groner from attempting to continue the activities of his precedessor and 
to seek through various schemes to extend his own influence over the army
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and civilian government. However, the ambiguity in the transition 
from Empire to Republic resulted in there no longer being clear-cut lines 
of command within the military establishment. In spite of the validity 
of the Imperial constitution in this period, which provided that the 
Prussian War Minister was the legitimate head of the army in peace time, 
both Groner and Seeckt bitterly fought both Reinhardt and the civilian 
authority for control of the army to determine the future structure and 
policies of the institution.
At the end of hostilities in 1918, the German headquarters moved 
from its wartime location at Spa in Belgium eastward from the Rhine 
toward Germany's troubled border areas, finally being established at 
Kolberg in West Prussia near the scene of an undeclared war with Czecho- 
slovokia, with Poland, and with Soviet elements in the Baltic area.^^^
From Kolberg, the High Command faction led by Groner conducted a campaign 
to re-establish its wartime influence over the army and to replace • 
Reinhardt as Prussian War Minister.
Reinhardt did not wait long after his appointment to furnish his
military opposition with a cause célèbre. His January 19, 1919, issuance
of provisional regulations regarding command authority and the place of
the Soldier's Councils in the peacetime army drew instant and vehement
criticism from his antagonists. The decrees reflected, on the one hand,
the acceptance by the socialists of Reinhardt's terms for taking the post
of Prussian War Minister and, on the other, his compromise with the Hamburg
Points. Reinhardt was caught in the middle between the officer corps
and the Soldiers' Councils, neither of whom were to be satisfied by less
108
than the complete victory of their own views. The regulations provided
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a means of control for the government in that the highest power of command 
rested with the Council of People's Representatives. It stated further 
that the government, insofar as it did not issue direct orders itself, 
transferred the exercise of the power of command to the Prussian War 
Minister. All military officers of Prussia, as well as those common to 
Prussia and the Reich, were subordinated to the Minister of War who was 
responsible in turn to the government for his command decisions.
The most controversial points in Reinhardt's decree dealt with 
the Soldier's Councils and required that such bodies be elected in regi­
ments, independent battalions and similar formations. The councils would 
supervise the activities of the unit commanders to guard against any 
misuse of power. Soldiers' Councils could participate in the promulgation 
of general and permanent orders relating to the welfare of the troops, 
social and economic questions, leave and disciplinary matters. Purely 
military orders, relating to training, command, and employment of troops 
still emanated solely from regular officers and required no counter- 
signature from the Councils. All appointments still came from the Ministry 
of War, and the councils could neither remove nor eliminate officers, but 
could request their dismissal. The final authority rested with the regular 
officers of the unit, the Area Command, or Ministry of War. Further, 
soldiers' councils were not permitted to interfere with matters pertain­
ing to other military or to civil authorities. Most important, directives
109or oders issued by the councils alone had no validity.
Two other decrees accompanied the regulations on command 
authority. The second dealt with rank markings which became simple stripes 
and the third restored the obligation to s a l u t e . T h e  first two decrees
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elicited an immediate and predominantly hostile response from most of the
officer corps— much of it directed against Reinhardt personally— because
of the compromise nature of the regulations and due to the efficient
retention of the solcier’s councils. Groner asserted that Reinhardt was
a profiteer from the revolution and a traitor to the officer corps. He
claimed that the feelings against Reinhardt were such that "an officer of
the General Staff in his fury exclaimed that he would like to throw a
hand grenade at the feet of the war m i n i s t e r T h e  January 19, 1919,
decrees increased the support for the High Command and General Staff
factions opposed to Reinhardt— and consequently the government— in what
a leading officer called the turning point in the relations between the
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government and the officer corps in the Weimar era. Indeed, the mili­
tary cooperation with the government which had secured the nation against 
revolution began to collapse. Groner complained that Reinhardt had gone 
"further in the elimination of the old military achievements than even the
Social Democrats would dare to do" and therefore raised doubts about the
113soundness of his character. Seeckt was not as belligerent initially 
because he appreciated the difficulties inherent in Reinhardt's position. 
He knew unpopular decisions were inevitable. In February 1919 Seeckt 
wrote to his wife:
Everything depends on our succeeding in making the government 
firm and keeping it firm; whether it pleases us or not, there is 
nothing else and whoever can, should help. Who is unable to do so, 
or cannot bring himself to do it, should at least not disturb. But 
that is what is being done by stupid newspaper articles which publi­
cize the many weaknesses and ridiculous traits of the Republic. This 
is also done by resolutions and speeches against the military decrees 
which emanate from the officer's side. It is very easy to say 'This 
is unheard of,' and then do nothing; it is very difficult to try to 
find usable timber among the ruins. Politics is the art of the 
possible, not what is desirable. . . .
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Many officers failed to grasp Reinhardt’s intentions or political 
acumen. The crux of his policy was to restore clear command authority to 
the officer corps while eliminating the revolutionary soldiers’ councils.
He realized these decrees would be unpopular with traditionalists who 
demanded a complete restoration of the old military order. They could not, 
or would not, see that with the January 19, 1919, decrees Reinhardt nul­
lified most of the radical demands of the soldiers' councils and Hamburg 
P o i n t s . T h e  majority of officers throught only of their own personal 
fate and found Reinhardt an easy scapegoat. In reality, the Soldier’s 
Councils had no power, officers were neither elected nor dismissed by 
them and their function was limited to an advisory capacity. Military 
decisions and traditional command authority still remained in the hands 
of the regular officer corps.
In spite of the practical results of Reinhardt’s decrees, the 
High Command and General Staff factions continued to press the civilian 
leadership, principally Ebert and Noske, to remove the Colonel from office. 
This, however, was not to be the case as the civilian regime henceforth 
regarded Reinhardt with more trust than could have been expected for a 
representative of the old order. The resolution of the question of the 
soldiers’ councils alleviated one of the problems which threatened the 
preservation of the officer corps, but the factional fight within the 
institution still raged. Despite the potential of the conflict for dis­
rupting the effectiveness of the army during a period when the military 
was the single most important factor in preventing civil war, the civilian 
political parties did not intervene through the Reichstag to settle the 
dispute even though it would have been to their own benefit to do so.
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The lack of a united front on the part of the civilian parties proved to 
be a significant factor in later relations with the military.
Conclusions
The November Revolution produced a number of major problems for 
both the civilian government and the military establishment. These 
included questions of an immediate nature, but the most significant were 
long-range conflicts which continued throughout the 1918-1926 period. The 
most serious and persistent of these problems concerned the control of 
the military establishment by the new civilian government and the command 
authority question within the officer corps itself. These conflicts 
ultimately were resolved, but the manner of their resolution, as well as 
the delay in settlement, was vital to the future of the military estab­
lishment and to the Republic. Because the government failed to solve 
these problems on a timely basis while the military was divided by internal 
conflict in the November 1918 to March 1920 period, the most opportune 
moments for. a successful alteration of the system came to naught.
The failure to resolve the major conflicts stemmed basically 
from the disorders in post-war Germany. A further debilitating factor was 
the general atmosphere of impermanence existing in both the civilian and 
military spheres. Such notions served to compound political conflicts in 
the Reichstag and rendered a consensus for a consistent military policy 
impossible. Even had significant change been adopted, the civilian 
authorities did not possess the power to enforce their decisions on a 
reluctant military establishment.
Most of the political parties in the Republic supported change in 
the military but could not agree on what to change or how to accomplish it.
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There was a wide diversity of opinion on military matters ranging from 
the radicals of the Independent Social Democratic Party and the Sparta­
cists who sought to replace the old army with a working-class militia led 
by elected officers, to the conservative German National People's Party 
which wanted to retain the old system intact. The majority Socialists 
adopted a moderate position in their attitude toward the military. In 
keeping with their notion of retaining the organs of the existing state 
for their own use, the SPD sought to alter the philosophy and value system 
of the officer corps and army, and to introduce democratic and republican 
ideals into the military system by opening its ranks to all citizens on 
an equal basis. The moderate political parties also favored military 
reform, but in the. final analysis the key to the acceptance of the old 
army and officer corps was that no other force of a reliable nature existed 
to provide the stability required for the regime's survival.
Although it was not clear at the time, other compromises were 
possible between the demands of the radical Soldier's Councils and the 
simple retention of the Imperial army. However, efforts to create truly 
republican troops such as the Volkswehr or Republican Officer's League 
found so little support even among the socialist leadership that it became 
necessary for the government to work with the old army, the officer corps, 
and the Freikorps in order to defend the Republic. This decision tempo­
rarily settled the military question, but most officers found nothing to 
support in the new government and considered it a transitional stage to 
the eventual establishment of a more authoritarian system.
The position of the officer corps in the new state was in fact 
secured by the Groner-Ebert Pact and Reinhardt's January 19, 1919, decree.
Ill
In addition, the Majority Socialists indicated their lack of radicalism 
in the Workers's and Soldiers's Congress of December 1918. when they 
opposed demands from the radical left for a revolution in the military 
system. Support for the Majority Socialist faction came from the bulk of 
representatives at the Congress who were well aware of the role that 
popular militias and council government played in the Russian revolution 
of 1917. Leaders of the majority faction realized that to consider radi­
cal alterations in the military system would cost the government the 
support of the army and the protection which the army leaders could pro­
vide against leftist uprisings. The result was that the old military 
hierarchy was able to retain a major degree of independence and a share 
in the decision-making processes of the nation.
To insure the survival of the provisional government and to obtain 
the continued support of the army the government deemed it necessary to 
restore the command authority of the officer corps to secure the relia­
bility of the troops. Reinhardt accomplished the return of command author­
ity to the regular officer corps through the January 19, 1919, decrees 
although many officers failed to realize that the underlying objective of 
this compromise settlement was to destroy the Hamburg Points and the power 
of the Soldier’s Councils through legal means rather than through armed 
confrontation. This cost Reinhardt the support of many officers who saw 
compromise as betrayal of the ideals of the corps and who transferred 
their hatred of the decrees to Reinhardt personally and to the Republic 
he represented.
Thus, by the end of the revolutionary period, the army and 
officer corps had survived virtually intact from the Imperial era as an
112
essential force for defending the government. The decision not to alter 
the military system had the result of postponing solutions to certain 
basic problems. Even then, the civilian government was already at a dis­
advantage in its relations with the army, and the seriousness of the 
situation was compounded by the absence of long-range plans to alter the 
organization or philosophy of the institution. One positive result of 
the period was the appointment of Colonel Reinhardt as Prussian War 
Minister. This meant that for a time at least, the head of the army 
could be relied upon to cooperate with the new regime. It remained, 
therefore, for the civilian authorities to make the most of the resources 
available to them in subsequent efforts to revolve the conflicts that 
remained.
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CHAPTER IV
THE DEMOBILIZATION STAGE, JANUARY 1919 TO JUNE 1919
Along with the general problems which the officer corps faced 
because of the lost war and the end of the monarchy, a number of specific 
issues bred further dissension in the corps. These included the demobili­
zation of the Imperial army and what form the army command structure 
should have in the new state. In the period following the revolution, 
the government sought to construct a new armed force as the first step 
toward a peace time army. Created from remnants of the Imperial army and 
Freikorps units, the Provisional Reichswehr served as a transitional body 
prior to the implementation of the military provisions of the Versailles 
Treaty. It was also during this period that the government made its last 
major effort to democratize the military through the promotion of non­
commissioned personnel to officer status.
Within the officer corps, the disputes between Reinhardt, Groner 
and Seeckt not only continued but expanded to include disputes over the 
selection of officers for the Provisional Reichswehr. Initially, the 
selection process began with the demobilization of the Imperial army after 
the armistice in November 1918. At that time a demobilization commission, 
headed by Reinhardt and composed of various staff, command, and adminis­
trative personnel connected with the General Staff, established the
selection criteria and determined the order of preference for retaining
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of efficient, well-trained men. This also meant that the attitudes of 
the officers toward their profession and the corps remained the same as 
before. Four main groups formed the basis of personnel for the officer 
corps; those commissioned in pre-war years, war-commissioned officers, 
qualified non-commissioned officers from the Imperial army, and after 
1920, candidates from outside the military establishment. In addition 
to the purely technical military qualifications required of officer 
aspirants, during the Seeckt years the prospective officer had to show a 
properly conservative attitude in order to join this elite. Those deemed 
by the military hierarchy not to possess this virtue generally never 
reached important command positions. This included all but a few of the 
NCOs commissioned during the immediate post-war period at the insistance 
of the civilian government. Although the Versailles Treaty established a 
minimum service time of twenty-five years or until age forty-five, many 
officers left the corps after a short career because they found promotion 
slow or impossible for those whose opinions differed from the leaders of 
the military hierarchy. Those who remained possessed the same ideals as 
their leaders, adopted those views, or performed their duty in silence to 
preserve their careers. Once again, unquestioning obedience became the 
key to success.
The demobilization of the regular, active officer corps of the 
Imperial army began slowly because of the uncertainty of the peace settle­
ment. Amid much speculation, the government and the military establish­
ment attempted to calculate the number of officer personnel required to 
form a peace time army. Their estimates were universally high, based 
upon figures slightly lower than the peace-time status of the Imperial
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army in 1913. Thus the demobilization proceeded cautiously while the 
details of the treaty settlement were being determined by the Allies.
The Demobilization of the Imperial Army
Dismantling of the Imperial army began with the Reich 
government's Demobilization Order of December 31, 1918, and was to be 
completed by January 10, 1919.^ The Rat der Volksbeauftragten considered 
the early demobilization of the old army vital in order to eliminate the 
influence of reactionary officers who might seek to use the army as a 
counter-revolutionary force and, secondarily, to remove any possible
2
threat to the state and to public order from an armed rabble of soldiers. 
Demobilization, therefore, was the first method employed to reduce the 
number of personnel in the officer corps. It involved a process of 
continuously-stiffening qualifications so that only the best of the old 
corps could remain. Those retained were to be supplemented by only small 
numbers of new officers. The demobilization period continued from 
December 1918 to the final creation in 1921 of the 100,000-man army man­
dated by the treaty. During the interim, resentment toward the Republic 
grew within the officer corps as the number of discharged officers 
increased.
In general, the criteria for selecting officers to remain in
the army were the same as in the past, based upon performance of duty,
six months minimum combat service in the field, general education with
an emphasis on military knowledge and ability, physical fitness, and 
3
character values. From the beginning, there existed a sharp difference 
of opinion regarding the criteria for the retention of officers in the 
peace army. Career officers objected to the retention of war-commissioned
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officers, regular officers without full preparatory training as well as
reservists, viewing them as neither efficient officers nor proper 
4
gentlemen.
Voluntary retirement of a number of officers eased the situation 
to some extent, but the majority of reductions had to be made by the 
Demobilization Commission headed by Reinhardt as Prussian War Minister, 
and assisted by the Personalamt of General Ritter und Edler von Braun. 
Unlike the demobilization of the common soldiers, which was carried out 
on the basis of specific instructions from the government, the terms for 
the reduction of the officer corps emanated from the military authorities 
themselves.^ This involved discharging both younger officers and those 
of advancing age, leaving men between the ages of 25 and 45 eligible to 
remain in the service. The Personalamt also favored officers with combat 
experience over career staff officers, retaining in particular those 
combat officers commissioned before the war who had completed their full 
training course.^ Most officers considered for positions in the peace­
time army were of senior and middle-grade ranks from regimental commander 
upwards along with some young regular officers of the General Staff and 
a small number of regular, war-commissioned lieutenants who were acting 
battery or company commanders for two years in the field before the end 
of the war.^
It was clear even to those who opposed the demobilization 
methods that not all officers could remain in the service. Groner wrote 
that he favored instituting "a severe screening of the officer corps
g
and the retention of officers from all classes." However, like Luden- 
dorff before him, Groner imagined that his position as First Quartermaster
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General entitled him, rather than the Prussian War Minister, to manage 
the activities of the army. In this vein, Groner wrote to Reinhardt in 
March, 1919, and complained that the selection of officers was not based 
upon the traditional criteria for recruiting officers. Groner asserted 
that the process should include, along with military ability and educa­
tion, a great reliance upon character and convictions (Gesinnung) and 
above all that officers should "have their hearts in the right place (das
Q
Herz auf dem rechten Fleck haben)." On May 2, 1919, Reinhardt circu­
lated a reply to the troop commanders of the Reichswehr indicating that 
the Personalamt and the War Minister still sought "to retain the best 
men for army service (die besten Manner dem Heeresdienst zu erhalten)" 
and that while having one's heart in the right place was important, 
officers should be receptive to new influences brought on by the advent 
of a republic.
Attempts to deal with the new situation in Germany appeared in 
all the contingents of the army. In Bavaria, the Ministry of Military 
Affairs went further than Reinhardt's suggestion that the officer corps 
become receptive to new influences. The ministry issued a decree to 
Reichswehr units in its area (Reichswehr Gruppenkommando IV) which stated 
that officers who could not adjust to the new political situation would 
be dismissed from the s e r v i c e . I n  Württemberg, the local military 
authorities employed a review process of their own to establish qualifi­
cations for officers desiring to remain in the service. An officer of 
the rank of Major or higher reviewed the records and performance of the 
command personnel of each regiment with battalions or smaller units 
scrutinized by a Captain, e.g.. Grenadier Regiment 119 by Colonel Strolin;
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Foot Artillery Regiment 29 by Major Seeger. For officers in staff
positions, a special investigating officer reported his findings directly
to the Wiirttemberg War Minister. Each investigator held a rank superior
to his subject and formal instructions established the criteria to be
utilized. These restated that the army must have only the best men. The
strong and weak points of each officer appeared in each report along with
an analysis of the subject's character. In concluding, the instructions
repeated Groner's phrase that each officer should have his heart in the
right place, i.e., the proper conservative and traditional convictions.
In many commands, confusion existed as to whether the First Quartermaster
General or the Prussian War Minister had the legitimate command authority
12
over officer selection.
While receiving the majority of their instructions from the 
offices of the Prussian War Minister and Personalamt, as they had under 
the Empire, the various states administered the demobilization of their 
own contingents. This furthered the already existing particularist senti­
ments and lent credence to the concept of a continuing federated structure 
for the army as it had been under the Empire. Such notions were quite 
pronounced in Bavaria where the funds for the Bavarian officer's pensions 
came entirely from the state government with no contribution from the 
Reich authorities in Berlin. Such an obligation served to confirm the 
opinion of Bavarian civil and military authorities that local autonomy
still prevailed while in reality that notion ran counter to the efforts of
13the Reich officials to create a unitary military structure.
Officers who were not selected to remain in the service but who 
wanted to secure a military related occupation had a number of options
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available to them. They could apply for an administrative position 
within the military establishment and pursue a civil career in this man­
ner, or they could join one of the various police organizations actively 
seeking former military officers to augment their own leadership ranks. 
Under a new retirement law, the retiring officer received a promotion for
pension purposes if he otherwise qualified for the next highest rank at
14
the time of leaving the service. The retirement provisions appealed to 
many middle-class officers who had never intended to pursue a military 
career. The voluntary process, however, did not reduce the officer corps 
to anywhere near the High Command's projected peacetime quota and neces­
sitated the implementation of a forced retirement program whereby many 
officers were given an outright release from the army.
To ascertain the number of officers who desired to remain after 
the retirement law, Prussian War Minister Reinhardt requested in the 
spring of 1919 a statement of intent from each officer as well as a letter 
of recommendation from his immediate commanding o f f i c e r . A  special "U" 
list existed for those who received ratings of unqualified (ungeeignet) 
from their commanders, but such lists were supposed to be unofficial. 
Black-lists of any type had been discontinued officially somewhat earlier 
in fear of possible charges of discrimination against persons of lower 
social or economic groups, or of differing political philosophy.Those 
deemed qualified to remain in the service entered an angonizing period of 
uncertainty which resulted nevertheless in dismissal for the majority
when further personnel reductions came as the result of the Versailles 
18Treaty. The number of officers released by 1923 was substantial rela-
19
tive to the estimated 40,000 active officers who survived the war.
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According to figures compiled by Lt. Gen. a. D. Constantin von Altrock,
20the numbers of demobilized officers by rank were as follows:
OFFICERS RELEASED BY 1923
First and Second Lieutenants 7,695
Captains 17,100
Majors 8,170
Lieutenant-Colonels 5,890
Colonels 2,850
Maj or-Generals 1,615
Lieutenant-Generals 760
Generals 230
44,310
Many officers who faced dismissal from the army found various 
police formations an increasingly attractive alternative career. Mili­
tarized police organizations in the Republic were of significance because 
their training, political attitudes, and value systems paralleled those 
of the army. In personnel, the police eventually outnumbered the 100,000 
man army and were in many instances utilized as an appendage of the 
Reichswehr. Eventually, in the army expansion during the Third Reich, 
re-entry directly into the Wehrmacht and Waffen SS by police personnel 
created full combat "Police Divisions" led by their own officers.
Because of the importance of the militarized police, the civil 
government sought to democratize such units as an example for the Reichs­
wehr. Accordingly, some 200 to 300 officers joined police units at the 
national, state, and local level becoming leaders in the Schutzpolizei,
Landespolizei, Ordungspolizei, Sicherheitspolizei, Hilfspolzei and 
21
Exekutivpolizei. Many of these possessed a strictly military charac­
ter. They were organized in Hundertschaften, housed in barracks, and
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were led by former army officers. Their ties with the army were so
strong that these formations often participated in military maneuvers
with the Reichswehr. By the summer of 1919, the Ordungspolizei numbered
22
150,000 and the Sicherheitspolizei, 70,000. This situation existed in
violation of the Versailles Treaty, which limited the size of the police
establishment in the Weimar Republic to less than its 1913 strength.
Such a limitation should have produced only 46,000 men for Prussia and
23
an additional 20,000 for the remainder of the nation.
Problems in the selection of officers for the police were much
the same as for the regular army insofar as pressure on the government
came from the radical left to initiate the election of officers on the
lower levels. The police expert of the Social Democratic Party, Colonel
Schiitzinger, adopted the same position as the officer corps, declaring
that such a program would result in command limitations for the police
leadership in relation to the elected officers and finally the breakdown
24
of the institution's reliability. As in the army, the government opted 
for the selection of trained officers who, besides having command exper­
ience, were available in increasing numbers. In Bavaria, the state
government reserved a full twenty percent of positions in the police ser-
25vice for retired army personnel. As an incentive to enter police service, 
the government permitted each officer who enlisted by October 1, 1920, to 
retain the highest military rank attained to which was added the prefix 
"Police." A regular army Colonel thereby became a Police-Colonel whose 
duties and command functions often paralleled his former army command.
Many of the military districts, the Wehrkreise, actively assisted with 
the recruiting of officers from units within their jurisdiction and made
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26efforts to bring the police and army as close together as possible.
In time, many police units operated directly under the High Command, and 
a comradeship developed between the regular army officers and their former 
comrades who still retained special feelings for the military establish­
ment.
The post-armistice demobilization of the Imperial army 
accomplished little in reducing the size of the officer corps. Too few 
officers chose to retire voluntarily. The situation thus required some 
form of compulsion. Inevitably, bitterness and resentment followed 
involuntary reductions and many of the officers affected became life-long 
opponents of the Republic. Even though a number of officers subsequently 
found a position in the police which was not far removed in practice from 
their former career, they were not totally satisfied outside the regular 
army.
With the problem of reductions in officer personnel also came 
another contest between the government and the Groner and Seeckt factions 
inside the corps to reorganize the command structure of the peacetime 
army. This added to the conflicts between those officers already 
struggling for control of the institution. The organizational structure 
of the command echelon of the new army was of grave concern to all of 
the factions because it would determine the competency of key positions 
in the military hierarchy. The officers who held those posts initiated 
policy and made decisions vital to the future of the army. It was upon 
these men that relations with the civilian military officials depended.
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The Command Structure Question in the Peace Army
Reorganization of the Imperial army actually began on October 28,
1918, when the Reichstag replaced the Kaiser as the ultimate authority
over the army. In order to strengthen its position in regard to the
military, the new regime created a state Under-Secretary to supervise
military affairs. Members of the SPD held the post until November 1919,
27when the office was abolished. The National Assembly subsequently
dealt with the question of army organization, but made no attempt to
implement the Hamburg Points or create an independent militia based on
the December 1918 Volkswehr Decree. For the most part, the deputies
exhibited a preference for an army strong enough to restore domestic
order, to protect the national borders, and nothing more. They further
sought to provide constitutional guarantees for the civilian control of
the military establishment as a whole, while permitting internal admin-
28
istration and command to remain in the hands of the officer corps.
With the demobilization of the Imperial army came a period of 
uncertainty regarding the future of the military establishment in Weimar 
Germany. A number of plans for a peacetime army evolved during this 
period, but none of them seriously considered the full elimination of the 
institution. Most of the plans were based on speculations about the 
terms of the forthcoming Versailles Treaty, and there was little agree­
ment among either politicians or the military on which arrangement to 
implement.
Once the military clauses of the peace settlement became known, 
the government and military discussed the possibility of bargaining for 
a larger German army. Seeckt wanted to obtain agreement for a 200,000
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man army, but at Paris the civilian representatives led by Matthias
Erzberger decided— without consulting the military mission— to accept
the 100,000 figure contained in the Versailles Treaty. The Allies knew
of the decision and showed little inclination to discuss the military's
proposal offered half-heartedly by the chief civilian negotiator
Brockdorff-Rantzau. As a result, Seeckt accused the civilians of
29
treachery and of "sacrificing Germany's honor" in the matter. As it
became increasingly clear that the Allies would not modify the military
provisions of the treaty, Reinhardt recalled Seeckt to Germany. In the
interim, Groner's associates at Kolberg launched a poison-pen campaign
against Reinhardt. The High Command faction at Kolberg advised Defense
Minister Noske that the officer corps had no confidence in R.einhardt, and
as a result, Noske made Seeckt the head of the Peace Army Commission
30
(Heeres-Friedenskommission) with the task of reorganizing the army.
The future organization of the array and its command structure 
was a primary concern go the High Command, General Staff and the govern­
ment. It was clear that whatever group reconstructed the army would set 
the criteria for officer selection as well as the limits of parliamentary 
control over the military establishment. During the early months, the 
High Command and the General Staff operated in some aspects of military 
administration independently from the Prussian War Ministry. In theory, 
the Defense Minister, which was Noske's title until August 1919, coordin- 
nated the activities of all three bodies. Each group planned policy and 
concurrently sought the re-establishment of discipline and unity of com­
mand although the most vital question of command authority in the future
31army was not settled. Such ambiguity only increased the confusion and
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hostility between the various groups trying to solidify their own 
positions in the emerging military hierarchy.
The problem became more clearly defined after the constitution 
created the post of Reichswehr Minister to act as the civilian head of 
the army. In spite of the settlement of the command authority question 
in favor of the civilian government, controversy still persisted in the 
military. The inner-military dispute shifted its emphasis to the char­
acter of the new ministry, its authority over military administration, 
and officer selection criteria. Members of the High Command had drafted 
plans for a future command structure as early as February, 1919. The 
Chief of the Military Railway Department, General von Olderhausen, raised 
the primary question of how the General Staff in the future could obtain 
a position independent of the War Ministry. His plan attempted, as did 
most of the subsequent ones proposed by the High Command and General 
Staff, to circumvent or nullify the constitutional controls imposed on 
the army. Specifically, Olderhausen's version called for a State Secre­
tary of Defense on the federal cabinet level to be held by a civilian 
politican who would have control of the state war ministries. The 
Secretary would, however, be required to refer any army questions to the 
Personalamt and cede to the military authorities direction of officer 
selection, especially in the contingents. Further, the High Command 
wanted to keep the civilian authorities divided by a federal political 
system giving full rein to particularism while creating a unified mili­
tary structure which would have a strong position in relation to the weak 
32
civil government. The State Secretary under this plan would theoreti­
cally have control over the General Staff, Reich Army Office, Personnel
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Office, and Admiralty. These were to be coordinated by parliamentary 
and military Under-Secretaries while the War Ministry became a General 
Inspectorate in charge of officer education. The proponents of the plan 
invisioned that Groner, Seeckt, or an officer satisfactory to the High 
Command and General Staff factions would be appointed to head the 
structure.
To the chagrin of the High Command and General Staff, not to
mention Groner and Seeckt personally, the first Chief of the Army Leader-
33ship was Reinhardt. Concurrent with this development, the struggle
for control of the army intensified between Groner’s High Command faction
at Kolberg and Reinhardt, whose post of Prussian War Minister was to be
abolished by the constitution. In the interim, Reinhardt held the
position of Chef der Reichswehrbefehlsstelle Preussen (Reichswehr Command
Prussia) and exercised the same functions as the Prussian War Minister.
The other contender, Seeckt, continued as head of the Peace Army
Commission and formulated plans of his own for the future army and command
structure. His proposal envisioned an army of 300,000 men organized on
the basis of contingents from Prussia, Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, and
Saxony. These were to be formed by treaty or convention into a unitary
system under the Prussian War Ministry and General Staff. The actual
structure would contain twenty-four divisions composed of two-year volun-
34teers and augmented by a militia with a three-month training period. 
Seeckt’s plan also proved to be a further irritant in his conflict with 
Reinhardt over officer selection because many surplus officers from 
duplicated staffs created by Seeckt faced retirement or dismissal from 
the corps i.i order to reduce its personnel to the Versailles
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specifications. Many of these officers, long-time career men on the 
General Staff, looked to Seeckt for protection of their positions and 
supported the General's efforts to control selection criteria.
The differences between the High Command, General Staff, and 
Reinhardt made a confrontation inevitable over a number of issues. This 
occurred on June 29, 1919, when Reinhardt proposed a new command structure 
under which the special army and group commands in the east directed by 
the High Command were to be placed within the authority of the Minister 
of Defense and the Chief of Reichswehr Command Prussia. The plan envis­
ioned a simplified command structure and included a provision for the 
High Command, which was essentially a wartime organization, to be redesig­
nated Befehlsstelle Kolberg with reduced authority. President Ebert and 
Reichswehr Minister Noske accepted Reinhardt's suggestions which also 
meant curtailing the autonomy of the Kolberg faction. Groner, enraged at
Reinhardt's move, telephoned the Colonel and demanded full authority in 
36the east. Reinhardt refused and shortly thereafter Groner announced
his retirement, but declared he would remain at his post until "military
37matters were finally settled." Groner wrote of the incident in his
diary that it was
nothing but an affront to my person: the Herr war minister, the
Bastard (Schweinhund), to whom I am bothersome as the devil, 
continues the struggle against me by means that slowly become 
indecent. I would not have expected him to be such a nasty
character.38 , :
At the same time, a dispute flared up between Reinhardt and 
Seeckt over the functions of the Reichswehr Ministry within the constitu­
tional framework of the Republic. The creation of such a post entailed 
changes within the command structure of the military establishment as a
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whole because the Prussian War Minister and the contingent war ministers
39had been eliminated. Seeckt sought to secure significant powers for 
the military over its own activités, while increasing his personal author­
ity as chief of the most important military office, the Truppenamt. Under 
Article 47 of the constitution, the Reichswehr Minister assumed the 
military duties of the old Reich Chancellor which included being superior 
to all soldiers with the highest command authority (Kommandogewalt— here, 
in the sense of an administrative function). Until the actual creation
of the Reichswehr Ministry on October 1, 1919, the Reich Minister of
40Defense exercised this function through the Prussian War Minister.
Seeckt's proposal of August, 1919, for a re-organization of the 
army's command echelon called for a horizontally-ordered college of 
office chiefs led by the head of the Truppenamt as the representative of 
the Reichswehr Minister. Known collectively as the Army Office (Heere- 
samt), the various offices in the system would include the Troop Office, 
Quartermaster, Ordnance Office, Intendant for the army, and the Personnel 
Office. The Army Office, which had strictly advisory powers under the 
Reichswehr Minister, was to be supplemented by a second body, the 
Armeerat (Army Council), composed of the chiefs of the Troop Office, 
Personnel Office, Quartermaster, and a number of high ranking command 
personnel in the field service. The Armeerat in this system had complete 
control over all matters pertaining to officers.Seeckt's purpose was
to make the chief of the Truppenamt an independent military head of the
army under a Reichswehr Minister with sole civilian responsibility for 
military affairs but no actual command authority. Seeckt did not want
to become merely the pro forma head of the army, but rather as chief of
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the Truppenamt the successor to the chief of the Genral Staff with no 
42military superior. The Reichswehr Minister in this scheme commanded
the troops in peacetime and the chiefs of the various offices came under
his direct responsibility. Since these would be controlled by the chief
of the Truppenamt— Seeckt himself— the person in that post possessed the
43supreme military authority in the establishment.
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Seeckt's Proposed Organization44
Neither the civilian government nor Prussian War Minister Reinhardt con­
sidered adopting Seeckt’s organizational scheme. The intent to destroy 
the newly-won civilian control over the army was apparent. On the other
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hand, Reinhardt accepted most of the structure proposed by Seeckt, but
insisted upon a unitary head for the army in the form of a Chief of Army
Leadership (Chef der Heeresleitung) under the Reichswehr Minister who
would have the authority to initiate binding orders independently of
other military authorities. Groner made demands for the acceptance of
Seeckt's organization plan, and then for the naming of Seeckt as Chef der
Heeresleitung. Both President Ebert and Reichswehr Minister Noske
45refused to be pressured into making such an appointment.
Ultimately, the government accepted a system devised by Noske 
and Reinhardt which retained checks on the military. Reinhardt's will­
ingness to concede considerable powers to the Reichswehr Minister in the 
eyes of the conservatives aided in the adoption of the plan. The civil­
ian government trusted Reinhardt and followed this suggestions regarding 
army reorganization. Reinhardt wanted the creation of a central adminis­
trative office which would end the struggle for control of the army
46
between his own office, the High Command, and the General Staff.
Reinhardt proposed, therefore, a constitutionally correct vertical plan
that had no Heeresamt or Armeerat, but placed the Chef der Heeresleitung
in direct control of the system under a Reichswehr Minister with full
47command powers over the military. The Army Ordinance Gazette
(Heeresverordnungs-Blatt) of 1919 enacted Reinhardt's plan into law,
signifying a victory for the Noske-Reinhardt faction and temporarily
preserving civilian supremacy over the military.
Reinhardt then faced the additional problem of legitimizing the
newly-won authority of the Reichswehr Minister and Heeresleitung in the
49
eyes of the officer corps and array. He did not consider a viable
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Reinhardt's Proposed Organization^^
military system possible on the basis of the Hamburg Points nor could the 
old system be maintained as many conservative officers w a n t e d . H e  
therefore adopted a middle course to insure that the military remained 
as free as possible from influence of the right or left. His objective 
was to assure security for the army by making it a vital part of the new 
order, indispensable to the existing government and an independent factor
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52in German politics. To accomplish this end, Reinhardt believed that
the Reichswehr had to accept the Republic and integrate its troops polit-
53ically into the constitutional system. He established the structure to 
make this possible but in doing so alienated many officers who refused to 
accept it as permanent. Reinhardt's efforts to achieve for the Reichs­
wehr Minister more than a figurehead status simply ran counter to the
traditions of the officer corps although most officers did not object to
54Gustav Noske personally.
Indeed, many officers were not dissatisfied with Noske's 
administration of the Reichswehr Ministry. As the conservative General 
Marcker wrote, Noske "showed a good understanding of military questions 
and I have often later said that he had an excellent knowledge of the 
'soul' of the troops— also of the o f f ic er s. No sk e himself was respected 
in the officer corps. The majority of officers considered him the strong­
est leader in the Social Democratic Party, displaying courage and a cold­
blooded soldierly thought in the best Prussian tradition.Like Reinhardt 
and other professional military men, Noske believed that command authority 
should be held by the officer corps of the regular army rather than the 
Soldiers's Councils, and he supported efforts to achieve this end. He 
once wrote that an army without discipline was a "scandal" (Affenschande—  
literally, ape-comedy)
Reinhardt and Noske brought the Reichswehr into compliance with 
the republican constitution and established an independent command author­
ity quite different from that of the old army. Since Seeckt did not 
prevail in the quest for implementation of his system, he left active 
service on July 14, 1919, though he was available in an advisory
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58capacity. According to Groner, Reinhardt then had the field to
59himself and could organize the army as he wished. Indeed, Reinhardt's 
appointment to the post of Chef der Heeresleitung came on September 30, 
1919, the very day Groner retired.
Under Reinhardt, the Heeresleitung became an integral part of 
the Reichswehr Ministry. It contained six major units: the Zentralrat
handled legal and budgetary questions, dealt with legislation which 
affected the military, and managed the internal affairs of the Heeres­
leitung; the Personalamt controlled all officer personnel assignments, 
selection, promotion, retirement, and pensions for both officers and 
NCOs; the Allegemeine Truppenamt assumed the role of the Great General 
Staff and had competence over troop employment, education of staff 
officers and staff assistants, national defense, army organization, 
military schools, physical training, and the Peace Army Commission. The 
Truppenamt controlled the education and training of officer candidates, 
but not their selection which remained a function of the Personalamt under 
the supervision of the Chef der Heeresleitung.^^ Reinhardt, as the senior 
military officer of the Reichswehr, cooperated closely with both President 
Ebert and Reichswehr Minister Noske to whom the Colonel conceded control
of the army. Reinhardt accepted the constitutional superiority of civil
62
authority in military matters "as a corollary of the revolution."
The Provisional Reichswehr Law of March 1919
While the debate raged over the permanent form of the new army 
and its command structure, the need to build an interim system became 
imperative. The Law for the Construction of a Provisional Reichswehr, 
passed by the National Assembly on March 6, 1919, gave the Reichspresident
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the power to dissolve the old standing army in order to form a
Provisional Reichswehr. It specifically cited the duties of the new
armed forces as the protection of the Reich's borders, the providing of
security for the government, and the establishing of internal peace.
This recreated, in effect, the same structural framework as the federated
Imperial army with contingents from Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony, Württemberg,
and Baden. Reinhardt, along with Groner, Seeckt and others opposed this
63system in favor of a unitary, centralized military structure. The
Provisional Reichswehr also retained many older relationships in the
command structure that rested upon the 1871 special rights accorded to
federation members and added to this a number of new positions which
increased the confusion already present during the demobilization of the
old army. State administrative organs for military affairs thereafter
consisted of semi-autonomous civilian military ministries which were, as
before, under the domination of the Prussian War Minister. They conveyed
orders, verbatim in most cases, from the Prussian War Minister to their
64
own contingents with only letterheads on the paperwork changed. Since 
the old Military Cabinet was not retained, the new structure simply com­
pounded the conflict over authority by introducing new factions into the 
65arena.
The Provisional Reichswehr carried over many characteristics from 
the old army because the nucleus came from existing units which had not 
been demobilized and from the ranks of the Freikorps or other volunteer 
forces. Most of these units relied heavily upon former Imperial army 
personnel who were generally anti-republican. A few republican Freikorps 
and security units also entered the Provisional Reichswehr along with
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their officers, but their numbers were small and resentment against such 
officers continued, particularly among the older personnel.
The Provisional Reichswehr Law delineated the general structure 
of the armed forces and the command relationships governing it. Paragraph 
One placed the Provisional Reichswehr under the supreme command of the 
President. Paragraph Two stated that the active command of the army 
originated with the President and was exercised on his behalf by the 
Reichswehr Minister. Subordinate to him was the Prussian War Minister 
who controlled the contingents of the army through the individual state 
war ministers. The former High Command received the authority to give 
orders in conjunction with the President through the Reichswehr Minister 
and government in concert with the Prussian War Minister. The naming, 
promotion, removal, and discharge of officers remained within the compe­
tence of the contingents, while officers of General rank were appointed 
by the President on the advice of the Prussian War Ministry. For each 
contingent, the law of March 6 received additional sections relating to 
the prerogatives in military affairs held by that state. Special rights 
in the sphere of officer selection on the lower levels for Bavaria, Baden,
and Württemberg gave these states a large degree of autonomy within the
.  67system.
New officer selection criteria opened the ranks of the officer
corps to NCOs and enlisted men who qualified through superior service
records, leadership ability, and duty in the field in a combat arm as a
68deputy officer for a minimum of six months. Within the contingents, 
the military ministers followed the instructions of the Prussian War 
Minister to form the Provisional Reichswehr. The selection of officers
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for the position of regimental commander came under the jurisdiction of 
the individual state ministries. Local Group Commands (Gruppenkommando) 
chose company commanders and other subordinate ranks in consideration of 
the wishes of the volunteer (freiwilligen) formations absorbed directly 
into the Provisional Reichswehr. Most of these units simply retained the 
officers already serving in their ranks. For officer personnel on the 
regimental, company, and battalion level, the implementation orders stated 
that the following categories of personnel merited first consideration 
for retention in the service:
1. Officers and NCOs of excellent service during the war who
proved themselves in volunteer formations.
2. Officers and men from the East African Colonial forces.
3. Active officers and NCOs who did not join volunteer forces 
but who were otherwise qualified.
4. Officers and NCOs from the old peacetime army who were 
associated with military schools or establishments.
The priorities for retention of officer and NCO's established by the
March 6, 1919, law provided an important element of continuity between
the Imperial army and the Reichswehr. Because the leadership element of
the Provisional Reichswehr came solely from the ranks of the old army,
its officer corps retained an anti-republican, anti-democratic character
which survived to influence the future 100,000-man army. Expedients
such as the return to active service of entire Freikorps units, most of
whom were openly hostile to the government, served only to defeat the
new regime's avowed goal of democratizing the armed forces. The officer
corps remained conservative and tradition-oriented with the majority of
its personnel supporting political ideals far removed from those of the
government. In the education and training of both the troops and officer
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candidates, traditionalist officers had a primary role and exerted a 
vital influence in advocating the replacement of the Republic with a 
more authoritarian system.
The immediate objective of the expanded selection criteria had 
been to provide as many trained officers as possible for the Provisional 
Reichswehr in order to maintain a maximum military efficiency. There was, 
in fact, an overabundance of such personnel even with the continuing 
demobilization of the Imperial army. Many men wanted to remain in the 
military in lieu of the uncertainty of obtaining civil employment during 
the post-war years. The problem for the government was either to have an 
efficient force immediately available for use in a time of continuing 
crisis or to attempt the creation of a new body more attuned to democratic 
ideals. In 1919, the former prevailed because the internal situation in 
Germany endangered the Republic and the leaders of the government sought 
to insure the viability of the system as their primary goal. However, 
efforts by the new regime to democratize the army continued through the 
promotion of qualified non-commissioned personnel to officer status.
The Promotion of Non-Commissioned Personnel to Officer
The upgrading of enlisted personnel to officer grades was a 
recognized, but not often practiced, custom throughout the history of the 
Prussian-German military establishment. With the demise of the Imperial 
army, the Social Democrats sought as one of their primary objectives to 
democratize the military system by the extension of possibilities for 
qualified non-commissioned officers (Unteroffiziere) to attain commis­
sioned rank. The Provisional Reichswehr Law of March 6, 1919, established 
the legality of this concept and, at least in theory, made positions in
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the officer corps open to all soldiers. In practice, however, 
requirements were rigorous and candidates limited to those who had served 
in a combat unit, been decorated for bravery, completed the seventh class 
of a middle school with a leaving certificate (Obersekundarreife), and 
had performed the duties of an officer for at least six months while 
holding the rank of sergeant-lieutenant (Feldwebelleutnant) or who had 
been breveted to deputy officer (Offizierstellvertreter). For those 
who did not have the proper educational background, but had a satisfac­
tory public school (Volksschule) record, special officer candidate 
courses assisted in preparing the aspirant for the Officer Candidate's 
Examination. The test itself covered the military knowledge of the 
prospective officer candidate. Those who either did not do well in the 
course or who did not pass the test returned to their former units and
had their names removed from the candidate's list.^^
The Army Ordinances of 1919 established a specific application 
process which required a formal written declaration that the aspirant 
wished to pursue the career of a professional officer in the Reichswehr 
as his life's "calling." Included also were comments from the applicant's 
commander regarding the suitability of the candidacy. The aspirant 
submitted in addition:
1. an autobiography
2. war record with comments by former commanders
3. recommendations for the candidate from officers under whom
he served which were to include:
a. mobilization assignment and duration of duty
b. present assignment and the date on which it began
c. assignments for which the candidate was especially 
qualified
d. military service abilities
e. marital status
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f. short assessment of personality and prognosis
regarding the officer candidate examination
g. verification that the candidate had served in the
field six months as a deputy-officer
h. recommendations from other former field commanders
4. verification of the proper education
5. declaration of freedom for officer's school, i.e., that 
present duty will permit release
6. prior military certificates
7. complete address of candidate
For those who attended Officer Candidate School, the application went to 
the Office of Military Education (Inspektion der Militar-Bildungsanstalten). 
For personnel with the proper non-military education, the process went 
through the appropriate Group Command and ultimately to the Office of 
Military Education. The final determination of candidates to be examined
came from Berlin for all contingents. A description of the examination 
appeared in Ordinance 977 of the Army Regulations of 1919, volume II. It 
consisted of tactics, weaponry, pioneer service (field engineering), map 
reading and general military knowledge. Both theoretical and applied 
problems had to be answered with the expertise of subaltern front 
officers.
The officer's candidate program consisted of taking special 
education courses in preparation for the Officer's Examination, attending 
Officer's School (Kriegsschule), and involved the same criteria for 
regular NCOs in each step of the process. All candidates attended Offi­
cer's School along with officers commissioned during the war and only 
after successful completion of the course was it possible to be commis­
sioned as a regular officer. The curriculum in Officer's School varied
in content from military subjects to economics, politics, and subjects of 
74
current interest. Candidates for promotion to officer came from all
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combat branches of the Imperial army, the Provisional Reichswehr, and
75
even the Austrian army on occasion.
A particular concern to both the Reich and Lander military 
authorities was the arbitrary commissioning of NCOs by the Reichswehr 
Minister, who in June, 1919, boasted that he had personally named seventy- 
five NCOs to be officers in one day. Such promotions were not isolated 
in the Prussian contingent, but occurred in Bavaria as well.^^ Arbitrary 
commissionings brought complaints from the Bavarian contingent, whose 
military leaders felt it allowed candidates not educationally qualified 
under the terms of the Provisional Reichswehr Law to attain a commission. 
Some, the authorities contended, were sponsored by soldiers's councils
77
and were not even active NCOs. The Bavarians pointed out that under 
the limitations of the Versailles Treaty their contingent in the officer 
corps should be approximately 420 active, professional officers. This 
meant that by April, 1920, around 2,400 officers would be released from 
the service in Bavaria. The present practice of promoting NCOs, they 
argued, would lead to non-commissioned personnel obtaining a dispropor­
tionate number of positions within the contingent compared with regular 
officers who wished to remain. Since there were approximately 8,000 NCOs 
who technically qualified for appointment to the rank of officer or offi­
cer candidate, the solution was for many of the commissions to be made 
78in the reserves. By July 16, 1919, the Bavarian Ministry for Military
Affairs reported that, in accordance with the Army Regulations Gazette
program for promotion to officer, 288 NCOs had been promoted to officer
79in their contingent;
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NCOS
Ensign (Fahnriche) 22
Sergeant-Lieutenant (Feldwebelleutnant) 66
Active NCOs (bravery in action) 29
Active NCOs (educationally qualified) 25
Active NCOs (officer candidate course) 146
Promoted to lieutenant in the Reichswehr 288
In addition to the above cited commissions, a limited number of persons 
entered active service after promotion to lieutenant in the reserves when
the Freikorps units in which they served were absorbed into the Reichs-
, 80 wehr.
The process for non-commissioned officers requesting promotion 
or becoming officer candidates required a strict adherence to the appro­
priate sections outlined in the Army Ordinance Gazette of 1919. Even if 
the prospective candidate followed the procedures and possessed superior 
qualifications, admission to the officer candidate program was not auto­
matic. Indeed, no NCO received an outright promotion to officer status 
except those arbitrarily appointed by the Reichswehr Minister or the 
Bavarian Minister of Military Affairs. The army demanded that the pre­
scribed route detailed in the official regulations be employed and insisted 
that all candidates pass the appropriate educational courses prior to 
consideration for a commission.
The Bavarian Central State Archives contains a number of complete 
dossiers of applicants for commission under the regulations of 1919. The 
majority revealed that the process for application received the exacting 
treatment demanded by the military. Indeed, only those who did follow
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the procedure outlined and made application through proper military 
channels had a good chance for selection. One of the most complete 
dossiers belonged to Ordnance Deputy-Officer Konrad Fabian, who wrote to 
his superiors regarding promotion to officer on the basis of bravery in 
action. Fabian wanted to become an active officer in the infantry, field 
artillery, or foot artillery and "pursue the officer's calling as his 
life's profession." Fabian followed precisely the format for applica­
tions as set forth in the army regulations. The required documents 
demonstrated that he had been a deputy-officer in combat for longer than 
six months. He had been cited for distinction against the enemy for 
defusing unexploded gas shells during the war and recommended for promo­
tion to officer. Fabian therefore requested promotion to officer in the
Reichswehr on the basis of the army regulations authorizing commissions
81for NCOs cited for bravery. After several additional letters to his 
superiors, Fabian's request was reviewed by Reichswehrgruppenkommando IV 
in Munich. The applicant was found to have acted in a brave and exemplary 
manner, but promotion to lieutenant was denied on the grounds that gas 
shells per se were not considered the same as enemy troops. However,
Fabian received a recommendation for Officer Candidate School after which
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he would be eligible for the Officer's Examination, and then a commission. 
The example again confirmed the military's insistence upon proper prepara­
tion and success through performance.
In some cases, the contingent commands prepared lists of 
non-commissiones personnel considered qualified for promotion, primarily 
on the basis of bravery before the enemy. Often, only those names appeared 
on the list whom the authorities wanted to be promoted. The lists also
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contained comments regarding the service records of leading candidates 
with what amounted to an official request for consideration of those 
persons named. One such list, prepared by the Bavarian command, contained 
eighteen names, thirteen of which were infantry NCOs and the remainder 
from diverse services within the contingent. Two received special atten­
tion for their war services in the form of lengthy comments and details
83from their official records. Such a recommendation virtually assured 
the person a place in an officer candidate program, while NCOs applying 
to the military authorities on their own behalf had much less chance to 
be selected.
In practice, the majority of successful candidates from the 
non-commissioned ranks came from among those sponsored by Group Commands 
where the local military authorities had already narrowed the lists of 
persons deemed qualified. Most of the NCOs in that category had been 
trained under the old Imperial system and possessed what the military 
considered a proper attitude toward the profession, the officer corps, 
and politics in general. Certainly few, if any, of those selected came 
from Soldier's Councils or possessed beliefs far removed from their 
superiors. Thus, the commissioning of NCOs did little to democratize 
the army because the personnel chosen for promotion were from the former 
establishment.
Because the promotion of non-commissioned personnel to officer 
could be accomplished in either the arbitrary fashion of the civilian 
officials or that of the military, confusion arose in the minds of many 
NCOs regarding those eligible for consideration. Even though the army 
regulations were quite specific in this regard, a number of NCOs from
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other than combat arms applied for commissions and were universally 
84rejected. With arbitrary promotion there also existed the possibility 
for undesirable personnel to enter the officer corps. One such incident 
involved a Bavarian NCO who became a member of the Communist Party after 
his application for a commission. The Bavarian military authorities 
voiced great concern that since the discovery of his political affilia­
tion came rather late in the process, the applicant might have already
been to officer candidate school, passed the Officer's Examination, and
85was, in fact, being commissioned. To avoid such problems, the military 
considered it imperative that arbitrary commissioning or appointments to 
officer candidate programs by civilian authorities cease. Such actions 
did stop after a brief initial period as the civilian ministers began to 
realize the extent of military opposition to arbitrary commissionings 
and because the Provisional Reichswehr Law provided a system with the 
possibility of producing more efficient officers through additional 
training and education.
The number of non-commissioned officers raised to lieutenant 
from December, 1918 to March, 1920 was not precisely known. Some histor­
ians, Harold Gordon for example, estimate the total as high as 300-400,
while a retired Lieutenant-General, Hans Mundt, numbered such promotions 
86at 200. It was known that many NCOs who took the officer candidate 
course and examination erned commissions either in the Reichswehr or in 
the reserves. Their total, in all probability, was far greater than a 
minimum of 200 or maximum of 400. Whether active or reserve, the total 
number of NCOs who became officers declined due to the personnel cut­
backs associated with the Versailles Treaty and the inauguration of later
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officer candidate programs directed at persons outside the military 
establishment. The second Reichswehr Minister, Dr. Otto Gessler, noted 
that the promotion of NCOs to officer was not particularly successful as 
a means to democratize the army or to produce efficient officers. In 
1928, of the 209 Unteroffiziere commissioned through various means who
were still in the service, only twenty-five had attained the rank of
. . 87captain.
The promotion of NCOs to officer failed to produce lasting or 
significant effects on the army because the bulk of personnel involved 
came from the old military system. They generally held the same politi­
cal views as the officer corps, accepted the same basic notions of 
inequalities in German society, and felt as threatened in their careers 
by the revolution as did the command hierarchy. Further, it was as 
necessary for an NCO officer aspirant to conform to the traditions, 
ideals, and values of the corps as it was for an officer candidate from 
any other source. Such men were quickly assimilated by the system and in 
most cases were quite willing to meet the expectations of the leaders of 
the corps in order to join a more elite and prestigious social group.
The failure of the NCO promotion program brought an end to attempts by 
the civilian authorities to alter the military. The Republic henceforth 
accepted the Reichswehr on its own terms because no other possibilities 
still existed.
Conclusions
In the demobilization period from January 1919 to June 1919, the 
conflicts already existing within the military and in military-civil 
relations continued. From the outset, the major area of dispute was
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over the question of what officers should be retained in the service.
The High Command and the General Staff sought to preserve the positions 
of officers of a traditionalist character, in particular staff officers, 
while the Demobilization Commission headed by Reinhardt insisted upon 
retaining the best men determined by front service and performance of 
combat duty. In the end, the former triumphed because in spite of efforts 
to reduce the officer corps’ personnel, Seeckt preserved many positions 
by the creation of superfluous staffs. As a result, fewer staff officers 
were released from the army. This meant that a high proportion of offi­
cers remaining in the service had strong ties with the hierarchy of the 
Imperial army.
For officer selection, the process of demobilization created 
more problems than it solved. Too few officers retired voluntarily and 
this left a large pool of men who wanted to continue a military career 
anxiously awaiting the results of the peace treaty and the formation of 
a new army. Because of Reinhardt's cooperation and acknowledgment of 
the Soldier's Councils is his January 19, 1919, decree, the Colonel 
appeared to these officers to be a traitor to the traditions and ideals 
of the officer corps. Many officers saw Reinhardt as merely a tool in 
the hands of a government hostile to the military. Such men failed 
utterly to grasp his sense of reality or appreciate the tactics he 
employed in nullifying radical demands to alter the entire military 
system.
The contest among Reinhardt, the High Command and the General 
Staff became more heated as plans for the organization of a peacetime 
command structure for the army began to materialize. Both the High
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Command and the General Staff submitted proposals to the government 
which were obviously weighted in favor of obtaining independence for the 
military leadership with freedom from civilian control as the ultimate 
goal. These plans allowed more power for the military than the civilian 
government wished to concede and were, in reality, contrary to the 
requirements for the command structure of the army as set forth in the 
constitution. Although the majority of Seeckt's organizational proposals 
were adopted, Reinhardt insisted upon changing the collegial system to 
one headed by a single commander-in-chief for the military establishment. 
With the acceptance of Reinhardt’s constitutionally correct vertical plan 
by the government, the President and the Reichswehr Minister became the 
actual commanders of the army. Groner retured shortly thereafter and 
Seeckt adopted an inactive status though he remained highly influential.
He operated behind the scenes to oppose and undermine Reinhardt as Chef 
der Heeresleitung through close personal associates still on active 
service. With the loss of their traditional superiority in civil- 
military relations, the old military hierarchy had suffered a severe 
defeat. However, these officers were not content to retire from the 
battle and continued the struggle by other means.
The last major effort on the part of the government to change 
the values and ideals of the military also occurred during the demobiliza­
tion period. This objective was considered obtainable by civilian offi­
cials through the infusion of presumably more democratic and liberal- 
minded officer personnel into the officer corps from the non-commissioned 
ranks. However, most of those commissioned were simply not as efficient 
as the officers they replaced nor were they any more democratic, being
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products of the Imperial army themselves. Further, the army itself 
controlled the majority of appointments to officer candidate programs and 
naturally selected only personnel considered to possess the proper con­
servative outlook. Those of liberal or democratic views who were commis­
sioned found the career a difficult one. Many were subsequently dismissed 
from the service because they did not qualify for the next highest rank, 
as evidenced by the small number who attained the rank of Captain. The 
long-term influence of commissioned NCOs on the officer corps was 
negligible in the final analysis.
The primary significance of the Provisional Reichswehr for the 
future was in the high degree of continuity it provided between the 
Imperial army and the 100,000-man Reichswehr. The inclusion of former 
Freikorps personnel in both the leadership echelon and rank and file meant 
that a significant portion of the military, whose sworn duty was to pro­
tect the constitution, actually despised the present government. Their 
reliability was highly questionable if circumstances had required them 
to defend republican institutions. In reality, the Provisional Reichs­
wehr served as a base for a 100,000-man army which was anti-democratic, 
anti-republican, and in favor of a more authoritarian system.
Thus, by June 1919, most of the conflicts within the army itself 
and between the civilian government and military leaders remained unsolved. 
Considerable progress had been made toward establishing civilian control 
over the army, but powerful forces opposed to governmental interference 
in military affairs remained at work in the officer corps. The publish­
ing of the Versailles Treaty in May 1919 presented the military leaders 
with the unpleasant task of making further reductions in officer personnel.
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Since this would require more drastic measures than heretofore employed, 
bitter conflict within the military was unavoidable.
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. CHAPTER V
THE SCREENING AND FORCED REDUCTION STAGE:
JUNE 1919 - MARCH 1920
More than any other factor, control of officer selection and 
education for the Reichswehr after World War One determined the character 
of the new German army. The recruitment and training of young men on 
whom the future officer corps and army depended was a critical issue, 
both to the government, which hoped that the army would be republican- 
minded, and to the traditionalists in the officer corps led by Seeckt, 
who wanted the ideals of the past maintained. This divergence of goals 
produced an unending conflict between the socialist-led government and 
the surviving officers from the hierarchy of the Imperial army.
During the June 1919-March 1920 period, the major conflicts 
remained much the same as before: between the Reinhardt and Seeckt fac­
tions in the military, and between the traditionalists in the army command 
and the government. Neither side in the latter dispute emerged victor­
ious because the government was as divided as the military, if not more 
so. Relations among all the contending groups deteriorated during the 
June 1919-March 1920 months to the point where major confrontations became 
inevitable if a settlement of the issues was to be reached.
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The period also saw the re-emergence of an assertive 
particularism in the south German states which challenged the authority 
of the Reich government, especially in matters relating to military 
personnel, and precluded the implementation of a united command and 
administrative system for the army. This meant, on the one hand, that 
the military leadership could not present a united front in its relations 
with the government and on the other, that the government in Berlin could 
not exert much control over personnel selection in the Baden and Bavarian 
contingents. Although the Reich government was not successful in solving 
this problem, the Reich military command— under Seeckt— did eventually 
overcome particularism in officer selection.
The period immediately following the demobilization of the 
Imperial army, therefore, contributed little toward solving the basic 
military problems which had existed since the armistice in November 1918. 
Because of lingering disputes between the civilians and military, and 
due to the continuity with the Imperial army provided by the Provisional 
Reichswehr, the government failed to find an alternative to the employ­
ment of the old army for its protection. Therefore, the conflicts over 
reorganization and officer selection widened the distance between the 
government and the bulk of the officer corps to an impassible chasm.
Added to these problems were the controversies over the acceptance or 
rejection of the Versailles Treaty, as well as the establishment of a new 
command structure necessitated by both the treaty and the Weimar 
constitution.
For the officer corps, the Versailles Treaty meant that the 
reduction of personnel continued through the employment of measures
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designed to force the retirement or separation of surplus officers. In 
spite of the fact that Reinhardt and Braun established basic selection 
criteria to be applied impartially to all candidates by the Personalamt, 
the decisive point in the development of the officer corps was Seeckt's 
manipulation of the system when he became Chef der Heeresleitung after 
March 1920. Even before then, however, from his position as head of the 
Truppenamt, Seeckt could influence officers and officer candidates pre­
paring for promotion or commissions through his control of training and 
education for. the army.
In general terms, the very acceptance of the treaty caused 
problems in civil-military relations. Many officers previously dismissed 
from the servoice joined conservative political parties or groups plotting 
against the new regime and later supported such forces in the Kapp-Liittwitz 
Putsch of March 1920. It was, indeed, the continued reductions in offi­
cer personnel, first under the continuing demobilization, and then after 
Versailles, which led to the Putsch that changed the history of the 
Reichswehr.
The Reduction of the Officer Corps: June 1919 to March 1920
With the adoption of Reinhardt's organizational plan for the 
command structure of the new army, Groner's retirement, and Seeckt's 
assumption of an advisory role in the Truppenamt, the primary conflict 
shifted from structural and command questions to that of officer selec­
tion. The officer corps of the Prussian-German army never possessed a 
centrally administered officer selection program because the Imperial 
army incorporated into its structure troops of the formerly independent 
states. These states retained considerable control over the selection
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process, but there were certain criteria common to all contingents, 
including military education, training, and performance, as well as the 
acceptance of a conservative outlook based upon the traditions of the 
past. In reality, very little changed in the basic requirements in the 
Reichswehr although the overall philosophy of the corps leadership 
underwent alteration due to the differences in outlook between Reinhardt 
and Seeckt.^
In the Imperial army, officer selection came in wartime under 
the direction of the Personalamt, as part of the Military Cabinet while 
the Prussian War Minister administered the program in peacetime. In the 
Reichswehr, the head of the Personalamt, the Badenese General von Braun 
(1918-1922) possessed an autonomous position because of his relations with 
Prussian War Minister Reinhardt. Braun had a great deal of influence, 
especially in the daily running of his office as well as in policy deci­
sions. It was Braun, as Reinhardt later wrote, who was responsible
through "his trustworthy loyalty [for] the position of the officer corps
2
not being destroyed."
Initially, the government considered the demobilization process .
adequate to reduce the army to peacetime strength. Some officers had no
3
interest in pursuing a military career and opted to retire voluntarily.
For officers wishing to remain in the service, the Personalamt applied 
the Personnel and Qualifications Regulations (Personal- und Qualifikations 
Bestimmung) from the Army Ordinance Gazette of 1902. These requirements 
listed the general characteristics for officers— and later officer candi­
dates as well— as military and intellectual knowledge and ability, 
physical vigor and condition, and they demanded that the nomination of
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officers be made only in the "interests of the service" (Intéressé des 
4
Dienstes), At that time, the overwhelming majority of officers and 
officer candidates came from personnel of the old army.
The application of the officer selection criteria in most cases 
was assigned to the regimental level, but in the spring of 1919, a serious 
dispute arose over selection criteria between the High Command and the 
Personalamt. The Imperial army had between 38,000 and 40,000 active 
officers at the end of the war. Of this total about 23,000 had pre-war 
patents (tenure); and 15,000 were war-commissioned. When on August 1, 
1919, it became known that only 4,000 officers would be retained, the 
policy of allowing demobilization to serve as the basis for the selection 
procedure came under severe criticism by the Hand Command and General 
Staff factions. By that time, 2,800 staff officers, 5,800 Hauptleute 
(Captains and First Lieutenants), and a large part of the war-commissioned 
and reserve-status officers slated for dismissal indicated that they 
wished to remain in the service.^ When Reinhardt and Braun began the 
selection process by picking the most qualified front line officers first, 
Groner and then Seeckt sent angry letters to the Reichswehr Ministry.
As acting Chief of the General Staff, Seeckt stated that he 
wanted all the really good elements of the old officer corps to remain 
and demanded that this should be made known to the Kreiskommissare in 
charge of local .selection. He stated further that apparently the 
Personalamt took an opposite stand with the policy that "the proven front 
officers must be selected first" due to the present unpopularity of the 
General Staff. The General Staff officer, he wrote, is a front officer 
and reminded Reinhardt of the great service the General Staff had
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performed in the past. In Seeckt's opinion, these men were the best 
possible officer material and the elite of the officer corps. Seeckt 
argued that strength and homogeneity in the army depended upon the older 
officers and every effort had to be made to procure positions for them.^ 
Reinhardt forwarded the letter to Braun with handwritten comments to the 
effect that he shared Seeckt’s view on the performance of the General 
Staff as he was certain the Chief of the Personalamt did, but the matter 
remained in Braun's hands.
Seeckt's demand was not rejected, but modified because Braun 
believed that he had to oversee the interests of all officers in the army. 
Therefore, the selection criteria remained as before; the best qualified 
officers in terms of performance of duty and education in each service 
grade of all combat arms would be considered first. General von Braun 
explained further that he had been advised by two leading officers not to 
give preference to General Staff officers in making appointments to the 
corps. They did not want front line officers forced to give "pride of 
place" to General Staff officers as a matter of principle. Many thousands 
of officers, Braun continued, had been released from the service since 
1918, but none from the General Staff. According to Braun, there was no 
official policy to select front officers over the General Staff although 
there was, he admitted, consideration of the present mood against the 
military elite on the part of proven front officers who were apprehensive 
about their own future. In conclusion, the Chief of the Personalamt 
commented that he would follow any course set by the Prussian War Minis­
ter.^ Selection criteria remained in Braun's control thereafter, unaltered 
by Groner's or Seeckt's complaints. It would in time be changed somewhat
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by the Versailles Treaty, but then only in numbers for both regular and
g
reserve officers and not in policy or procedure.
The conflict over who should be retained, war-commissioned front 
officers or staff officers, had long range consequences. Many of the 
former were young, virtually taken out of school and sent to the front 
lines with.inadequate training. The army became the focal point of their 
lives as it already was with the professional officer. After being 
excluded by the selection process, neither the war-commissioned officer 
nor the professional officer had an acceptable alternate career. Front 
officers felt badly misused after the sacrifices they made for the 
nation, and consequently the majority became alienated from the Republic 
and even the army. Radicalism and violence appealed to many who turned 
in their frustration to groups opposing the Republic and espousing a 
violent solution to Germany’s post-war problems. Organizations like the 
SA provided these persons solace and a comradeship akin to that of the 
front.
The professional General Staff officer differed in his response 
to the threat to his position. Like the front officer, the staff officer 
was bitter and resentful toward the Republic and its military leaders. 
However, the majority of these officers were highly competent leaders 
unlike the war-commissioned personnel who had less training. The staff 
officers were among the most competent in the service and were more likely 
to possess the traditional social and political qualifications. They were 
a part of the military elite of the nation and their talents were well 
respected regardless of their conservative or traditionalist views, even 
by the republican government. Furthermore, with Seeckt as their champion.
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they could expect support within the military hierarchy. It was possible, 
therefore, for the staff officer to obtain effective support for reten­
tion in the officer corps through ties with Seeckt at the Truppenamt, 
where officer training and educational policies were determined. This 
proved to be a decisive factor in the struggle over officer selection 
criteria, especially when Seeckt became Chef der Heeresleitung after 
March 1920. The programs to select future commanders during Seeckt's 
tenure as head of the Truppenamt made it possible for staff officers to 
utilize their educational superiority to great advantage in direct com­
petition with other officers. The tests and courses which formed a vital 
part of the selection process better suited the capabilities of the staff 
officer and considerably enhanced his chances of success in retaining a 
place in the new army.
Thus, Seeckt's position as head of the Truppenamt became the key 
for the future officer corps because of its role in the preparation of 
officers and officer candidates for promotion. This became apparent— at 
least to the military.leadership— early in the contest over officer 
selection because only through superior education and performance of duty 
could officers expect to remain in the corps. Particularly important in 
this respect was a program initiated by Seeckt in 1920 to attract volun­
teers from outside the present establishment for training as officer 
candidates in the army.
The Officer Candidate Program of 1920
A new officer training program in the army became vital to the 
command hierarchy because of the republican government's early policy of
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promoting non-commissioned personnel to officer status. The army 
leadership became concerned with the number of NCOs arbitrarily raised 
to subaltern and Seeckt devised a program to give the military at least 
some control over the commissioning of NCOs through the Truppenamt. In 
this manner, the army could assure that those promoted accorded with 
their notion of a Reichswehr officer. Concern in the army grew further 
with the reductions in professional personnel and due to the commission­
ing of enlisted men. Seeckt*s 1920 program for officer candidates sought 
to ensure that rigorous education and performance standards, as well as 
political reliability, continued to be met by all officers regardless of 
their origin.
The existence of such a program became vital to Seeckt's 
rebuilding of the officer corps. Eventually, the majority of officer 
candidates who attained commissions after completing the program came 
from previously non-military backgrounds. In addition, the bulk of non­
commissioned personnel who had been promoted to officer were then dis­
missed from the service as unqualified for the next highest rank. Their 
replacements were not only more qualified technically through the mili­
tary educational programs, but due to Seeckt's influence in designing 
the courses also held more traditionalist views.
Later, after the Versailles Treaty limited the number of officer 
candidates to that produced by a yearly discharge rate of five percent,
9
the Reichswehr had a maximum of 200 new officers annually. In the 
beginning, the sources for officer candidates were the same as before; 
NCOs, former Cadets, Fahnriche or Fahnenjunker from the army, air service, 
or navy. The method by which applicants were chosen as officer
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candidates from outside the establishment became even more important as 
many former sources for officers, especially the Cadet Corps, were 
eliminated. After 1920, most officer candidates had attended civilian 
schools and the examinations for these persons tested performance on the 
expected educational level of a Realschule, Oberrealschule, Gymnasium, or 
other public secondary institution-^^ Non-graduates could become offi­
cers, but could not rise to the higher ranks because the military 
hierarchy considered these candidates only marginally qualified in 
educational background.The officer candidate training process entailed 
attendance at a number of service schools and exposed the candidate to 
constant scrutiny and examination. Each successful candidate began with 
the Reifeprüfung or matriculation certification from a secondary school.
If he did not already have the completion certificate, he could obtain it
through special courses and qualifying examinations before becoming an
12
official officer candidate.
The scope of recruiting personnel for the officer corps also 
expanded since it became possible for officers of the navy to enter the 
Reichswehr as provided by an order of Reichswehr Minister Noske on 
September 2, 1919. Active naval ensigns (Fahnriche zur See) could trans­
fer to the army if they had passed the Sea Officer's Examination and were
qualified for the rank of Sea Lieutenant or under the law entitling ensigns
13of the old army to become officer candidates. The number of naval 
personnel who actually transferred to the army is not exactly know, but 
sources for such applicants might have been the radical Volksmarine 
Division and the Loewenfeld Naval Brigade.
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An important question which arose regarding Fahnriche and
Fahnenjunker of the old army dealt with whether or not the half year at
the front was still required or whether in such cases the aspirant was
14
eligible only for promotion into the reserves. The need for clarifi­
cation of policy was resolved by instructions from Noske and Seeckt, 
acting on behalf of the Chef der Heeresleitung, on January 20, 1920. It 
set the tone for the following years by stating that the new army was 
indeed smaller and its officers needed to be more capable. Strict 
observance of the selection criteria established by the Personalamt was 
the order of the day.
During the officer candidate’s training with the troops and in 
weapons school, evaluation of his qualifications occurred regularly. The 
volunteer who entered the army could expect the following schedule in 
his career:
1% years front service (active duty with a troop unit)
2 years weapons school (including service time with the troops) 
% year front service (active duty with a troop unit)
4 years total, or until promotion 
The earliest possible date for a commission of new officer candidates 
under the Seeckt plan was April 1, 1924, and the number of candidates 
eligible for promotion at that time could produce as many as 450 new 
officers. Fahnriche, Fahnenjunker and officer candidates from the non­
commissioned ranks were to be given primary consideration for entry into 
the program. In the first category (A) were personnel from the old army 
who qualified under the terms of the Army Ordinance Gazette of 1919 for 
promotion to officer, candidates whose qualifications were not yet
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fulfilled, but who had completed special courses; and lastly volunteers 
of promise who entered the army and served on active duty with a troop 
unit. In the next category (B) were non-commissioned officers who passed 
the Officer's Examination required by a March 31, 1919, decree, those 
qualified by other categories such as bravery before the enemy, and others 
who were deemed by their commanding officers especially qualified. Up to 
thirty percent of the available positions in the special courses to pre­
pare officer candidates for the Officer's Examination were to be filled 
by non-commissioned personnel.
The fact that the civilian government took no part in determining 
the content of educational and training programs for the army meant that 
the head of the Truppenamt had a powerful tool with which to mould the 
attitudes and values of the future leaders of the military establishment. 
Officer training and education were areas in which the government tradi­
tionally played no role, this being left to the experts in the field— the 
military themselves. Even after the November Revolution, the new regime 
placed education and training on an internal administrative basis for the 
military hierarchy to control and thus forfeited a possible means with 
which to influence the army along more liberal lines. It was the heads 
of the Truppenamt in the final analysis who maintained the ideals of the 
past in the Reichswehr through their control of education and training.
The officer education program sponsored by the Truppenamt was 
not the only one which produced highly qualified personnel for the Reichs­
wehr. Lieutenant-General Reinhardt, after his resignation as the Chef 
der Heeresleitung inaugurated the "Reinhardt Course" of university study 
for ten array and two navy officers per year. The curriculum included
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military history, operations, foreign languages, seminars on topics of 
general interest and trips outside the country to broaden the officer's 
perspective. The program featured instruction by both military and
civilian educators and was the forerunner of the latter-day Wehrmacht
16 ' ' academy. Additional programs were offered in specific subject areas
for officers at technical colleges which featured bridge building,
ballistics, and motor and aircraft construction during an eight-semester
curriculum. Examinations followed the completion of the course, and
successful candidates earned academic degrees as Diploma Engineers
(Diplom-Ingenieur-Dipl.Ing.) or Doctor of Engineering (Dr.Ing.).^^
The technical quality of officer produced by the Reichswehr 
system of selection and education was extremely high. This, coupled with 
the rigorous competition for the few positions available within the 
officer corps, meant that the old military classes, the nobility, the 
professions, and the upper middle class with proper education, once again 
monopolized control over the army as a whole. The lower classes, par­
ticularly the workers, were effectively excluded through a lack of edu­
cation, social position, and after March 1920 when Seeckt became head of 
the army, by the traditional view that these elements did not possess 
proper "character." Most middle-class officers did not suffer this 
discrimination, especially if they had a conservative political philosophy.
By the end of 1922, Seeckt controlled all of the vital positions 
in the leadership of the Reichswehr which were necessary for the central­
ization of the selection, training, and education of officers. None of 
the civilian plans for the re-adjustment of the philosophy of the army 
had succeeded and the traditionalists under Seeckt's direction reconstructed
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the Reichswehr to suit their own conceptions of the new army in Germany. 
Despite the numerous plans by various civilian and military groups for 
the future army, it was the Versailles Treaty which had the greatest 
long-term effects on the organization of the military establishment on 
subsequent programs for officer selection.
The Versailles Treaty and the Reichswehr
Much of the in-fighting between the Prussian War Minister, the 
High Command and the General Staff factions in the military came to 
naught because the Versailles Treaty provided specific terms under which 
the government and Reichswehr had to operate. The provisions of the 
treaty first became known to the Germans in May 1919 and were received 
with shock and resentment.
The treaty contained a special section. Number 5, which dealt 
with military, naval, and air matters. It outlined the organization and 
strength of the future German army in great detail, and for the officer 
corps, nine particular points were of utmost importance. These few lines 
shaped the corps' structure, fixed the total number of officers permitted 
to serve in the army at 4,000, but established no criteria for officer 
selection. According to the treaty, the German army was to comprise no 
more than seven divisions of infantry and three of cavalry with a total 
number of effectives not to exceed 100,000 men inclusive of officers and 
depots. Furthermore, the army was to be reduced to 200,000 men three 
months after ratification of the settlement. In each subsequent three- 
month period, new reductions schedules were to be determined by the Allies 
so that by March 31, 1920, the army would be at the specified 100,000 men. 
The treaty also restricted para-military forces, as well as the number of
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customs officers, forest guards and coast guards to that of 1913 and 
forbade the assembly of these personnel for military training.
For the future army, the most important articles dealt with 
the creation of a professional military force based upon voluntary enlist­
ments. Article 174 set the service time for NCOs and other enlisted ranks 
at twelve consecutive years with an annual discharge rate of five percent. 
Article 175 provided that officers retained in the army had to serve to 
forty-five years of age and new officers for twenty-five consecutive 
years. Former officers were forbidden to take part in any type of mili­
tary exercise and the annual discharge rate was also five percent.
Article 176 abolished military schools except those training replacements 
in specific branches of the service at the rate of one school per arm 
with the number of students related to the actual vacancies in the offi­
cer corps. Educational establishments, societies of discharged soldiers 
and clubs of any type could not engage in military training or have any 
connection with the ministries of war or other military authority.
As a result of the Versailles Treaty, the Germans lost the 
greater part of their army administrative organs, training facilities, 
and educational institutions. These included the War Academies at Berlin 
and Munich, military technical academies, war schools, the Cadet Corps, 
and NCO schools of the Imperial army. In the military administrative 
system, the agreement necessitated the dissolution of seven inspection 
areas, twenty-five general command areas (Generalkommando), the Inspec­
torates of the Cavalry, Foot Artillery, Pioneers, Fortresses, Jagers, 
the Landwehr Inspectorate and regional recruiting commands in addition to 
numerous staffs and commands created during the war. The most significant
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losses, however, were that of the General Staff and the High Command
which were dissolved and, by the terms of the treaty, never to be 
18reconstituted.
A law implementing the treaty became effective August 21, 1920, 
and stated that the armed forces (Wehrmacht) were to be composed of volun­
teers from the same sources as the Provisional Reichswehr, from the
Provisional Reichswehr itself, and the Provisional Navy with all of the
19
stipulations regarding the period of service and requirements included.
The creation of the treaty-based army opened a new era in the history of
the German military establishment. Instead of weakening the German
military to the point where they could never threaten the peace of Europe
again, the stringent terms led to the development of a small, but highly
efficient army which could easily be expanded should the opportunity ever
arise. The ultimate effect of the treaty was precisely the opposite of
that intended. The Reichswehr trained future leaders for a larger army
which became a force without equal in Europe.
The immediate reaction of leading officers to the treaty, however,
showed no uniformity of opinion on a course of action. Most favored
rejection, even at the cost of renewed hostilities and the probable loss
20of German territory. Reinhardt called the treaty unbearable, especially
the so-called Peace Treaty; like Pandora's Box contains new evil that once
21
again only blood and iron can heal. . . . "  Further conflict emerged
within the officer corps between those favoring rejection and those who
did not and like Groner counseled acceptance to preserve the unity of the
Reich. Most officers realized that it was extremely doubtful any popular
22support could be found for a continuation of hostilities. Reinhardt
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considered resigning over the matter, but did not want to have Groner
succeed him as Prussian War Minister. He eventually accepted the treaty
23
in spite of his reservations and dislike of the honor paragraphs. To 
strengthen the pro-treaty forces, Groner proposed the formation of a 
national dictatorship headed by Gustav Noske and received limited support 
from his own High Command faction. However, Noske flatly refused Groner's 
offer even though the General pledged personally to remain with the 
Defense Minister on the acceptance of the treaty "through thick and 
thin."^^ Noske's refusal ended the matter, but the bitterness over the 
issue remained in the officer corps.
The Constitution of August 1919
After the acceptance of the Versailles Treaty, the framers of 
the Weimar constitution attempted to incorporate the stipulations con­
tained in the military clauses into national law. Particular emphasis 
was placed upon a strict adherence to the exact requirements in numbers 
of personnel and the overall structure demanded by the Allies. In most 
respects, however, the constitution maintained the pattern of the Imperial 
army by implementing a contingent system rather than a unitary one favored 
by the majority of the military hierarchy.
The republican constitution also partially recreated the command
structure of the former regime by making the head of state the commander-
25
in-chief of the armed forces in the same manner as the Kaiser had been.
In the revised system, the president became the head of the army and his 
office had the authority to name officers and the senior military officer 
in the army.^^ The constitution further provided for a Reichswehr- 
ministerium led by a civilian in order to place the armed forces under
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parliamentary control. Although the National Assembly intended to create 
a central authority for the Reichswehr to eliminate the previous federal 
system, many politicians felt that it was not possible at that time. The 
result was a compromise that continued many features of the Imperial 
period.
The Weimar constitution retained the system of special rights
instituted in 1871, thereby respecting the particularist sympathies of
the south German states. Article 79 gave partial control of the state
contingents to a special commandant (Landeskommandant) who represented
the state's interests. This person was also the actual contingent
27
commander for the Bavarian units in the Reichswehr. Each contingent,
while under the command of the Prussian War Minister, was also subordi-
28
nate to the administrative competence of a state defense minister.
Instead of clarifying the conflict between the Reich authority 
and the Lander military officials, the constitution contributed further 
to the divisiveness. By re-affirming the federal character of the mili­
tary system and giving the states a semi-autonomous position in personnel 
matters, the constitution considerably lessened the control of the Reich 
government over officer selection— an area vital to the future army and 
officer corps. The adoption of a contingent system lent credence to 
existing notions and claims for independence in certain military matters 
on the parts of Bavaria and Baden made the task of creating a central or 
unified system dependent on the readiness of the southern states to do so 
voluntarily or upon a change in the law governing the military relations 
between the Reich and the states. In the interim, the selection of 
officers by the states continued to be based upon directives from the
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Personalamt although consideration was given to the special rights and 
wishes of the individual contingents.
'The Versailles Treaty and Weimar constitution also heightened 
another problem for the Reich civil and military authorities, that of 
south German particularism. Throughout the demobilization of the Imperial 
army and the initial reductions in the officer corps, the local authori­
ties in Bavaria and Baden utilized the special rights accorded to them 
to retain places in the armed forces for soldiers of their Lander. How­
ever, the Versailles Treaty meant that in practical terms the south 
German states could no longer have such a free hand in local personnel 
matters because the reduction of the army and officer corps to the agreed 
treaty level fell under the competency of the Reich.
The Germans failed to meet the initial reductions schedule as 
some 290,000 troops were still under arms in February 1920 and 231,000 
in April of that year. At the Spa Conference in July 1920, the Germans 
convinced the Allies to extend the timetable and finally reached the 
treaty figure of 100,000 men by January 1, 1921. It was, however, not 
met without difficulty, and many of the problems stemmed from the Bavar­
ians and Badenese employing their constitutional prerogatives in personnel 
matters to protect the positions of their own officers in the Reichwehr.
During the interim between the Versailles Treaty and the 
attainment of the 100,000-man level, the army command attempted to find 
an acceptable formula for the allotment of personnel to each contingent. 
The formula which ultimately prevailed was based on the percentages of 
the Reich population in the individual states. This would have given
29
Prussia 71%, Bavaria 13%, Saxony 10.5%, Württemberg 5% and Baden 0.5%.
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In practice, however, the figures were somewhat different and produced 
the following numbers of men for each contingent :
Contingent Percentage Number of Troops
Prussia 72.6 72,600
Bavaria 11.6 11,600
Saxony 8.1 8,100
Württemberg 4.1 4,100
Baden 3.6 3,600
With further troop and officer reductions, the Reich government and 
military authorities met increasing resistance from the Bavarian and 
Badenese officials to release personnel from their contingents. Parti­
cularism had always been a potentially disruptive force in the Republic 
and after mid-1919 became so in fact.
Particularism and Personnel Selection
Particularism in southern Germany stemmed from Bavaria, 
Württemberg, and Baden having been independent political entities before 
the formation of the Empire. The differences in culture, traditions, and 
to a great extent, religion, were recognized by the creation of a federal 
system in both the civil and military spheres of Imperial Germany. Because 
of the federated political system and the semi-autonomous position of the 
Lander military contingents, the feelings of a separate identity from the 
other parts of the Empire persisted in the southern states. With the end 
of hostilities in 1918 and the subsequent disarray of the civil government 
and Imperial army, the southerners seized the opportunity to lessen the 
dominance of Prussia over their states. Particularism thus became a 
strong divisive force in the civil and military affairs of the early 
Weimar Republic. The national authorities constantly sought a solution 
to the problem in order to re-establish administrative and military unity.
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However, southern particularism continued to trouble the national 
government until after 1923.
World War One brought about a re-birth of particularist 
sympathies in south Germany. The prolonged war effort after 1914 neces­
sitated the imposition of national controls over the state economies and 
other facets of life. Relations between Prussia and the south deteri­
orated sharply in 1916 with the advent of the Hindenburg-Ludendorff
dictatorship. This situation served to add constitutional as well as
31economic differences to the traditional rivalries. The increasing
centralization of functions under the Prussian-dominated government
resurrected the idea of a Prussian "power-hunger" in the minds of many
south Germans. They believed that at the opportune moment Prussia would
attempt to subvert their constitutional rights by creating a Gross-
32
preussen at the expense of the states in the south. Since Berlin
assumed the direction of the war effort and war economy, the Bavarians
in particular reasoned that Berlin was responsible for every inconvenience
and misfortune and "there had not been so much grumbling about the ’Sau-
33preussen' in Bavaria since 1866." Indeed, the expression became so
common and so widely used that many Bavarian children believed that
34Saupreussen was a single word.
Much of the anti-Prussian agitation in Bavaria toward the end of
the war came from the radicals of the left, such as Kurt Eisner of the
Independent Socialist Party, who sought to establish a republic. The
propaganda of the radicals developed a decidely anti-monarchist character
35
directed against the Wittelsbachs as well as the Hohenzollerns. However,
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in 1918, Bavarians in general lamented the end of the monarchy instead
36of celebrating the founding of the republic.
The immediate post-war months brought an intensification of 
particularist agitation by southern politicans. As early as the Lander 
Reichskonferenz of November 25, 1918, in Stuttgart, south German spokes­
men voiced support for the retention of a federal system based upon the 
1871 military convention and constitution. This continued at the second 
Reichskonferenz in Berlin on January 25, 1919, where Eisner proposed a 
federal plan in the names of Bavaria, Hesse, and Saxony which featured
a continuation and enlargement of the special rights (Sonderrechte) of 
37the Lander. In addition, ideas for a new south German Bund to include
Austria emerged and won support from delegates representing Bavaria,
38
Württemberg, Baden, and Hesse.
The debate soon spilled over into the National Assembly, where
the protection of military rights against possible reduction became a
primary objective of the representatives of Bavaria, Baden, and Wurttem- 
39berg. Prussian representatives opted for a system which would have
retained the prominence of their own state and even the SPD deputy
Eduard David warned that the National Assembly should not become an
"organ of particularims.It was necessary, however, to heed the wishes
of the south German states, and their demands helped shape the final
41character of the republican constitution. The framers of the Weimar 
constitution realized fully that a solution to the particularist problem 
would not easily be found. On January 28, 1919, Hugo Preuss, who played 
a principal role in drafting the new constitution, stated at a cabinet 
meeting that "The unified state cannot currently be realized in Germany;
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particularism is still too s t r o n g . T h e  system which evolved as the 
result of the insistence of the southern states upon retaining their 
special rights served only to prolong the particularist problem. Par­
ticularism waxed and waned over the following years, but always remained 
present and visible in one form or another.
The command echelon of the Reichswehr was especially concerned 
over the retention of the contingent system for the army under the Repub­
lic. Both Reinhardt and Seeckt as successive Chefs der Heeresleitung 
favored a unitary Reich command authority with complete control of
43officer selection, training, and administration in a centralized system.
Seeckt in particular made efforts to overcome the particularism of the
state governments and state commandants, because the contingent system
and state's rights constituted two of the greatest obstacles not only to
his personal control of the army, but also to the internal unity of the
officer corps, the independence of the army within the republican frame-
44work, and the general effectiveness of the troops. Simply stated,
Seeckt as commander of the Reichswehr felt that he could not rely on
certain units in view of the hostility of the southern states toward the
Reich authorities.^^ The Heeresleitung under both Reinhardt and Seeckt
conducted campaigns to obtain more control over the contingents primarily
in the field of personnel policy, but the Land governments resisted
46vigorously in the military and political spheres.
The conflict between the state authorities and the Reich 
officials continued throughout the life of the Weimar Republic. However, 
only Baden and Bavaria had any success in pressing particularist demands 
because they had been granted more autonomy than other states by the
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constitutions of 1871 and 1919. In the republic Württemberg and Saxony 
were subject to the direct control of Prussia and Reich officials as they 
had been under the Empire and possessed a much less autonomous position. 
Many south Germans saw little difference in control by Prussia under the 
monarchy and control by Prussia in a republic led by Social Democrats or 
liberals. To them, the conflict was a matter of defeating Prussian 
designs to control all of Germany for its own purposes.
The position of the states regarding military rights related to 
constitutional questions which offered no ready solution until alterations 
occurred in the military command structure and administrative functions 
of the military authorities. Seeckt instigated such changes in the rela­
tionships between the Reichswehr Minister and the Chef der Heeresleitung 
and reduced the powers of the Lander military ministries in the Wehr- 
gesetz of 1921. He then assured compliance with his wishes by the 
appointment of personal proteges to commands within those states seeking 
autonomy for their contingent after the Bavarian Crisis of 1923. The 
problem, however, remained even after Seeckt's resignation in 1926.
Seeckt ultimately achieved control over officer selection and over other 
key functions in the system as Chef der Heeresleitung. The long-standing 
dispute with General von Braun in the Personalamt ended in 1922 with 
Braun’s ouster from that position and the inclusion of the Personalamt 
under the direct supervision of the Chef der Heeresleitung.
Particularism and Officer Selection: The Baden Example
The demobilization of the Imperial army and its contingents 
brought forth a strong upsurge of particularist sympathies focused on 
the percentage of officers to be retained by each state compared with the
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Prussian allotment. Baden and Bavaria were the most volatile because 
of anti-Prussian sentiments which had lingered since 1866 and because it 
appeared to state officials that the Prussian-dominated Reich adminis­
tration planned violations of local rights in personnel matters. Thus, 
officer selection became a point of contention from the outset. Both 
Baden and Bavaria sought to retain a higher percentage of native-born 
personnel in their Lander contingents which meant that many Prussians 
serving in the states's contingents faced dismissal on grounds other than 
military capabilities. In regard to the Baden conflict, the historian 
Harold Gordon asserts that the problem was gradually overcome so that "no 
immeasurable differences arose between the military authorities of the 
Reich and the government of Baden.However, Gordon errs because the 
problem continued throughout the Seeckt era and beyond.
The reduction of personnel in the officers’ corps of the Lander 
contingents provided an opportunity for the state governments and military 
authorities to exercise their special rights in selecting officers for 
command positions. The states based their arguments on both constitu­
tional and traditional grounds in that the rights in question stemmed 
from the Imperial period and had been exercised on occasion since that 
time. In the Weimar era, the Reich authorities tried in vain to obtain 
voluntary compliance with the wishes of national officials in such 
questions but ultimately bowed to the demands of the states. Neverthe­
less, the removal of special state's rights occupied a prominent place in 
the objectives of both the civil and military authorities of the federal 
government.
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The most common conflict which arose between the state military 
establishments and the Reich in the immediate post-war years centered 
around the retention of officers for command positions in the state con­
tingents. In Baden, both the state government and the local military 
authorities made continuous efforts to secure positions in the Reichs- 
wehr for Badenese officers. This effort constituted an excellent 
example of the contest between the Reich and state officials over per­
sonnel selection.
The Chief of Staff of the Baden contingent, Lieutenant-Colonel
Fohrenbach, carried on the struggle to secure positions for native
Badenese officers during the demobilization with such vigor that it
attracted the attention of not only the Baden state government, but also
the Reich government and the Baden-born head of the Personalamt, General
von Braun. Fohrenbach advised the Baden military ministry as early as
April 1919 that the Baden Reichswehr Brigade was too small to permit
industrious young officers the possibility of progress and good training.
Badenese officers, he contended, were worth as much as their Prussian
comrades and should be afforded more opportunities for training in the
48Prussian contingent of which they were a part. On May 26, 1919, the 
Baden Ministerium fur militarische Angelegenheiten communicated with the 
Generalkommando of the XlVth Army Corps on this subject. The ministry 
stated that the military convention (Übereinkunft) between Prussia, 
Saxony, Bavaria, Württemberg and Baden provided for the possibility of 
the selection of higher leadership personnel by each state utilizing 
indigenous personnel (Landeskindem). Ministry officials, therefore, 
were of the opinion that it was not permissible for the position of
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Adjutant of the Baden Reichswehr Brigade to be occupied by a non- 
Badenese. Consequently, the appointment of a certain Captain Richter 
could not receive the consent of the ministry. Badenese military author­
ities, it continued, also placed a special value upon filling the position 
of Brigade Intendant with a Badenese. Positions for physicians and 
veterinarians, it further complained, had been filled with non-Badenese 
and the ministry requested that especially qualified personnel from Baden 
in these categories be taken from other corps areas or recalled from the 
reserves to correct the imbalance. One complaint related to a specific 
officer, Major-General von Chrismar. The Badenese wanted Chrismar dis­
missed as Brigade Artillery Commander because he did not get along with 
his Badenese troops. The ministry suggested that his replacement be the 
Baden-born Major-General von Freideburg. In a similar vein, the ministry
stated that a certain Captain, "as a non-Badener does not possess the
49Badenese native character (Volkscharakter)."
On May 27, 1919, the reply to the Baden military ministry from 
the Gruppenkommando of the XlVth Army Corps stated that an exhaustive 
examination had been conducted pursuant to the complaints received. The 
point regarding the non-Badenese Adjutant was well taken. However, the 
Generalkommando had previously suggested this to the Reich authorities 
and had attempted to find a qualified Badenese Captain without success. 
Captain Richter, the report continued, was the son of an officer who 
spent many years in a Badenese regiment and had himself joined a Freiburg 
infantry unit in 1907. He served as battalion and regimental Adjutant • 
and was twice wounded "for the German Fatherland and in a sense for the 
Baden h o m e l a n d . T h e  question was therefore referred to the Chief of
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the General Staff and to the Chief of the Personalamt. Badenese 
reserve medical personnel would not be recalled to active duty, but 
efforts would be made to locate qualified personnel in other corps areas 
for service with the Baden Reichswehr Brigade. The note closed with the 
stat ement that Major-General von Freideburg would likely be named to 
replace Major-General von Chrismar as the Badenese suggested. The ques­
tion of the Major-General's qualifications, however, rested "with the 
Personalamt.
The conflict continued and toward the end of 1919, a member of
the National Assembly in BErlin sent a letter of protest to Baden State
President Geiss stating that complaints had been received by Reich
authorities regarding the preferential treatment accorded to Badenese
officers over Prussian officers in the Baden Reichswehr Brigade. Reserve
Badenese officers, it asserted, had been retained in the service instead
of active non-Baden officers. The member of the National Assembly
reminded the Baden State President of the critical nature of the times
and concluded with the admonition that discrimination among contingent
52officers was henceforward discouraged. However, in November 1919, the 
Baden Ministry of Military Affairs pursued the matter further by address­
ing its case directly to the Personalamt. The ministry again repeated 
its contention that the Prussian-Baden military convention required 
participation by the Baden contingent within the Prussian system and that 
as a result, there were many Badenese officers in Prussian formations and 
non-Baden officers and officials in the Baden contingent. Of a total of 
245 officers in the Badenese component of Reichswehr Brigade 13, the 
letter stated, sixty-seven were Prussian with an additional twenty-two
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Prussian officers recently appointed to the Brigade. With a maximum of
three hundred officers forming the Badenese part.of the Reichswehr
officer corps, the Prussian share should have been a maximum of ninety
the ministry contended. Yet, nearly a third of all officer positions
were already filled with non-Badenese. The Baden Landtag, it warned,
could not accept such a situation as long as qualified Badenese officers
were available. The ministry complained that the twenty-two Prussians
recently appointed to the predominantly Badenese Reichswehr Brigade 13
did not belong in the Baden contingent because they were born Prussians,
although they were rated by the Reich military authorities— Reich in this
instance being synonymous with Prussian— as superior to many of their
Badenese comrades. The Badenese government and military contingent were
capable, the ministry asserted, of determining the correctness of the
53qualifications of the officers themselves.
The Personalamt * s tentative answer to the claims of the Baden
military ministry dated November 29, 1919, agreed to fill as many places
in the Baden contingent as possible with Badenese. If necessary, the
additional Badenese would come from among those serving in other Reichs- 
54wehr contingents. On January 20, 1920, General von Braun personally 
wrote a reply to the Badenese in which he attempted to refute the claim 
that only a few Baden-born officers had been selected for the Prussian 
contingent and stated that those in various staffs, training, and command 
echelon positions numbered twenty-eight. According to Braun, an additional 
forty-seven native Badenese had officer positions in the Prussian contin­
gent of the 200,000-man army, other than those in special assignments. 
Forthwith, he ordered, there was to be no discrimination made between
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Badenese and Prussians. This applied particularly to officers of long 
service in Badenese regiments. General von Braun then repeated the 
former instructions given for the selection of officers stating, "that 
for the future army it is conclusively known and shall remain [our policy] 
to obtain the most qualified and meritorius officers
The controversy which should have ended with Braun's directive 
against further discrimination continued because the basic constitutional 
problems of the contingent system remained. Even after Seeckt became 
Chef der Heeresleitung and appointed personal proteges to positions within 
the Badenese— and Bavarian— commands to insure that his wishes would be 
followed, particularism remained as a latent but always potent force.
As late as 1926, after the army was generally considered to have achieved 
a unitary command and administrative posture as the result of Seeckt's 
efforts the Badenese contingent still jealously guarded its prerogatives 
in officer selection and assignments. On December 12, 1926, a letter 
from Landeskommandant Major-General Fohrenbach to the Baden State Ministry 
noted that a Lieutenant-Colonel Muff, commander of the 2nd Battalion of 
Baden Infantry Regiment 24 in Tubingen had been ordered to Berlin. In 
his place had been named Lieutenant-Colonel Noak, now in the Reichswehr 
Ministry. The letter closed with the comment "Oberstleutnant Moak ist 
nicht geborner Badner."^^
Particularism in the military affairs of the Weimar Republic was 
only part of the struggle between factions holding different views of the 
proper relationships and functions of national and state governments in 
a federal system. The southern states supported a concept of decentral- 
ized government in which local authorities possessed considerable
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autonomy, both in civil and military affairs. The Reich government, 
which wanted to maintain the power of initiative in its own hands, viewed 
particularism as a threat and obstruction to the implementation of a 
stable, unified system in the civil as well as the military sphere.
The particularist problem revealed a great deal about the 
relations between the southern states and the national government. The 
fact that the framers of the Weimar constitution felt compelled to retain 
the basic federal structure of the Empire, complete with the special 
rights accorded to the south German states, revealed the importance given 
to particularism as a political force. It was present in many states, 
although Bavaria and Baden became the leading proponents in the military 
sphere because of their traditional independence. Particularism was a 
combination of real political objectives— federalism, among the most 
important— and notions regarding the continued existence of the state 
traditions, customs, and cultures under a government still dominated by 
Prussia. The state governments saw any attempt to increase the authority 
of the Reich government as an encroachment on their constitutional rights 
and a threat to their sovereignty by what they considered to be a tool 
of Prussian expansionism. Many of the political leaders of the southern 
states believed that steps toward a centralized political or military 
system simply meant the return of the same Prussian domination of the 
nation as it had under the Empire and increased the possibility of a 
permanent Prussian hegemony.
Many particularist politicians and military leaders saw their 
salvation in the maintenance of a federal system in which the national 
government remained subordinate to the member states. This produced a
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political orientation toward the past and to arrangements such as under 
the Empire, although without Prussian leadership, which recognized the 
rights of the states to a separate existence and their governments to 
local autonomy.. Efforts by the political leaders of the Republic to 
centralize functions, even for the sake of efficiency in some cases, 
bore the connotation for the particularists of attempts to destroy the 
unique Bavarian, Badenese, or Württemberg homeland, culture, and way of 
life. Particularism, therefore, became identified in the south with 
Land patriotism, opposition to the national government, anti-Prussianism, 
and remained present in civil and military affairs until the states them­
selves were dissolved during the centralization of the Third Reich.
Notwithstanding the particularist insistence upon a decentralized 
system and state's rights, the southerners in general did not unalterably 
oppose the Republic as the governmental form for Germany and did not 
attempt its dissolution. Other groups, however, had no regard for a 
parliamentary system and it was through their actions that the process 
began to settle some of the lingering problems which first arose at the 
end of World War One. In the months following the ratification of the 
Versailles Treaty, hostilities against the government increased to the 
point where a test of will and strength became only a matter of time.
Such a contest, known as the Kapp-Lüttwitz Putsch, occurred in March 1920 
and proved to be the turning point in civil-military relations in the 
Weimar Republic.
The Kapp-Lüttwitz Putsch
The Kapp-Lüttwitz Putsch was important in several apsects both 
for the military and civil authorities. Politically, it resulted in the
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withdrawal of the Social Democrats from participation in the government 
and consequently produced a move to the right in the leadership echelon 
of the Republic with the introduction of control by less radical parties 
such as the Democratic Party, the People's Party, and the Catholic Center 
Party. For the military, the coup resulted in the resignation of Colonel 
Reinhardt as Chef der Heeresleitung and the appointment of Seeckt in his 
place as the head of the army. In addition. Dr. Otto Gessler replaced 
Gustav Noske as Reichswehr Minister, and the next six years brought 
changes in the relationships between the civilians and military which 
culminated in independence for the army on its own terms. Along with 
the changes in leadership came a change in the philosophy of officer 
selection and the imposition of Seeckt's personal views on the qualities 
necessary for commissions to the existing criteria.
Prior to the Putsch the civilian government still enjoyed control 
over the military establishment, and officer selection remained in the 
hands of General von Braun at the Personalamt. The struggle within the 
military for leadership of the command structure of the army appeared to 
be over with Reinhardt's victory at the expense of the Groner and Seeckt 
factions and the emergence of civilians in offices directing military 
affairs. All of this, however, proved to be temporary, for in a few years 
the situation had become completely reversed. In the interim, from April 
1920 to the end of Seeckt's tenure in 1926, the new head of the army 
ousted Braun from the Personalamt due to differences over officer selec­
tion and policy, eliminated particularism as an obstruction to the 
implementation of a unitary command and administrative system in the 
Reichswehr and gave the army a virtually unassailable position in the 
nation.
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The Putsch itself resulted from the beginning of further troop 
and officer reductions required by the Versailles Treaty. General 
Walter Liittwitz, commander of Reichswehr Group Command I in Berlin, pro­
claimed that he would not permit the dissolution of certain units under 
his command. He then made demands on the government for the cancellation 
of orders disbanding particular formations as well as political demands 
which Reichswehr Minister Noske refused to meet. On February 29, 1920, 
word reached the Reichswehr Ministry of an imminent coup directed against 
the government by General Luttwitz and a civilian official. Dr. Wolfgang 
Kapp.
The German historian Johannes Erger wrote in his study of the
Putsch that General von Seeckt knew of the coup intentions of the Kapp-
Lüttwitz group from contacts with the conspirators as early as November
1918 and had knowledge of the impending coup in October 1919, while
Chief of the Truppenamt. I n d e e d ,  Gustav Noske later complained that
Seeckt advised him of the coming putsch only at the last moment even
58though the General was well informed about it. Seeckt acted in that 
manner because he wanted to become Chef der Heeresleitung in order to 
control the command and administrative functions of the army. Tlie officer 
in such a position could set policies for the military establishment and 
direct the relations of the military with the civilian government with 
the goal of securing independence for the army from outside control.
Seeckt saw the coup as an opportunity to oust the present head of the 
army, Reinhardt, whose policies he thoroughly opposed. In this regard. 
Colonel von Thaer wrote that he believed Seeckt could have obtained 
Lüttwitz’s resignation in October 1919 to avoid the whole episode.
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However, according to Thaer, Seeckt "adopted an attitude that was above
59all to his own advantage."
Early in the morning of March 13, 1919, with the rebel troops 
already on their way to Berlin, a meeting took place in the Reichswehr 
Ministry to consider the situation and possible action to rectify it.
Only Colonel Reinhardt and Major von Gilsa counseled armed resistance 
with the former stating, "There can be no neutrality for the Reichswehr. 
The quicker we act, the quicker the spark will be put out."^^ The major­
ity of officers, however, followed Seeckt who said to Noske that the 
Reichswehr would not fire on its own and asked, "Do you, Herr Minister, 
have the intention of countenancing a battle before the Brandenburg Gate 
between troops who have fought side by side against the e n e m y ? N o s k e ,  
with President Ebert's approval, decided against armed resistance and 
thereby determined that future civil-military relations in the Weimar 
Republic would favor the army. In doing so he also made untenable the 
positions of Reinhardt as Chef der Heeresleitung and himself as Reichs­
wehr Minister.
While the military refused to resist the putsch, the Social
Democrats called a general strike which destroyed the rebel government in
three days. As the Putschists fled, both Noske and Reinhardt resigned
while Seeckt assumed command of Reichswehr Group I. Reinhardt wrote that
the order for loyal troops not to fire made his position impossible, and
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with Noske's resignation, he could no longer retain his post either.
In a letter to President Ebert on March 25, 1920, Reinhardt wrote:
After you, Herr Reichspresident, have now accepted the request 
of Minister Noske for release from his office, I hold it fitting
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that I also request my discharge. I have always administered my 
office as Prussian War Minister and Chief of the German Army Leader­
ship in close cooperation with People’s Representative Noske.
Starting from entirely different political attitudes, we were united 
in the conviction that a competently-led armed force, divorced from 
political parties and high in morale but undeviatingly faithful to 
the Constitution, is a vital necessity for the German people, because 
without such a force neither can order be preserved at home, nor can 
our sovereign rights be protected nor our borders defended. . . .
If because of the defeat of March 13 Reichswehrminister Noske cannot 
remain at his post, I see also for myself no useful possibility of 
remaining active as Chief of the Army L e a d e rs h ip .
Since his appointment as Prussian War Minister, Reinhardt’s position had
been constantly attacked and gradually undermined by Groner and Seeckt,
as well as by dissatisfied officers like Liittwitz. In addition, he had
been away from his post immediately prior to the Putsch and out of touch
with current developments. Reinhardt’s wife died in late February 1920,
and the Colonel stayed in Stuttgart far from the center of activity in
Berlin, until early March. He thus became a victim of the Putsch from
which only Seeckt profited.
With Reinhardt’s resignation, Seeckt became Chef der 
Heeresleitung, having finally succeeded in the power struggle for control 
of the army in a manner which Harold Gordon praised as being "in the 
highest tradition of German military leadership.Others have seen 
Seeckt's behavior in a different light, suggesting that by remaining 
outwardly neutral he in fact supported the Putsch and therefore "usurped" 
the post of Chef der Heeresleitung to gain control of the army.^^ His 
actual appointment came as the result of nominations by a council of 
officers from the Berlin command area— a number being close personal 
proteges from the outset— and from Reinhardt. The civilian Minister of 
Justice, Dr. Eugen Schiffer, confirmed Seeckt’s new position on behalf of
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the government on the same day as the nominations, March 27, 1920. The 
choice fell upon Seeckt because he had the support of the officers in 
the Berlin command who were on hand and could make their influence felt, 
and the civilian government allowed the appointment to stand because it 
appeared that Seeckt had enough control of the army to handle the situa­
tion. Seeckt had not, in any case, carried out his sworn oath to protect
the constitution and sought primarily to preserve the Reichswehr as his 
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own instrument. Seeckt thereafter became what F. L. Carsten termed 
"king of the army" and a substitute "Royal shield" which the officer corps 
had lost on November 9, 1918.^^ In the aftermath of the coup. President 
Ebert soon renewed the same pact with Seeckt that he had made with Groner 
and Hindenburg some eighteen months earlier. In the latter instance, 
however, the officer corps was not only assured of its existence, but 
also control over its own affairs with minimal civilian interference.^^
The results of the Kapp-Lüttwitz Putsch produced unforeseen 
consequences for the officer corps and army and was a turning point for 
Weimar Germany as well.^^ The change in personnel in key positions in the 
army and civil government stemmed from the hopes of civilian leaders that 
Seeckt could restore stability to the army without violence and a loss of 
unity in its ranks. Once again, the political parties left what they 
considered an internal army matter to the military who seemed to be able 
to manage the situation. As a result, the government became dependent 
on a hostile institution for its existence and even granted to the leaders 
of that body more autonomy than it had accorded to officers such as 
Reinhardt who supported the constitution against threats from any quarter. 
Further, the government permitted the resignation of the most prominent
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military man prepared to defend it with force and allowed the appointment
to the highest leadership position in the military establishment of
another man who had already shown that he would not defend the republican 
72system.
Noske and Reinhardt had for a time bridged the chasm between the 
political leadership of the nation and in the process tried to bring the 
army and the Republic closer together. Seeckt now had an unopposed reign 
and the power to build the officer corps according to his own philosophy. 
This he did, and the legacy of his work ultimately contributed to the 
downfall of the Republic. The Kapp-Lüttwitz Putsch marked the end of 
Social Democratic control over the Reichswehr and this was soon followed 
by a withdrawal of the party from participation in the political machinery 
of the nation as well. The retirement from the political scene of Noske 
and Reinhardt proved to be the end of any opportunity for the civilian 
government to establish a rapport with, or controls over, the officer 
corps. Relations between the civilians and the military were never again 
on any basis but military superiority.
Conclusions
The period of forced reductions of personnel in the army and 
officer corps from June 1919 to March 1920 was a pivotal one in the devel­
opment of the Reichswehr. During these months the basic conflicts between 
the military and the civilian government, and those within the military 
itself, intensified significantly. Bitterness against the Republic rose 
perceptibly in the minds of the majority of officers because they felt 
the civilian regime bore the responsibility for Germany’s degradation and 
ruin. For many officers, who saw the reductions in the officer corps and
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the threat to their careers as a direct result of the treachery of the 
civilian government, the acceptance of the Versailles Treaty was the 
last straw. Within the military, the situation became explosive, as the 
bulk of dismissed officers considered Reinhardt, who acted for the hated 
civilian regime, a traitor to the officer corps and an accomplice in the 
destruction of their way of life. Hostilities reached the stage where 
the idea of forcefully removing the government and its military author­
ities found favor among dissidents both within and outside the ranks of 
the army. The ultimate result of the efforts to decrease the army and 
officer corps to conform with the terms of the peace settlement was the 
nearly complete alienation of the officer corps from the Republic. Dif­
ferences in opinion regarding the acceptance or rejection of the treaty 
proved extremely destructive to the unity of the corps, and in many 
quarters the ratification of the Versailles Treaty did not end the 
controversy.
The future form of the army was perhaps the only question to be 
clarified during the period, although factional fighting within the com­
mand structure of the officer corps continued until after March 1920. 
Reinhardt and Seeckt battled for the key position of Chef der Heeres­
leitung which combined the command and administrative heads of the army 
into one office. Reinhardt's victory temporarily assured the continuation 
of a policy of cooperation with the civilian government, but the principal 
barriers to a unified command and administrative system still existed. 
These were, in fact, strengthened by the Weimar constitution and the 
adoption of a decentralized contingent organization for the Reichswehr.
The other primary obstacle, also reinforced by the constitution, was the
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particularism of the south German states which produced deep divisions 
in both the civil and military spheres.
Between the factions of the military, the rivalry for control 
of the officer selection program continued throughout 1919 and 1920.
Both Groner and Seeckt complained bitterly about the criteria initiated 
by Reinhardt and the head of the Personalamt, General von Braun. The 
real conflict was not over procedures, or even technical qualifications, 
but stemmed from the application of the criteria to officers already on 
active service. Reinhardt and Braun emerged victorious in the content 
and continued to employ their selection policies through the Personalamt 
on a predominantly impartial basis despite Seeckt's insistence on giving 
preference to former General Staff officers. However, all of this changed 
in 1920 when Seeckt became Chef der Heeresleitung. From that office he 
maintained total control of officer selection procedures, policy, and 
qualifications.
After March 1920, the danger to the Republic as a persisting 
form of government increased when the Reichswehr came under the command 
of von Seeckt who secured independence for the military from civilian 
control and established a degree of internal unity that the army had not 
enjoyed since the demise of the Empire. With the Kapp-Lüttwitz Putsch 
came the end of the brief era of civilian control and direction of mili­
tary affairs and began another of more lasting consequences.
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CHAPTER VI 
THE CONFLICTS RESOLVED
The elevation of General von Seeckt to the position of Chef der 
Heeresleitung in April 1920 opened a new phase in the history of the 
Reichswehr. One of his first tasks was to complete the formation of the
100,000-man army and, of greater significance, to establish his own 
ideas on the proper place for the military establishment in the Republic. 
Seeckt’s ideas differed substantially from those of Reinhardt, specifi­
cally in the area of civilian control over the army. In the area of 
officer selection, Seeckt did not change the procedures or criteria set 
in the Reinhardt period, but he did subtly alter the emphasis on the 
qualities demanded for officers. Instead of selecting the best qualified 
men for the officer corps regardless of their political views or social 
background, the General required in addition to efficient performance of 
duty and extensive educational preparation, the attribute of "character" 
by which he meant a return to the traditional values of the past.
With the end of factional disputes within the officer corps,
and the emergence of the post of Chef der Heeresleitung as the single head
of both the command and administrative functions for the army, Seeckt
became the most powerful man in the military establishment. With his
control of officer education and training through the Truppenamt, and
later his direct supervision of the Personalamt, Seeckt acquired all of
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the facilities necessary to mould an officer corps into any configuration 
he chose. The General completed his personal control of the Reichswehr 
after the Bavarian Crisis in 1923 by appointing trusted men to key posi­
tions where they nullified the particularists’ ability to obstruct a 
unitary system directed by the Reich-appointed head of the army.
Along with Seeckt’s activities, a second significant factor which 
altered civil-military relations in the Weimar period was the appointment 
of Otto Gessler as Reichwehr Minister. Gessler allowed Seeckt to dominate 
the relations between their offices, and in doing so, he materially 
assisted the military in recovering its independence from civilian con­
trol. Instead of the cooperation of the Noske-Reinhardt period, the 
military became independent of the civilian authorities in fact and then 
in law. The Wehregesetz of 1921 confirmed the superiority of the mili­
tary and reduced the civilian minister to a primarily administrative role 
in the system. The civilian government abetted the reversal of its 
position vis-à-vis the military by passing the Wehrgesetz. This stemmed 
from the attitude that the military should be led by experts, particu­
larly in its internal affairs, and by the continuation without adequate 
checks of the initiative power granted to Reinhardt as the consequence of 
his good relations with Noske. Such power in Seeckt’s hands invited abuse 
and enabled Seeckt to eliminate outside interference in army affairs. The 
result was that by the end of Seeckt’s tenure as Chef der Heeresleitung, 
the Reichswehr had become a state within the state.
Officer Selection in the Seeckt Era
Officer selection in the post-Kapp period began to change slowly 
and subtly in philosophy, but not in procedure or educational requirements.
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The first indication of an alteration in policy came in Seeckt's initial 
Erlass to the officer corps on April 18, 1920. He stated that the corps 
had reached a turning point and that it had to learn to live in the new 
house of the Reichswehr. All ranks of the Reichswehr were to be open to 
anyone, however, "the choice of leaders will be as before, on the basis 
of qualification and character."^ The Versailles Treaty required sub­
stantial reductions in officer personnel which made the selection process 
brutal and uncompromising.
The Personalamt remained in the hands of General von Braun, 
although substantial differences remained with Seeckt over policy. In 
addition, the office had progressively less autonomy than in the Rein­
hardt era because it now fell under the supervision of the Chef des 
Heeresleitung rather than the Reichswehr Minister. In spite of the 
mounting pressure from Seeckt to enlist only tradition-oriented, conser­
vative candidates, selection policy under Braun continued as before to
seek the best qualified men in technical respects for the few positions 
2
available.“ Requests for the names of officers who wished to remain in
the service were again made in the spring of 1920, and the officers in
question were advised in strong terms that replies had to be forthcoming.
The. statements of intent had to be received by the Personalamt by
December 31, 1920, because after that date any officer not in compliance
with the request, whether qualified or not, would be involuntarily retired.
Major-General von Mohl, the Bavarian State Commander, warned that the
future selection procedures would be arduous, consisting of exacting and
thorough tests. The acceptance of each officer meant fewer places for
those who followed and Mohl stressed that only men absolutely certain they
4
wanted a military career should apply for retention.
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The criteria employed to reduce the officer corps were to be 
applied in a strict manner in each case. Many officers possessed the 
educational background required, but the additional quality of "charac­
ter" demanded by Seeckt made it possible for the Heeresleitung to approve 
only personnel with the proper political views. In contrast to this 
unwritten requirement was Seeckt's statement in the April 18 Erlass that 
individuals would not be asked their political creed, but from that time 
forward the High Command expected every officer who served in the Reichs­
wehr to take his oath seriously, a reference to the Kapp-Lüttwitz Putsch 
in which many regular officers joined the rebels. To produce the desired 
personnel, Seeckt insisted upon a good general education for all officers, 
an intensive professional training program, and a properly conservative 
philosophy. Seeckt believed these qualities could be developed through 
the officer's educational process and wrote that genius was work and 
work came from character.^
Seeckt's objective for the educational process for officers and 
officer candidates was to produce a corps homogeneous in character and 
thought.^ He felt that the homogeneity of convictions (Gesinnung) and 
education (Erziehung), the training and the experience of the old officer 
corps, should be used to build the new army.^ Seeckt's idea of personality 
and character, the German historian Rainer Wohlfeil has written, produced 
a spirit in the officer corps of a closed entity [caste] whose basic 
concepts were not in accordance with the ideals of a republic. The con­
sequences of this educational system in the political sphere, Wohlfeil
g
concluded, were all highly questionable. Because of the strong influence 
of the past in the Reichswehr, the differences between the civilian 
government and the military hierarchy eventually became irreconcilable.
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The methods employed by Seeckt for selecting and training 
officers for the army were a source of complaint from various Lander con­
tingents, notably the Bavarians and Badenese. In September 1920, General 
von Mohl, the Bavarian Landeskommandant, wrote to the Personalamt concern­
ing the large numbers of older Captains and First Lieutenants (Hauptleute) 
retained in the service and pointed out that in an army of 100,000 men no
9
more from this age group should be accepted. Many of these officers, 
however, were from the former General Staff and among those whom Seeckt 
wished to retain to build the new army. Seeckt, therefore, continued to 
reduce the officer corps on his own terms and to determine the basic 
qualifications for officer candidates using education and character as 
the primary guidelines.
It was during this time that Seeckt also changed the titles of 
officer candidates from Fahnriche and Fahnenj unker to Offizieranwarter in 
order to appear less like the old regime and further required that all 
such candidates enter the army as private soldiers.Specific selection 
criteria for officer candidates appeared in a memorandum to the Baden 
State Ministry on July 2, 1921, from Major von Blomberg, Chief of Staff 
of the 5th Division in Stuttgart. For admission into the Reichswehr, 
whether as an officer candidate or not, the applicant had to be in good 
health, be 17 to 23 years of age, possess German citizenship, and have a 
desire to become a professional soldier. Those who failed to meet the 
above qualifications, along with vagrants, persons previously considered 
unqualified or reduced in rank in the former army or navy, persons who 
had committed crimes, and married applicants were not accepted. At the 
time of enlistment, the applicant also had to present a copy of his birth
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certificate, a character reference from the police, a photograph, a 
family background report from the police, a report detailing where the 
applicant had worked or attended school for the last two years, a copy 
of his former military papers, and, if a minor, a written consent state­
ment from his legal guardian.The company or battalion recruiting 
officer handled enlistments and examined each candidate's credentials.
If all was satisfactory, the officer ordered a medical examination for 
the recruit and the applicant received a provisional acceptance. Formal 
induction for new personnel in the armed forces occurred in April and 
October of each year.
Normally, the officer candidate program in the Reichswehr
involved 120 to 180 persons per year which was slightly less than the
number who could have been enrolled if the army employed the five-percent
discharge rate allowed by the Versailles Treaty. Later, the discharge
rate increased to thirteen percent and, according to a British report,
12
reached twenty to twenty-five percent on occasion. The relatively high 
turnover in personnel meant that a large number of officers or officer 
candidates left the corps for various reasons each year. Whether these 
personnel retired prematurely, failed to meet academic standards, or 
failed promotion due to political beliefs, Seeckt built the kind of offi­
cer corps he wanted from the type of personnel he considered properly 
suited.
In practice, not all of the officer candidate positions available 
to those outside the military establishment were filled each year. This 
was due in part to the selection process but also due to the low esteem 
many persons accorded a military career, the low pay, and the slow
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promotion within the small officer corps. In August 1921 for example,
the corps required 250 officer candidates to fill vacancies. However,
only 100 applicants qualified for the program; the remainder came from a
new series of appointments from the non-commissioned ranks through
13special qualification courses. Since these candidates entered the 
officer candidate program from inside the military establishment by 
nomination from their superior officers, there was little difference in 
their basic attitudes from that of the other aspirants and only educa­
tional differences separated the two sources. In addition, Braun 
supplied Seeckt with 180 war-experienced air service personnel who
either entered the officer corps or joined various aircraft manufacturers
14until the creation of the Luftwaffe.
On the surface officer selection in the Reinhardt and Seeckt 
periods appeared to be much the same, yet it changed in several key areas. 
As the demobilization of the army continued throughout Reinhardt’s tenure 
and well into Seeckt’s, the General had the opportunity to retain 
increasing numbers of staff officers instead of combat personnel and 
thereby contributed to the maintenance of a homogeneity of philosophy in 
the officer corps. Reinhardt dealt primarily with officers still in the 
service and added a few new personnel not already in the armed forces. 
However, Seeckt looked to the future and initiated an officer training 
program to select and educate candidates from outside the military estab­
lishment. By the time officer candidates entering the Reichswehr in 1920 
became eligible for commissions in 1923 and 1924. Seeckt had eliminated 
most of the NCOs raised to officer status as well as combat officers who 
did not possess the "character" attributes he demanded. ïfhen the General
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became Chef der Heeresleitung, he also ended any civilian participation 
in the officer selection process and ensured that future officers would 
be conservative and tradition-minded.
The final authority in the selection of officers rested, as it 
had from the beginning, with the Personalamt, but the actual control and 
direction came from the Truppenamt. This made Seeckt's supervision of 
the entire sequence easier because as the head of the army, he appointed 
his personal protege. General Heye, to command the Truppenamt. Later, in 
1922, Seeckt ousted his old opponent Braun from the Personalamt, and thus 
eliminated the last barrier to his personal control of the a r m y . T h e  
General then employed all the facilities at his disposal to educate and 
train officers for the Reichswehr without interference from any civil or 
military source.
Tests and Courses for Officers and Officer Candidates
The education and training processes for officers and officer 
candidates in the Reichswehr were extensive and arduous. Officers, as 
well as officer aspirants, were subjected to numerous examinations as 
part of the selection process to determine fitness for promotion. Eli­
gibility for the next highest rank was a primary requirement to remain in 
the service. Most of the tests and special educational courses were 
mandatory and produced a steady stream of personnel entering and leaving 
the officer corps. The strict educational requirements for officers and 
officer candidates served to eliminate many persons of lower-class origin 
who simply did not have the proper schooling. Since all applicants for 
officer training in the corps had to possess a secondary school
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matriculation certificate, the military establishment made efforts prior 
to 1923 to upgrade the educational level of non-commissioned personnel 
in the service. Soldiers considered to be good officer material attended 
special courses to prepare for an elementary examination, the Vorpriifung. 
Successful completion of the examination enabled the candidate to take 
another test, the Nachprüfung, which brought him to the level of those 
candidates entering the service with the certificate completed.
The administration of the tests occurred in April and October of 
each year in the Wehrkreise (recruiting districts) over a period of about 
one week. A typical example was the Vorpriifung for April 1922, which 
encompassed a two-day span separated from the Nachprüfung by oral exami­
nations administered by the divisions to whom each candidate applied as 
an officer aspirant. The Nachprüfung took three days followed by addi­
tional oral examinations on the divisional level. The schedule for the 
examinations given in Wehrkreis VII, Bavaria, for April 1922 read as 
follows:
Vorprüfungen
19.4 German, written 45 minutes
German, essay 3 hours
Foreign language, dictation 1 hour
Foreign language, translation 1 hour
20.4 Arithmetic and Geometry 3 hours
Written exercises
History, essay 2 hours
21.4 Oral examinations on specific subjects
22.4 Examinees report to appropriate divisions
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Nachprüfunoen
24.4 German, essay 3 hours
History, essay 2 hours
Chemistry, written Ih hours
25.4 Mathematics, written exercises 4 hours
Physics, written exercises Ih hours
26.4 Geography, essay 2 hours
Foreign language, translation 2 hours
27.4 Oral examinations on specific subjects
28.4 Examinees report to appropriate divisions
The candidates who passed the tests continued their officer 
training program with additional courses and duty with a troop unit.
The most successful also had the opportunity to proceed to advanced study 
which led in many cases to a War Academy appointment. Thereafter, the 
highest qualified usually received positions in the War Academy with the 
possibility of a later assignment as a staff officer.
In early 1920, Seeckt, as head of the Truppenamt, developed a 
program for testing the competence of Reichswehr officers in both military 
and non-military fields. He wanted to train staff officers for the high­
est positions in the army and began the program under the pretense that 
the tests were designed to secure information about the general level of 
education in the officer corps. In reality, the testing program selected
future candidates for general staff training by means which would not
18
cause concern to the Inter-Allied Control Commission. Plans for such 
an educational program had been considered in early 1919 when Seeckt 
realized that changes in the military system were inevitable as the
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result of the lost war and Germany's political situation. Seeckt set 
the tone for the future in an order of July 6, 1919, in which he stated, 
"The form changes, the spirit remains the old. It is the silent, self­
less performance of duty in the service of the army. General Staff
19officers have no names." The program which evolved had the title 
"Fiihrergehilfenausbildung" (Leader Assistant Education) and followed the 
old War Academy curriculum. Unlike the former centralized system, how­
ever, it had to be maintained and administered by the seven Wehrkreise 
in a decentralized manner to avoid conflict with the clauses of the 
Versailles Treaty which expressly forbade a re-institution of the War 
Academy and like military educational schools. Special testing and 
examinations, the Wehrkreisprilfungen were given to all officers of the 
Reichswehr with the rank of Captain or less. The ten highest scoring
candidates in each Wehrkreis entered the Fiihrergehilfenausbildung program
20which encompassed a three-year curriculum. This covered a wide variety 
of military and civil subjects taught by former General Staff instructors 
on a Wehrkreis level with the final year at the Reichswehr Ministry in 
Berlin. However, the final determination of candidates took into consid­
eration not only scholastic merit and practical performance but also
"character." To Seeckt, character meant upholding the values of the
. 21 past.
The Wehrkreisprilf ungen, which all officers could take if they so 
chose, generally involved only First Lieutenants and Captains between
22
twenty-five and thirty years of age with five years' service experience.
23The subjects tested were:
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I. Military
A. formal tactics, command technique
B. applied tactics
C. weaponry and equipment
D. Pioneer (Engineer) service of all arms
E. topography
II. General
A. history
B. civics
C. economic history
D. foreign language
E. mathematics
F. physics
G. chemistry
H. physical education, gymnastics 
(Also see Appendix G.)
The physical education portion of the Wehrkreisprufung contained 
both theoretical and practical components. Those officers of pre­
armistice commission or those above certain ages did not take part in the
24
field trials, being able to substitute a special theory course instead.
Included on the practicum of the examination were the hand grenade throw,
running, the long jump, and the 3,000-meter run as well as exercises on
25the horizontal bars, parallel bars, and sidehorse. (Also see Appendix
H.)
In addition to the regular battery of tests to which officer 
personnel of the Reichswehr were subjected were those administered by the 
various service arms— Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, etc.— during the 
period of the candidate's four-year training course. For example, the 
Infantry Offizieranwarterprufung of 1922 was given from July 6 to 8 in 
each division and consisted of written and oral sections. The test 
schedule and subjects were:
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7.6 Morning - Army knowledge, written ih hours
Weapons knowledge ih hours
Service lessons 
Afternoon- Gymnastics
7.7 Morning - Field Service and Topography
Shooting with rifle
7.8 Morning - Army knowledge, oral
Weapons knowledge, oral 
Pioneer Service
Signals (communications) Service 
Afternoon- Make-up work, if necessary 
Further instructions required that the performance of a candidate in 
the practical examinations as a group leader in physical training be at 
least "satisfactory" (geniigend). In shooting, the candidate's marksman­
ship with a rifle in the standing position at 150 meters constituted the 
only firing examination. The test permitted only one practice round to 
be fired before the three shots which the examiners recorded for the 
actual score. The results of the entire examination went to the Inspec­
torate of the Infantry in the Reichswehr Ministry.
The OTitten questions for the infantry officer candidate's
examination of 1922 were specific and required analytical skill in most
26
cases. These included:
1. Army knowledge: Ifhat does the Wehregesetz state about the
service and the rights of personnel in the armed forces?
2. Weapons knowledge: Give the primary parts of the light machine
gun and their function. How will the light machine gun be 
employed on the march and in combat?
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3. Field service: The examinees, who are to think as a patrol,
are to present or describe a picture of the terrain [various 
scenario described for the topographical problem . . . .] The 
examinee must prepare a report about what he sees on a report 
map.
4. Topography: The premise occurred in the test regarding terrain. 
The patrol must scout a way for one infantry company with their 
vehicles or scouting enemy machine gun nests with the objective 
of an attack there.
(See Appendix I.)
Those whose performance was unsatisfactory could still salvage a military
career if they so chose by passing the Unteroffizieranwarterpriifung to
27
become qualified as a non-commissioned officer.
Each officer who passed the Wehrkreisprufung entered the first 
Fuhrergehilfen course which his particular division administered under 
the name "D-I". No examination followed the completion of the D-I cur­
riculum and all candidates thereafter attended a "D-II" course for 
approximately two years. Upon completion of the D-II program, examina­
tions eliminated all but twelve to fifteen officers out of a class of 
some seventy. The unsuccessful candidates returned to troop duty.
In the D-III phase, the military education authorities expected
eight to ten candidates out of the twelve to fifteen would pass satis-
28factorily, but this was not achieved in reality in many Wehrkreise.
Such was the case of 164 officers of Wehrkreis VI (Hannover, Braunschweig,
Oldenburg and Bremen, headquarters Munster) who took the Wehrkreisprufung
in the spring of 1922. In the autumn of that year, twenty entered the
Fuhrergehilfen program, but only six passed to the next course and in
29
1925 only one was posted to the Truppenamt in Berlin. The Führer- 
fehilfen courses were rigorous in content and covered tactics, war 
history, army organization, logistics, weaponry, communications, air
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defense and foreign languages, Special lectures on intelligence, 
transportation, military and veterinary medicine, and the navy and sea 
tactics also formed a part of the program. Course D-III expanded the 
scope of the preparation for the future General Staff officer by adding 
new areas of study such as General Staff service, organization and leader­
ship of foreign armies, engineering, foreign and domestic politics and
 ^ 30sports.
The focal point of the D-III curriculum was to train staff 
personnel in operations and tactics so that they could become the First 
General Staff Officer (la) of a combat division. A D-I course of study 
theoretically prepared the candidate for such duties in a reinforced 
infantry regiment or infantry division, the D-II course prepared person­
nel for the la position in a cavalry or armored division; and D-III for
31a corps or army level assignment. Successful candidates received an
appointment after the completion of the program to a troop staff or a
detachment in the Reichswehr Ministry where he served one to two years.
Subsequently, the officer was posted to the General Staff and added to
his service rank at that time the title "i.G.— im Generalstabe" (in the
General Staff) with the right to wear their distinctive silver collar
insignia. Above all, he won the most coveted military prize of all, the
carmine-red trouser stripes which confirmed his position as a member of
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the elite of the army.
The education and examination system for officers and officer 
candidates in the Reichswehr attempted to procure personnel of outstand­
ing leadership ability. Not only were the candidates expected to show a 
logical, analytical approach to problem-solving processes, but the
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examinations also required an integration of technical military knowledge 
with decision-making ability, clarity of expression in a solution, and 
decisiveness in the manner of approach to practical situations which 
could be expected to occur in an officer's career. Military education in 
the Reichswehr sought to produce a technically well-prepared officer with 
an extensive general knowledge of many fields, one who demonstrated the 
ability to assist in maintaining the viability of the institution, 
whether on the regimental, corps, and army level; or as a future Chef des 
Heeresleitung.
As a part of the educational process in the Reichswehr, Seeckt 
devised a system in early 1921 to instill the values of the past into 
future officers. His objective was to maintain a visible reminder of the 
glories of former times; not the degradation and dishonor brought upon 
German arms by the Republic and its civilian political leaders. In 
Seeckt's mind, the first mission of the Reichwehr was to keep alive the
33spirit of the old army and, secondarily, to defend the nation's borders.
To accomplish this end, he designed a program to not only retain the
former spirit, but also to build an inner bond between the new and old
armies. Part of the traditions of the past were kept alive by the Frei-
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korps and formations of the Imperial army taken into the Reichswehr.
Seeckt himself revered the traditions of the barracks, exercise and
maneuver areas, Potsdam, Leuthen and other bygone glories. He believed
that the Reichswehr should adopt the traditions of the old army, to which
the present system would add a spirit of its own to be passed on as ideals
35for the German army of the future. As Waldemar Erfurth, a former offi­
cer, has written, "Seeckt combined the fundamentals out of historical
227
and the old Prussian military discipline and it succeeded for him 
36immensely."
Seeckt linked the present and past together for the Reichswehr
in the form of tradition companies (Traditionstrager). In his system,
each infantry company, cavalry troop, and artillery battery adopted and
became the custodian of the traditions of a former regiment or battalion
37of the Imperial army. This provided a link between the recruits of the
Reichswehr and the traditions of glory
. . . which ran like a thread of gold from the Great Elector and 
the old Fritz, through Schamhorst, Gneisenau and Blücher, to 
Moltke and to Schlieffen and to Hindenburg. . . . This glorious 
heritage, the young recruit was taught, was as much his as it 
was the Imperial Army’s, and it must inspire him to maintain it 
intact and unsullied.^8
With the activities of the Traditionstrager, the 21 regiments of
the Reichswehr preserved the former glory of 217 geriments of the Imperial
army. This was especially important, as Harold Gordon wrote, in an army
39where the regiment was the center of all military life. Regardless of
the future rank held by an officer, or the number of units he commanded,
his basic loyalty was always to the reiment in which he was first com- 
40missioned. Because of this emphasis, the leaders of the tradition
companies in the Reichswehr had a great deal of influence on the attitudes
41of officer candidates. For officer candidates, a part of their educa­
tional process was to learn to respect, to maintain, and to protect the 
traditions of their regiment. The glory of the past represented all that 
was good in the values of the military and contrasted sharply with the 
reality of the situation in the Republic. The young officer candidate 
was constantly surrounded with reminders of how much better the past had 
been for the professional soldier. Tradition became, therefore, a
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vital part of the officer candidate's introduction to the military 
life-style.
Thus, the entire system of education and training in the 
Reichswehr produced a generation of officers attuned to the milieu of the 
past and dedicated to the traditions of their mentors who opposed, or at 
best only tolerated, the government of their country. The results of 
Seeckt's efforts were apparent in other features as well, such as the 
social composition and the conception of the role of the army in the 
state. These factors, in the final analysis, were significant in deter­
mining the character of the corps and reflected what the institution 
became under Seeckt's tutelage.
The Social Composition of the Reichswehr
In social terms the composition of the Reichswehr in 1926 
revealed the extent of Seeckt's success in selecting and retaining offi­
cers from the same classes that filled the ranks of the officer corps 
during the Empire. The social structure of the upper echelon of the 
officer corps changed little from that of the Imperial period. In the 
lower ranks, however, a majority of active Captains and Lieutenants com­
missioned in the pre-war years were killed in the first few months of
the First World War. The replacement of these losses changed the social
42
composition of the subaltern ranks of the officer corps. Many battle- 
tested non-commissioned personnel and enlisted ranks were commissioned 
as officers during the war without regard to social background. Tradi­
tionalists felt that these persons did not possess the proper education, 
trainiTig, or social standards to become regular officers and the hybrid 
rank of deputy-officer became widely used as an interim measure.
229
Sergeants with good records performed officer’s duties for the duration 
of the war as Sergeant-Lieutenants (FeIdwebelieutnants) with the under­
standing that at the end of hostilities they would revert to their old 
43rank. The lower commissioned ranks also underwent a considerable 
change which continued as the war progressed and as losses in personnel 
mounted. As Karl Demeter points out, the greater part of the war was 
fought primarily with reserve and Landwehr officers. The change in 
social composition did not mean, however, a change in the values or 
philosophical position of the corps in general. The new officers shared 
the professional officer's view of the army, but preferred to pursue a 
civilian occupation in peacetime. These officers served to fulfill their 
patriotic duty with few considering the military as a career after the 
war.
Statistical data on the actual numbers of officers who saw 
service during the war varies considerably. The most often cited sta­
tistics are those of Wolfgang Sauer and Karl Demeter, both of whom drew 
their information from other works. A composite of the figures used by 
these sources revealed that 30,459 active officers held pre-war commis­
sions in 1914 as well as 89,295 reserve officers for a total of 119,754.
45Officers participating in the war in combat arms were:
Active Reserve
jPrussia 39,160 169,625
Bavaria 5,900 30,200
Saxony 3,704 16,555
Württemberg 1,990 9,750
50,754 226,130
Imperial German army officers killed in the course of hostilities from 
1914 to 1918 included including non-combat arms: Prussia - 41,093;
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Bavaria - 4,883; Saxony - 3,439; Württemberg - 2,382; reserve;
Prussia - 28,100; Bavaria - 3,404; Saxony - 2,310; and Württemberg -
46
1,679, for a total of 87,290.
Among the 38,103 active officers including war-commissioned 
personnel, at the time of the armistice, some 23,000 were commissioned 
prior to the war and 15,000 during the war. Of significance to the 
later social composition of the Reichswehr, the largest losses in the 
officer corps were among reservists called to active duty. Demeter, 
using Altrock's figures, calculated that casualties in this group were 
35,943 killed as compared with around 12,000 from the ranks of the regu­
lar officer corps. He further observed that regular officers numbered
48
about one-twelfth of the total number employed during the war. The
majority of officers who survived the war were pre-war commissioned
regulars. Part of the reason for this was that late in the war many
pre-war commissioned regulars were withdrawn from front-line combat duty
and assigned staff positions, particularly in the General Staff, with the
object of utilizing their combat experience and War Academy education to
"preserve a nucleus of what can be called the old, properly trained type 
49of officer." Thus, the traditional, conservative outlook of the offi­
cer corps survived through these men while those of lesser social status 
and education bore the brunt of the fighting and suffered the highest 
losses. By the end of the war, many officers who were admitted to the 
corps during the course of hostilities, or were originally reservists, 
had experienced enough combat to destroy whatever notions they might have 
had about the glory of war. Most of those who survived were simply 
grateful for their good fortune and wanted nothing further to do with a
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military way of life. The disinterest shown by the educated middle
class in a military career was significant for the future of the officer
corps and civil-military relations in the Weimar Republic.
At the end of hostilities, the majority of officers who wished 
to remain in the service consisted of those pre-war commissioned regulars 
assigned to staff duty in the closing days of the conflict. They were 
professional soldiers whose life was inexorably bound to the army and 
officer corps. These officers were also the best educated and best 
trained in the service. Their social background revealed a large percen­
tage of aristocrats. This was due to the high casualty rate among
reservists and active officers from the middle classes whose places were
often filled by deputy-officers from the non-commissioned ranks. The 
social origins of officers in the Reichswehr was as follows, according to 
Demeter, Woertz, and Sauer:
SOCIAL ORIGINS OF THE OFFICER CORPS
1913 1926 1921-34
% % %
Regular and reserve officers 23.74 44.34 34.93
Higher officials, clergy, civil and 
military doctors and professors 39.06 41.51 36.50
Landowners 9.12 4.73 4.76
Tenant farmers 2.38 .94 1.59
Businessmen, factory owners 15.57 6.13 9.52
Minor officials and
non-commissioned officers 4.17 1.41
7.94
Other private persons 5.96 .94 4.76
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The numbers of noblemen and officers from traditional 
officer-producing social backgrounds decreased only slightly in the 
1918-1926 period. These officers still comprised an important percentage 
of the corps in spite of the fewer places available due primarily to 
better education and training, and due to the group representing the old, 
conservative outlook that became a vital part of the retention and selec­
tion qualifications under Seeckt. The officer corps was thus dominated 
by the same groups with the same political views and values as in the 
Imperial period.
Demeter gave a further breakdown of the sociology of the officer 
corps by service arm regarding the noblemen who served in the Reichswehr
as:51
1920 1926
Total Noble Total Noble
Staffs 770 26.4 767 21.8%
Infantry 1,692 17.6% 1,480 17.6%
Cavalry 520 50.4% 567 45.0%
Artillery 544 12.5% 551 10.7%
Pioneers 112 4.5% 76 3.9%
Intelligence 88 5.7% 75 5.3%
Motorized 112 10.7% 70 15.7%
Lines of Communication 113 6.1% 92 7.6%
Medical - - 61 20.5%
Overall totals 
and averages (%)
3,971 21.7% 3,739 20.5%
Although the actual number of nobles in the officer corps decreased, and 
the overall percentage fell by 1.26%, this in no way affected the outlook
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of the corps as a whole which still remained conservative. As before, 
the old military aristocracy retained an important percentage of staff 
positions where the decisive policy decisions for the army were made and 
generally chose the same service arms throughout the history of the 
officer corps. Those branches of the service possessing the highest 
prestige and glamor, the cavalry and infantry, were joined by a new, 
emerging arm in the motorized troops which contained the nucleus of the 
future armored divisions. The percentage of nobles in the Panzer arm 
contined to rise and remained high throughout the Reichswehr period and 
the Wehrmacht of the Third Reich. That officers of pre-war tenure were 
reaching retirement age and leaving the service caused the slight decline 
in the number of noblemen between 1920 and 1926. However, the large 
number of older officers still on active service brought Seeckt a great 
deal of criticism from younger officers who felt their careers stifled 
by the lack of promotion in the Reichswehr.
In the upper ranks, the nobility still held a numerical 
superiority in the categories of General, Lieutenant-General, Major- 
General, and Colonel, while non-nobles held ranks in the lower echelons 
in an increasingly larger percentage. This was particularly true of 
service branches where the nobility traditionally showed least interest. 
By late 1920, the highest ranks of the Reichswehr, comparing nobles to 
non-nobles, revealed
Nobles Non-Nobles
Generals 3 -
Lieutenant-Generals 14 6
Major-Generals 27 18
Colonels 99 66
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The large numbers of older officers and nobility in the highest command
positions of the Reichswehr served to perpetuate further traditional
ideals in the corps. It also placed many officers in key positions who
could oppose new ideas or policies which conflicted with their own point
of view. Thus Reinhardt encountered serious problems from these officers
over his policy of cooperation with the civilian government, and many
held positions where their influence could be powerful.
One of the reasons many members of the middle class who might
have pursued a military career did not was the length of time required
for advancement. In contrast to the civilian world, to achieve higher
military command positions took the greater part of an officer's active
53
career. The average time in service for promotion was:
Rank Time
Lieutenant 4 years
Captain 16 years
Major 22 years
Colonel 31 years
Major-General 35 years
Many prospective officers simply did not want to wait that length of time 
for recognition. The long career, with slow promotion, low pay, and a 
lack of prestige, especially in the immediate post-war years, caused all 
but the most dedicated to eliminate the army as a career.
Throughout the years of the Weimar Republic, therefore, the 
persons who most often sought a military career came from the same social 
strata which traditionally provided the majority of officers, the nobil­
ity, followed by the upper middle class who viewed the profession as did 
the aristocrats. In 1921, an article appeared in the Deutsches Adelsblatt 
which maintained that "Young noblemen need not fear any competition from
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'the crowd' [because] . . . the corps of officers was still being 
recruited from the best in the land."^^ Persons of a conservative out­
look, therefore, maintained a dominant position in the corps and parti­
cularly the highest command offices. After March 1920, Seeckt's policies 
and practices again discriminated against the less educated and those 
holding political views differing from those of the military leadership.
Even though the social character of the officer corps in the 
lower ranks changed somewhat in the 1918-1926 years due to the addition 
of men from varying backgrounds, this was of little consequence since 
the policy-making positions were still in the hands of the old elite. 
Regardless of social origin, the values and political orientation for a 
military career remained those of the past. Officers or officer candi­
dates who wanted a position in the corps conformed to Seeckt's ideals or 
did not remain long in the service. In the final analysis, since Seeckt 
possessed the power to make the officer corps what he wanted, the educa­
tional and training processes were more important than birth. In 1926, 
the officer corps was again exclusive, but was composed of the elite of 
"character" in traditional terms rather than a solely aristocratic one. 
This result was not solely due to a unilateral manipulation of the selec­
tion, education, and training processes from the Heeresleitung but was 
also related to changes wrought by the Kapp-Liittwitz Putsch which brought 
Otto Gessler to the position of Reichswehr Minister.
The Reichswehr Ministry under Otto Gessler
The Kapp-Liittwitz Putsch brought changes to the Reichswehr 
Ministry which, according to the SPD's Albert Grzesinski, "soon became
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an unbelievably complicated body."^^ In practice, the Reichswehr 
Minister had a double role, first as an intermediary between the Presi­
dent and the military establishment and second as the superior to all 
civilian administrators (Beamten) in the military system.After 
assuming his post, Gessler did not operate as a normal minister who 
planned policy and tried to realize specific aims. Instead, he seconded 
Seeckt while providing a public shield for both the activities of the 
General and the Reichswehr. This constituted a "change of decisive 
importance since the days of Noske who reserved to himself the vital 
political influence and had close contacts with leading officers.
According to Seeckt’s protege. General Joachim von Stiilpnagel, 
the General would have never achieved his aims without Gessler's loyal 
cooperation: "In purely military matters he [Gessler] only intervened in
the field of personalia of senior officers and officers of the ministry 
58. . . ." Gessler was a Vernunftrepublikaner who considered himself a
man of Realpolitik. His loyalty to the state approximated that of
traditionalist officers who served the idea of a Fatherland or Reich
rather than a particular form of government or especially a lasting
59republican regime. Gessler claimed that he wanted to democratize the 
army and to make it a loyal instrument of the state. However, he saw 
little hope of accomplishing such a goal under the present system with so 
many political parties and conflicts.Germany, he stated, "had a par­
liamentary system that would be suitable for a country with two or three 
parties, but not based on a parliament with fifteen parties.Gessler's 
personal relationship with Seeckt also contributed to the re-emergence of 
military supremacy over the civilian ministry. While Reichswehr Minister,
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Gessler readily adopted a submissive role, not unlike the parties 
themselves, and Seeckt easily excluded him from the mainstream of mili­
tary planning in the ministry. The General, in fact, privately circu­
lated an order on April 9, 1920, to the officers of the Reichswehr 
Ministry staff which stated, "The officers and departments are forbideen 
to announce or give reports to the minister without my prior agreement
. . . .  Reports are first rendered to me, I shall make further deci- 
62sions." Along with the parties, who raised no substantial objection 
to Gessler*s posture, the Reichswehr Minister bore the primary respon­
sibility for allowing the military to regain their old position in the 
state. Gessler was quite correct in his later statement that the
63civilian command authority of the Reichswehr Minister was a fiction.
He helped make it so by his submission to Seeckt's wishes. The sub­
ordinate role of the civilian minister which Gessler permitted to be 
imposed upon his office was later confirmed by law, and the advantage 
thus gained by the military was never lost.
The Wehrgesetz of 1921
The interaction between the civilian Reichswehr Minister and 
the Chef der Heeresleitung as head of the military proved to be of vital 
significance because it was within these offices that policy decisions 
were made for the entire military establishment. Constitutionally, the 
Reichswehr Minister held the superior position, but in practice this was 
not the case after the appointments of Seeckt and Gessler. The coopera­
tion of Noske and Reinhardt in the early years was the exception in the 
Weimar period, yet it influenced the future relationship between the 
offices. As a result of the trust which existed between the two men.
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the civilian government gave to the Chef der Heeresleitung in an Erlass
on September 20, 1919, considerable initiative and discretionary powers,
particularly to issue orders independent from the Reichswehr Minister's
direct supervision. The edict, entitled "Provisional Regulation of
Command Authority and the Competence of the highest Command Positions in
the Reichswehr (Vorlaufige Regelung der Befehlsbefugnisse und Arbeits-
bebieten der obersten Kommandostellen in der Reichswehr), stated that the
President was the superior to all personnel in the armed forces. The
Reichswehr Minister was second and exercised the legal practice of command
authority for the President. Under the minister came the remainder of
the military command structure which included the Chef der Heeresleitung
who directed all the activities of his own department. By paragraph IV
of the regulation, the Chef der Heeresleitung received the power to issue
independent decrees, make judgments, and issue instructions in all matters
of command leadership insofar as such actions were not reserved by law
to the Reichswehr Minister himself. For these orders which emanated from
the Heeresleitung, the Reichswehr Minister became accountable even though
he may never have seen the orders, have been consulted about them, or been
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aware of their existence. Such a system required the complete trust on 
the part of the civilian minister toweard his military counterpart. 
Reinhardt and Noske achieved this delicate balance, but it could not be 
maintained with Seeckt as the head of the Heeresleitung.
After the Kapp-Lüttwitz Putsch, the relationship between the 
men holding these key positions was completely different from that of 
their predecessors. Further changes in command authority appeared on 
August 20, 1920, which confirmed the superior position of the Reichswehr
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Minister, but made the head of the army his advisor. It also bestowed 
upon the Chef der Heeresleitung the authority to represent the Reichswehr 
Minister in his exercise of command authority.The importance of this 
change was that Gessler allowed Seeckt to impose his "advice" upon the 
ministry without question and sought to enact whatever Seeckt wanted 
rather than pursuing policies of his own. Thus, the Reichswehr Minister 
reversed the intent of the law which only permitted the military to 
express an opinion on policy set by the ministry. Seeckt's wishes in 
practice became the policy of the ministry due to the older regulation 
permitting a degree of initiative to the head of the army, the new regu­
lation providing an advisor to the minister, and to the subservience of 
Gessler himself. The minister remained responsible for the actions of 
the Heeresleitung, while in reality policy decisions came solely from 
Seeckt.
The final step in the process toward the military regaining full 
independence over its own affairs was the Wehrgesetz of March 23, 1921.
This law laid the basic foundations for the peacetime army and was a 
synthesis between the military clauses of the Versailles Treaty and the 
Provisional Reichswehr Law of March 6, 1919.^^ The new law altered the 
relations of the Lander contingents to the central authority of the 
Heeresleitung by lessening their autonomy and subordinating them to con­
trol by the national government. It also reduced the command authority of 
the President. He now had to exercise his authority through the office of
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the Reichswehr Minister and have his orders countersigned by the Minister. 
Further, the law stipulated that the head of the army was to be a General 
who would serve in the position of Chef der Heeresleitung. On the
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relationship between the civilian and military heads of the army, the new 
law was ambiguous. What it meant was that the civilians possessed 
Befehlsgewalt, a non-initiative, administrative authority, and the mili­
tary received Kommandogewalt, a superior authority to initiate direct 
orders which governed the military establishment, including its own 
internal affairs, and to do so independently of control by any other 
source. Both the former General Staff officer Friedrich Hossbach and the 
historian Walter Tormin ascribed the wording and intent of this important 
section to Seeckt himself.
In reality, the type of authority possessed by the head of the 
army and the Reichswehr Minister was vital to the legitimacy of orders 
and policies which originated from those offices. Both Befehlsgewalt and 
Kommandogewalt meant command authority, but as all parties understood 
the difference in the two implied that the civilians' role was purely 
administrative. The military, however, recovered superiority in matters 
dealing with internal questions relating to command, education, training, 
and personnel selection. Thus, the authority granted to the military and 
civilian officials determined in specific terms the functions each office 
controlled and the return of Kommandogewalt to the military brought inde­
pendence in their own affairs. After the passage of the Wehrgesetz in 
1921, Seeckt simply dictated to Gessler and the civilian government with­
out serious challenge until 1926 when an error in judgment in a violation 
of the Versailles Treaty forced his resignation.
The changes in the command structure and command authority of 
the military and civilian officials which evolved from 1919 through 1921 
made the office of Chef der Heeresleitung the pivotal one in the military
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establishment. Each step which centralized decision-making power in 
this office brought an independent and unified military system closer to 
realization. Building on the earlier grant of limited initiative author­
ity to Reinhardt, Seeckt assumed progressively more powers because of 
Gessler’s subservient posture. Regardless of the fact that these powers 
were later confirmed in law, the Reichswehr Minister at any time could 
have reversed the progression if he had been so inclined by requesting 
the resignation of the head of the army.
The reversal of authority roles of the civilian president, 
civilian military officials and the army commanders was not solely the 
result of Gessler’s actions. The Wehrgesetz was passed by civilian 
parties in the Reichstag. At that time, the political parties control­
ling the government were the Center Party, the Democratic Party, and the 
People's Party since the SPD had withdrawn from the leading role in the 
government. This meant a more conservative outlook in military affairs 
than under the SPD. The withdrawal of the Social Democrats from active 
participation in the government in 1920, even though the SPD remained the 
largest party in the Reichstag, left no real opposition in the inner 
circles of the administration to oppose such measures of far-reaching 
implication as the Wehrgesetz. Further, the moderate and conservative 
parties still clung to the notion that military affairs should be left 
to experts in the military establishment and supported Seeckt in the 
belief that his control over the army made the government safe from 
revolutionary threats. This attitude was a vital factor in the revival 
of military independence in the Weimar Republic.
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General Hans von Seeckt
The early years of Seeckt's tenure as Chef der Heeresleitung 
were filled with both internal domestic and external crises. During this 
period the control of the government was in the hands of the Center Party 
and the Democratic Party, along with a number of non-partisan experts in 
various fields. It was an era of increasing political radicalization 
brought about by economic disaster, foreign invasion, the Ruhr crisis, 
and escalating problems with Bavaria. To the civilian politicians, the 
situation made the presence of a strong Reichswehr with decisive leader­
ship vital. Thus, the atmosphere in which Seeckt began his efforts for 
personal control of the array and for freedom from civilian intervention 
in military affairs, made it possible for the General to conduct his 
affairs with less criticism than might have been forthcoming in other 
circumstances.
From the outset it was apparent that Seeckt’s own personality 
and political views would play an important role in the development of 
the army and officer corps. Seeckt was a thorough traditionalist but 
politically more astute than the majority of older officers who remained 
in the service at the end of the war. The fact that during the war the 
bulk of his service was in the east and also the fact that he was dis­
liked by the Hindenburg-Ludendorff clique saved his reputation from being 
damaged by the final collapse in the west.^^ Seeckt's notions regarding 
the place of the army in society reflected the traditional belief that 
the military should require the state to take into consideration the army’s 
share in the life and substance of the nation. In Seeckt’s view, to 
accomplish this the army leadership had to engage in politics but not
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become the instrument of any political party or partisan group. In
practice, therefore, the political stance of the army was always quite
clear. Since the army served the state, and only the state, Seeckt
believed, then it was synonymous with the s t a t e . T h e  conservative
character of the army, the General wrote, came from its role in history,
and the consciousness of being part of a glorious tradition had an
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unquestionable influence on the quality of the troops. For Seeckt,
the military was part of an idealized, although abstract entity— the
Reich— which was a reflection of German glory and power obtained through
the actions of the army. In this regard he wrote
The Empire! There is something supersensuous in this word. It 
embraces far more and connotes something other than the conception 
of a State. . . .  It is an organic living entity, subject to the 
laws of evolution. . . sprung from roots which did not lie in 
Germany^^linked to the Roman World Empire and the world church
According to Seeckt, the functions of the state were to insure the 
highest possible well-being for the whole of its citizenry and not the 
equal well-being of all. To Seeckt, the weal of the community was the 
primary consideration and he felt strongly that the socialist-led govern­
ment courted disaster by considering any changes in the traditional pat­
terns of German life. "The state in which we are living," he wrote, "is 
not a guinea-pig for vivisection by theorists and we cannot afford the 
luxury, less than ever nowadays, of reducing wrong tenets to absurdity 
for the instruction of their disciplines."^^
Seeckt considered parliamentary government a particular
anathema and called it the "inveterate evil of our times . . .  an archaic
75end cancerous sore . . . ." The nation was too busy to contend with 
political problems and preferred, in Seeckt's opinion, to be well
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governed regardless of what form or who controlled it.^^ Parliament's
duty, if indeed such a body was necessary, was
. . .  to counsel the holder of State power by free parleying,
. . .  by conveying its wishes, by virtue of its knowledge of the 
needs and circumstances of the governed, by arriving at agreement 
with him on the burdens and duties to be imposed, and thereby to 
exercise the desired checks on the activities of the officialdom.
Seeckt's concept of the functions of government and the role of 
the army in the state placed him outside the Wilhelmine framework. 
Instead, he returned in philosophy to Frederickian times, prior to the 
evils of modern society— parliaments, disruptive political parties, and 
dangerous social groups who challenged the status quo. In that ideal­
ized time, the monarch, the aristocracy, and the army combined to oversee 
a truly subservient population. Since this relationship could not be 
reestablished in part because the personal bonds between the monarch and 
his brother officers had been severed by the lost war and the abdication 
of William II, an important part of the traditional ties re-emerged with 
the loyalties of the officer corps attached to Seeckt rather than the 
Kaiser. This was a vital component of Seeckt's popularity among those 
older officers who remained in the corps and formed the leadership cadre 
of the army. He thus became a surrogate Supreme War Lord (Obersten 
Kriegsherrn) in the place of the Kaiser, and the majority of officers
showed devotion to Seeckt as did "the Landsknechte to their Colonels;
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they fought for this colonel when he ordered it, not for the state."
In this role, Seeckt played lord-protector for the army and defended the 
institution from its enemies. In return, the army was Seeckt's personal 
instrument, identifying his interests as the army's and the nation's as 
well. In this context, Seeckt actively engaged in politics, which was
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officially frowned upon— and for which he and Groner had criticized 
Reinhardt— in order to promote army interests behind a façade of self­
less, personal sacrifice for the good of the corps.
Seeckt’s popularity with the officer corps declined during the 
last years of his tenure (1924-1926). His cold and authoritarian nature 
and his penchant for catering to older officers and ideas aggravated 
differences over personnel policy in particular. A number of officers 
who formerly supported Seeckt became disenchanted with him. General von 
Stiilpnagel wrote in his memoirs that Seeckt
did not like to hear the truth and surrounded himself with 
stereotypes . . .  in questions of defense we have made no progress 
for years, only because S.[eeckt] could not be pursuaded to discuss 
all matters openly with the government. In too many things we have 
play-acted and have not educated characters, but yes-men.'?
One example involved a suggestion for improved mobility in motor units
made by Seeckt's former confidante. Colonel von Blomberg. To it Seeckt
replied, "Dear Blomberg, if we are to remain friends, you must refrain
80from such suggestions." Blomberg believed that Seeckt's hostility
stemmed from the General's resentment that the young officers of the
81Reichswehr were attempting to teach him. Even more bitter was the 
attitude of General Ritter von Mohl, former commander of the Bavarian 
contingent who was arbitrarily removed from his command by Seeckt in 
1924. In several letters to Reinhardt, Mohl recalled the affair and 
stated that
Even in General von Seeckt I would not have believed possible 
such a lack of sincerity, frankness, and comradeship, although my 
estimation of him as a character and soldier has always been low.
He cultivated Byzantinism and cliquism, the well-known main evils 
of the Prussian army since the ’Wilhelminian' period.
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Mohl further stated he hoped a "change of government" would return 
Reinhardt to Berlin along with the comment that "With Gessler, Seeckt,
83
and the whole clique connected with them nothing can be achieved. . . . "
After 1925, Seeckt ran afoul of President Paul von Hindenburg.
The old soldier took his constitutional position as commander-in-chief of 
the army seriously and was not content with the secondary role relegated 
to Ebert by Seeckt. Hindenburg still had a vast following among the 
younger officers of the Reichswehr, many of whom were dissatisfied with 
Seeckt’s policies and looked to the president for leadership.This also 
strengthened the position of Reichswehr Minister Gessler who began to 
reclaim some of the decision-making initiative he had once, conceded to 
Seeckt when it became clear that the President disliked Seeckt and would 
support those who opposed the General. Seeckt lost ground rapidly after 
1925 and a year later Gessler secured his resignation without difficulty. 
The General’s primary objectives, however, had been accomplished. In 
structure and philosophical framework, the army and officer corps had 
adopted Seeckt’s ideas. These notions lived on in the General's numerous 
proteges who had been appointed to prominent positions within the system 
and among the officers trained and educated while he directed the Truppen- 
amt. Seeckt’s accomplishments included not only the achievement of a 
tradition-oriented value system for the officer corps and securing 
independence for the army from civilian control but also the creation of 
a united, centralized command in the Reichswehr as the result of the 
Bavarian Crisis of 1923.
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The Bavarian Crisis of 1923
The semi-autonomous status of the Bavarian army contingent led 
through a series of disputes over policy and procedures with the Reich 
government and army command to its near mutiny in September 1923. Under 
the constitution, Bavaria retained a large degree of. independence which 
both Reinhardt and Seeckt sought to eliminate in order to create a truly 
unified Reich command system. The demobilization of the Imperial army, 
the formation of the Provisional Reichswehr, and the creation of the 
100,000-man army contributed to the conflict due to the large number of 
career officers dismissed from the service. Because Prussia tradition­
ally played the leading role in the Imperial army by providing the 
majority of high ranking and General Staff personnel, the Prussian con­
tingent in the peacetime army continued to dominate military affairs in 
the Weimar Republic.
The fact that Prussia still occupied a superior position in the 
new federal system produced bitter resentment throughout south Germany 
and especially in Bavaria. In turn, the Reich command echelon of the 
Reichswehr resented the efforts of the southern contingents to protect 
native-born officers, many of whom the Prussians considered inferior in 
ability to their own officers who were being released from the service.
A further irritant was the inability of the Reich authorities to gain 
full control over the officer selection process due to the special rights 
held by the southern states. The period leading to the Bavarian Crisis 
was, therefore, one of hostility within the officer corps— as it was in 
the civil sphere— which ran counter to Seeckt’s desire for unity of 
command and purpose in military affairs. To Seeckt, the situation was
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especially galling because it represented a challenge to his authority 
and also threatened the tenuous unity within the Reichswehr as a whole.
By 1923, the relations between the Reich and Bavaria reached the point 
where the slightest provocation could produce, a confrontation of major 
proportions.
The incident which set in motion the encounter between the 
opposing forces stemmed from attacks upon Seeckt in the radical rightist 
press in Bavaria. A number of nationalist and Volkisch groups objected 
to Seeckt’s curtailing the formation of illegal Freikorps units by 
Bavarian State Commissioner Gustav von Kahr in response to the estab­
lishment of communist governments in the neighboring states of Saxony 
and Thuringia. As relations between the Reich government and Bavaria 
continued to deteriorate, rumors spread in Berlin concerning a possible 
march on the capital by Bavarian troops to remove what the radicals 
labeled a "Red" regime. The government had good reason to be alarmed 
over the loyalty of certain Reichswehr units and commanders. At a meet­
ing to discuss the problem on September 26, 1923, President Ebert asked
Seeckt where the Reichswehr stood in the conflict with Bavaria and the
85General answered, "The Reichswehr, Herr President, stands behind me.'"
In practical terms, this meant that the army would follow Seeckt, not 
necessarily the constitutional commander-in-chief. The Reich government, 
therefore, found it necessary to rely again upon the army for protection 
against possible rebellion from the military ranks. This time, however, 
Seeckt upheld his oath to defend the constitution because the authority 
of his position as Chef der Heeresleitung was in question. Many Reich 
officials also saw more at stake than the unity of the Reichswehr or the
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solution to problems created by a dissident state government. They 
believed that an armed clash with Bavaria would mean the complete dis­
solution of the Reich and foreign intervention by hostile forces from
86France, Poland, Czechoslovakia or Russia.
In the crisis, Seeckt hoped to find a solution without resorting 
to bloodshed because, in his own words, he could not permit the Reichs­
wehr to be placed in circumstances where it had "to fight for a govern­
ment which is alien to it, [and] against people who have the same
87convictions as the army." Seeckt wanted to prevent a putsch by either
the right or left because in the process the Reichswehr might well suffer 
88permanent damage. The General's position in the conflict with the 
Bavarian military authorities appeared in an article intended for publi­
cation in the Munchener Neueste Nachrichen on October 9, 1923. In it, 
Seeckt wrote that he believed the protection of the unity of the Reich
was foremost in the minds of those representing Bavaria, as it was of the
89
Bavarian Reichswehr, but for himself:
What weighs heaviest is the support [given] to the State 
Commissioner’s attempt to undermine the command authority of the 
Reich superiors of the Bavarian troops. The execution of a mili­
tary order will be made dependent upon the consent of the Bavarian 
civil authorities, and in agreement with it the leader of the 
Bavarian troops— although nationally appointed and pledged to 
obedience— decides whether he will carry out the orders of his 
military superiors or not. He will decide whether they lie in the 
public interest. In Bavarian or national interest? . . .  It is 
time the Bavarians realize their dispute with the national govern­
ment must not be fought out in the military sphere. . . .
With no solution to the problem immediately available, the Reich 
government proclaimed a state of emergency in the nation and empowered 
Reichswehr Minister Gessler to deal with the situation. Since Gessler 
viewed the problem as primarily a military one, he transferred his powers
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to Seeckt who became the representative of the government in the matter.
As a result of the Reich government delegating authority to the military,
Gustav von Kahr and the then little-known Adolf Hitler joined together
to protect the rightist Verbande and Bavaria's interests from "Red 
90Berlin." A scathing article appeared in the Volkische Beobachter 
accusing Seeckt of being a close friend of the Jewish-owned Berliner Tag- 
blatt and stated further that Seeckt's wife, along with Chancellor
91Stresemann's, was a Jewess and influenced the General politically. 
Reichswehr Minister Gessler ordered the immediate suppression of the 
Volkische Beobachter and directed the commander of the Bavarian 7th 
Division, General Lossow, to execute the decree. Lossow, however, 
referred the matter to State Commissioner Kahr who refused to order the 
closing of the Volkische Beobachter. The Reich government then commanded 
Lossow a second time to enforce the order personally, which he refused to 
do.
As a result of Lossow's disobedience, Reichswehr Minister
Gessler dismissed the Bavarian from his post on October 19, 1923, but
State Commissioner Kahr refused to leave and ordered the 7th Division to
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swear their allegiance to the Bavarian government. Seeckt then demanded 
the loyalty of the 7th Division to the Reich and its submission to the 
orders of the highest Reich military commander. The problem for the 
highest Reichswehr commander during the confrontation was to maintain 
unity in the army even while the civilian government was becoming frag­
mented. Seeckt issued a decree to the Reichswehr on November 4, 1923, 
stating that "A Reichswehr that is united and obedient is invincible and
the strongest factor in the state. A Reichwehr split by political cleav-
93ages will break up in the hour of danger. . . . "
251
The situation deteriorated until it seemed to the Reich 
government nothing short of an armed clash could resolve the dispute. 
However, the Hitler putsch saved Seeckt from such a decision. The 
abortive attempt to start a march on Berlin met its end at the hands of 
the Landespolizei. One of Seeckt's greatest fears was that the Reichs­
wehr units in Munich might not respond to orders to put the putsch down 
if such had been necessary, but to his relief, the Reichswehr never 
became extensively involved. Later the General did send the army into 
Saxony and Thuringia to expel the communist governments amid charges 
from the leftist parties that he had not been inclined to do the same to 
the right-wing rebels in Munich. The Chef der Heeresleitung retaliated 
against the Bavarians by closing the Infantry School in Munich whose 
cadets had participated in the Hitler putsch and relocated it permanently 
in Dresden. Further, he returned the Bavarian company of the Berlin 
Guard Regiment on the grounds that they were no longer reliable, and made
the dismissal of all Bavarian officers in the Reichwehr Ministry possible
 ^94 upon request.
The Heeresleitung took advantage of the situation to regain firm
control over the 7th Division, "a high-priority project of long standing
95which had hitherto been blocked by the Bavarian government." Reprisals 
against Bavarians for their involvement in the putsch attempt emcompassed 
only a limited number of high-ranking officers. Seeckt, in fact, 
rescinded most of the orders punishing Bavarian units and officers because 
he considered the Bavarians as a whole loyal, but misguided. Although 
they violated the constitution, their aim was the recovery of certain 
federal rights from the Imperial period and not the destruction of the
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Republic.Seeckt insured that future obedience to the Reich military
authorities would be unquestioned by dismissing Lossow and naming a
personal protege.. General Kress von Kressenstein, to the position of
State Military Commandant in Bavaria.
The Bavarian government feebly opposed the nomination of
Kressenstein although it offered no suitable alternative. Their primary
objection was not to the man, but his "being forced the throats of
97Bavarians by Seeckt and Gessler." The new appointee was a fervent
disciple of Seeckt as was the new Chief-of-Staff of the Bavarian command,
Lieutenant-Colonel Ritter von Leeb. Although both officers were native
Bavarians, Seeckt knew "they could be trusted to see that the 'Berlin
98Line' was henceforth followed in Bavaria as in the rest of Germany."
As a result of the Bavarian Crisis and Beer Hall Putsch, Seeckt
overcame the last barriers to his personal control of the Reichwehr, its
administrative organs, its policy-making officers, and its ability to
function on an independent basis. In spite of the continuation in law of
the special rights and prerogatives of the southern states, military
particularism never again threatened the unity of the Reichswehr. The
destruction of the particularists was the final step toward the complete
independence of the military establishment in the Weimar Republic and
allowed the emergence of the first truly unified army in German military 
99history.
Conclusions
With the end of the Bavarian Crisis in late 1923, the basic 
conflicts between the civilian government and the military hierarchy, and
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those within the military itself were resolved. The solutions to these 
problems, however, were conservative and anti-republican. This was par­
ticularly the case with the departure of Noske and Reinhardt who were 
responsible for the tenuous control held by the civilian government over 
the military. It was the appointment of Otto Gessler as Reichswehr 
Minister and Hans von Seeckt as Chef der Heeresleitung which was the 
turning point in civil-military relations in the Weimar Republic. From 
the outset, Seeckt worked to eliminate the Reichswehr Minister from the 
decision-making processes in military affairs and this did not prove 
difficult in view of Gessler’s subservient attitude toward the General 
personally and to the army as an institution.
Officer selection in the Seeckt era did not change significantly 
in procedure or criteria from the earlier period. It did add an emphasis 
on "character” which meant each candidate had to demonstrate a respect 
for the past and political conservatism to complete the program success­
fully. After 1920, each Reichswehr recruit could in theory become an 
officer and this in itself was a new, even radically different, feature 
of the process as a vhole.
The organizational re-alignment which placed the Personalamt 
under the direct supervision of the Heeresleitung allowed Seeckt to cur­
tail the autonomy of General von Braun in selection policy. Seeckt then 
had direct control of the army's internal functions relating to officer 
selection, education and training. This proved to be vital in the 
creation of a corps reflecting the General's own ideals and values.
Even more important in the production of the type of officer 
Seeckt demanded than the initial selection process were the educational
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programs in. the Reichswehr. Officer candidates had three to four years 
to learn their trade and during that period were subjected to constant 
reminders of the values of the past. They were made to feel a part of 
the glorious traditions of German arms through not only military history 
courses, but also the activities of the Traditionstrager. Through 
Seeckt’s program, the army assimilated its future leaders, moulded them 
to fit certain ideals, and provided them with a homogeneous life-style, 
philosophy, and value system.
One of the primary factors which facilitated re-creation of the 
officer corps according to Seeckt's ideals was that the majority of the 
most qualified officers in the transitional army came from the old Imper­
ial army and held the same notions as Seeckt. Since these officers were 
the basic source of leadership in the hierarchy of the peacetime army, 
the Reichswehr indeed appeared to be an Imperial army in miniature. The 
army again was in a position to help influence the outcome of the state 
crisis in 1933 because it remained virtually the only stable institution 
in Weimar Germany. By that time, the Republic had already lost the sup­
port of most Germans and was in desperate straits socially, politically, 
economically, and intellectually. The political system was in a state of 
collapse when the actions of army officers such as Kurt von Schleicher 
made possible the appointment of Adolf Hitler as Chancellor.
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CONCLUSION
The selection, of officers in the Rëichswehr was a vital concern 
to both the civilian government and the military during the years from 
1918 to 1926. Each realized that the corps of officers would determine 
the character of the army. However, ideological differences existed 
between the new regime and the old hierarchy of the Imperial army over 
the future officer corps and these provided bitter conflicts in the 
civil-military sphere and among factions in the army itself. The com­
monly held notion that the officers determined the ethos of an army 
proved correct, but a more basic question for the civilians should have 
been what made the officers what they were. The key to the character of 
the officer corps was not the selection criteria but rather the control 
of officer education and training. The civilian government left this 
function to the hierarchy of the army as an internal matter and thereby 
permitted the maintenance of conservative and traditional ideas in the 
corps.
After the Prussian Reforms of 1807, officer selection never 
changed in concept and retained a basic emphasis on technical military 
education and performance of duty. The process began, as it had since 
the days of the Great Elector, in each regiment where the aspirant applied 
as an officer candidate. If the person had prior military experience, 
such as a Cadet School education, he entered as a Fahnriche and if not,
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as a regimental Fahnenjunker who received military training in his unit. 
Only in the post-World War One period was the title of such officer can­
didates altered for political reasons to Offizleranwarter. It was a 
decentralized system which endured until Seeckt established personal 
control over the policy-making and administrative offices governing 
officer selection, education and training in the Reichswehr era.
Even though alterations in the officer corps were rare, changes 
did occur due to expansion in the size of the army, war, and the creation 
of the Empire in 1871. The leadership of the army endeavored to retain 
as much homogeneity in social character, philosophy, and political out­
look as possible. Tradition was vital in the psychological milieu of the 
corps and separated the military, especially the officers, from other 
citizens. When the ruling combination of throne, altar, and sword broke 
down as the governing triad of the nation, the military aristocrats still 
employed a tradition-oriented philosophy to segregate themselves from the 
rest of the nation. The old military aristocrats hated industrialization, 
urbanization, and modernity in general for destroying their former suprem­
acy in society. Officers such as Seeckt realized these features were 
necessary in order for the army and nation to keep pace with other 
nations in technical military expertise. It was possible, however, to 
insulate the officer corps against outside influences for change through 
a conservative philosophy and tradition.
To produce the type of officer Seeckt considered necessary for 
the Reichswehr, the General altered the selection criteria somewhat to 
emphasize "character" in traditional terms. This meant selecting candi- 
.dates already conservative in outlook, and reinforcing their ideas' while
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while in officer training. Tradition companies kept the glories of the 
past alive while at the same time the future officer could see the chaos 
and inefficiency of the Republic all around him. Weimar inspired little 
admiration for either a more democratic philosophy or the parliamentary 
form of government. Further, most of the officers involved in.army edu­
cation and training were themselves products of the Empire, and their 
own attitudes representated a large degree of continuity with the past 
which remained an important part of the Reichwehr.
For the future army and officer corps, serious internal conflicts 
proved more important than did selection policy or any other factor. 
Generals Groner and Seeckt, leaders of the High Command and General Staff, 
attempted to undermine the military officials of the civilian government 
in order to obtain control over the army for themselves. These attempts 
were the result of disputes with Prussian War Minister Reinhardt and 
General von Braun of the Personalamt over the application of officer 
selection criteria and particularly over Reinhardt's policy of coopera­
tion with the civilian government in the question of civilian supremacy 
in military affairs. The problems attained more serious proportions after 
the Versailles Treaty necessitated a major reduction of the officer corps' 
personnel. To comply with the military clauses of the agreement, five 
out of six officers remaining in the service after June 1919 had to be 
released from the army. The beginning of forced reductions in the corps 
brought about the Kapp-Lüttwitz Putsch which ended with the resignations 
of both Reinhardt and Reichswehr Minister Noske. In reality, Reinhardt 
had little time after the signing of the Versailles Treaty to plan, much 
less to implement, programs that could significantly alter the officer 
corps.
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Even in the relatively short period which Reinhardt served as 
head of the army, his efforts produced the most promising opportunity for 
the civilian government to alter its relations with the military. Rein­
hardt was a reformist conservative who acting out of necessity, protected 
much of the old while attempting to create a bridge to the new. In spite 
of being overshadowed by the imposing personality of Seeckt, Reinhardt 
still had laudable success in dealing with the problems confronting the 
government and its military system. By the end of his administration, 
the army had a clear-cut chain of command, its officers had control of 
their troops, and the threat of radical change in the military establish­
ment had been thwarted. Reinhardt accepted the constitutional authority 
of the civilian government over the army and helped bring the military 
under parliamentary control for the first time in German military history. 
The command structure Reinhardt planned and implemented represented a 
radical break in civil-military relations because the head of the army 
became subordinate to a civilian military minister. Along with his 
insistence upon adhering to the constitution, his policy of cooperation 
with the government provided the possibility for change of significant 
proportion within the military if such a position could have been main­
tained. That it was not, could not be attributed to Reinhardt himself.
The decisive role Reinhardt played, and perhaps could have 
continued to play, in the critical post-war years of the Republic did not 
escape the notice of the former General and military historian, Waldemar 
Erfurth, who stated that "If Reinhardt had stayed longer at its head, 
then the Reichswehr would have exhibited another character, but would not 
necessarily have been any better [more efficient]."^ Another officer.
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discipline and policy decisions of the military hierarchy. However, 
disputes over authority within the highest echelons of the officer corps 
proved more difficult to solve. The three-way struggle between Rein­
hardt, Groner, and Seeckt divided the officer corps like few other 
questions during the existence of the Reichswehr. Each sought to gain 
final authority in command decisions, but only the Prussian War Minister 
had the constitutional right to head the peacetime army. Reinhardt 
ultimately eliminated Groner and Seeckt from the contest, but resigned 
shortly thereafter himself with the officer corps still in upheaval. 
Later, Seeckt's return to an active role as head of the army culminated 
in the achieving of unity and a centralized command system where 
Reinhardt had failed.
The other primary requisite for the restoration of the old 
position of the army was the securing of independent command initiative 
without the supervision of the civilian government. Independence in com­
mand authority came in practical terms about two years earlier than unity 
of command. It began with the granting to Reinhardt in September 1919 of 
a limited degree of unsupervised decision-making and initiative to issue 
orders without prior approval of the Reichswehr Minister. This was the 
result of his good relations with the government, but in it lay the pos­
sibility of abuse in hands unfriendly to the Republic. With Reinhardt's 
resignation in March 1920, this supposedly limited power came to Seeckt 
without checks or reservations placed upon its use. Seeckt immediately 
began to eliminate the new Reichswehr Minister Gessler from the decision­
making processes of the ministry.
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Moritz Faber du Faur, expressed even stronger sentiments, writing that
"If Reinhardt had remained Chief of the Heeresleitung, the German destiny
2
would have taken a difference course."
In the final analysis, the crux of the disputes and conflicts in 
the officer corps revolved around the regaining of internal unity in order 
to achieve independence in military affairs. The officer corps, if it 
remained a state within a state, could survive and function under any 
system of government. This, however, was not enough for officers who 
recalled the days when the army was the elite of the nation and had a 
significant role in determining the nation’s character and goals. Only 
with independence from control by any outside force, could the army 
expect to recapture its former position.
To control its own affairs, the army had to achieve internal 
unity. Only then could the army possess the power to sway the government 
toward its wishes in military or political affairs. General von Older- 
hausen’s memorandum to the General Staff in late 1918 posed the question 
of how independence could be obtained and concluded the task would be 
easily accomplished if the civil government remained divided and weak.
The new regime continued to face deep divisions resulting from coalition 
rule, complicated by the political and economic turmoil of the early days 
of the Republic. However, at the same time, the army was unable to take 
advantage of the situation because of barriers to unity within the 
officer corps itself.
Reinhardt began the process of restoring unity to the officer 
corps by returning full command authority to the officers of the regular 
army and eliminating the threat of the soldiers' councils to the
267
What Seeckt created was an anachronism: technocrats with a
feudal philosophy. In the post-war years for the first time since the 
18th century, the interests of the state and the officer corps no longer 
coincided. Officers such as Seeckt were determined, therefore, to 
ultimately change the state in order to reconcile the institutions.
Seeckt wanted a return to at least the philosophy of a time when the 
Offizierberuff made the officer a very special part of society, to a time 
when social status and privilege compensated for a life of obedience, 
duty, loyalty, and sacrifice for the Fatherland. Seeckt's own preference 
was a corporate, organic structure where the hierarchical social order 
was unquestioned. The initial steps in the restoration of the outlook 
of such a time were the purging of alien elements from the officer corps, 
purifying the character of the corps, instilling in its officers a sense 
of purpose through service to an abstract state, and ensuring through 
officer education and training the maintenance of a conservative outlook 
in the corps.
In the final analysis, though, officer selection qualifications 
and procedures under both Reinhardt and Seeckt were quite liberal— even 
revolutionary— in comparison with prior times, the educational programs 
of the Truppenamt and Seeckt's tradition companies proved to be the 
deciding factors in the restoration of an independent, tradition-oriented 
officer corps in Germany. It would be incorrect indeed to view the pro­
gression toward military independence as the reflection of a militaristic 
German character or as forced upon unwilling parliamentarians by a mili­
tary coup. In the contemporary context of civil war, economic disaster, 
political disarray, and constant crisis, such an eventuality may have been
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unavoidable. However, during the process the civilian ministers and 
presidents always possessed the constitutional prerogative of removing 
from office any officer whose views or actions were inconcistent with 
democratic, parliamentary government. The Reichstag was never compelled 
against its wishes to pass legislation favorable to the military, but 
instead contributed to its own demise by permitting the military to 
retain unsupervised control over internal and administrative affairs in 
the army. Thus, it was the civilians who allowed the head of the army to 
determine the character of the officer corps and army— by default.
NOTES FOR THE CONCLUSION
^Erfurth, Generalstabes, p. 55, "Wenn Reinhardt langer Zeit 
an der Spitze geblieben ware, dann hatte die Reichswehr manche anderen, 
aber wohl nocht besser Ziige angenommen."
2
Faber du Faur, Nacht und Ohnmacht, p. 77, states, "Wenn 
Reinhardt Chef der Heeresleitung geblieben ware, hatte das deutsche 
Schicksal ein anderen Lauf genommen."
269
A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
There are many studies of the political and social impact of the 
army in Weimar Germany. Only a few, however, attempt to deal with methods, 
procedures, and criteria of officer selection. The topic frequently 
appears in a work of wider scope with the emphasis and analysis on other 
matters: for example, F. L. Carsten, The Reichswehr and Politics, 1918-
1933; Gordon Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640-1945; and 
John I^fheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Power. The best description of 
officer selection in the Reichswehr in English is given by Harold Gordon, 
The Reichswehr and the German Republic, but the primary thrust here is 
the political interplay between the military and civilian government. 
Gordon provides some specific material relating to officer selection 
but in a number of cases questions arise concerning his conclusions. A 
sociological view of the officer corps is presented by Karl Demeter, The 
German Officer Corps in Society and State, 1650-1945 and Martin Kitchen, 
The German Officer Corps, 1890-1914, with additional statistical data on 
the immediate post-war period in Lt. Gen. a.D. Constantin von Altrock,
Vom Sterben des deutschen Offizierkorps. These remain the standard 
treatments of the subject.
German scholars in recent years have probed deeper into matters 
pertaining to the officer corps, as part of government projects or with 
the support of private agencies, and have produced a number of excellent
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studies on the subject. The political relations between the Reichswehr 
and the Weimar Republic are superbly analyzed by Wolfgang Sauer in 
K. D. Bracher, Die Auflosung der Weimarer Republik and by Franz von 
Gaertner, Die Reichswehr in der Weimarer Republik; Ernst Huber, Heer und 
Staat in deutschen Geschichte, an older but well written study; and 
Otto-Emst Schiiddekopf, Das Heer und die Republik. Jurgen Schmadeke, 
Militarische Kommandogewalt und Parlementarische Demokratie is perhaps 
the best study of the question of military command authority and parlia­
mentary control problems in the Weimar period. Rainer Wohlfeil's con­
tribution to the series published by the Militargeschichtliches 
Forschungsamt in Freiburg im Breisgau, Handbuch zur deutschen Militar- 
geschichte 1648-1939, Band VI, "Reichswehr und Republik, 1918-1933," is 
an extremely comprehensive effort from various archival records and an 
outstanding example of the high quality of contemporary German scholar­
ship. Of comparable quality on the development of a military elite is 
the Jahrbuch II der Ranke-Gesellschaft, Kontinuitat und Tradition in der 
deutschen Geschichte, "Führungschicht und Eliteproblem."
Several periodicals in GErmany regularly present articles of 
value on military subjects. These include Wehrwissenschaftliche Rund­
schau, Viertelsjahrhefte fur Zeitgeschichte, Wehrkunde and, if care is 
taken to expurge propaganda, the Militar Geschichte of the Militar­
geschichtliches Institut der DDR. Specific articles of importance in 
this category which deal with officer selection are Friedrich Doepner,
"Zur Auswahl der Offizieranwarter im 100,000-mann-Heer," Wehrkunde, 
numbers 4 and 5, 1973 and Hans Meier-Welcker, "Die Stellung des Chefs 
der Heeresleitung in den Anfangen der Republik: Zur Entstehungsgeschichte
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des Reichswehrministeriums" in Viertelsjahrhefte fur Zeitgeschichte, 
number 4(2), 1956.
Other contemporary studies of note which provide primary 
material and insight into the inner workings of the officer corps is 
Jacques Benoist-Mechin, Histoirie de L’Armee Allemande, I, De Armee 
Imperial a ^  Reichswehr (1918-1919) and volumn II, De Reichswehr ^ 
Armee Nationale (1918-1919); the books and collected writings of 
Generals Walther Reinhardt, Wehrkrafte und Wehrwille; Wilhelm Groner, 
Lebenserinnergungen; and Hans von Seeckt, Gedanken eines Soldaten, 
Landesverteidigung, Die Reichswehr, and in translation The Future of the 
German Empire. Many former officers have contributed to the literature 
on the period including Moritz Faber du Faur, Macht und Ohnmacht; 
Friedrich Hossbach, Die Entstehung des Oberbefehls über das Heer in 
Brandenburg-Preussen und im Deutschen Reich von 1655-1945; Waldemar 
Erfurth, Die Geschichte des deutschen Generalstabes, von 1918 bis 1945; 
Hans-Georg Model, Der deutsche Generalstabesoffizier, Seine Auswahl und 
Ausbildung in Reichswehr, Wehrmacht und Bundeswehr; Fritz Ernst’s edited 
version of Reinhardt's papers, Aus dem Nachlass des Generals Walther 
Reinhardt; and the cooperative edition of the Militargeschichtliches 
Forschungsamt, Beitrage Zur Militar und Kriegsgeschichte, Band IV, 
’’Untersuchungen Zur Geschichte Des Offizierkorps."
Memoirs and biographies relating to persons of importance during 
the Weimar years are available such as Gustav Noske, Von Kiel bis Kapp 
and Albert Grzesinski, Inside Germany. These provide valuable insights 
from the point of view of two prominent Social Democrats in the govern­
ment who were acquainted with the problems of the immediate post-war
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years. Otto Gessler, Reichswehrpolitik in der Weimarer Zeit covers the 
period from the Kapp Putsch to the end of the period in question but 
presents a very defensive account of the author’s career and relation to 
the breakdown of civilian-military relations after March 1920.
Of the many biographies regarding military personalities,
Hans Meier-Welcker, Seeckt is superior to Friedrich von Rabenau, Seeckt. 
The latter was the confidente and official biographer of Seeckt, a man 
he idolized. It is neither objective nor reliable with a bias toward 
Seeckt in all matters. In similar fashion Dorothea Groner-Geyer,
General Groner: Soldat und Staatsmann represents the response of an
adoring daughter to her father’s opponents.
A scarcely used but valuable source are the papers contained 
in the National Archives MS Series. These were written by leading German 
officers after the Second World War as part of the interrogation process 
for prisoners of war. These manuscripts furnish material relating to the 
operations of the military system and relatively few have appeared in 
published form. The National Archives also retains on microfilm the 
records from government ministries and offices. An example of this is 
the T-120 series, Aktenzeichen der Reichskanzlei whose contents cover •• 
such subjects as rearmament, security, national defense and army 
organization.
The primary material relating to the question of officer 
selection in the Reichswehr is located in a variety of archives within 
both the Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic. The cen­
tral office for Reichswehr personnel records at Potsdam was bombed during 
1944 and access to any records which remain is limited. However, it is
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possible to trace the officer selection process through the records of 
the former state military or Wehrkreis offices which are located in the 
Federal Republic. Because the Prussian War Minister, and later the Chef 
der Heeresleitung, was responsible for officer selection throughout the 
Republic, the regulations and policies of the persons in that position 
are available as transmitted to the lower echelon offices for implemen­
tation. The most complete collection of surviving records are found in 
the Bayerische Hauptstaatarchiv München for Bavaria, the Hauptstaatarchiv 
Stuttgart for Württemberg and the Generallandesarchiv Karlsruhe for Baden. 
The Federal Bundesarchiv/Militarchiv in Freiburg im Breisgau has fewer 
holdings of value on the subject. A number of other locations contain 
material not included in the study, primarily due to a lack of funding 
for the project. Among these are the Heeresarchiv Potsdam and Dresden.
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APPENDIX A
OFFICER EVALUATION INSTRUCTIONS
The following directions came from the Württemberg War 
Ministry in July 1919 and were concerned with the procedure for review­
ing officer’s records to determine those suitable for retention in the 
service. The Reich military authorities later adopted a similar process. 
An interesting comment appeared on page 2, paragraph 3, where one of the 
qualifications was stated to be that the officer "have his heart in the 
right place." These were General Groner's exact words regarding what he 
considered a vital part of the selection criteria and which brought 
bitter conflict between himself and Colonel Reinhardt, the Prussian War 
Minister, whose office determined the qualification for officers to be 
retained in the service. The implication borne by Groner's comment was 
that officers should be conservative and tradition-minded as in the past.
Source; Hauptstaatarchiv Stuttgart, M 390, Band 289, Württem­
berg K.ministerium, abt. Gen.Kdo.Ila, M. 6095/19P, Juli 11, 1919. From 
Chapter IV, p. 125, ff.
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3utunft gegeiiübetne^t, mup eg bail iüeftrebeii (tin. bie be ft en SJlfinntt bem Çeeteébicop ju -  
B ^tten .unb baà fiaatêet^alteiibe element, baâ im Dfniterfôrp?' fetnen Ktübtutf pnbet, ju  
Utiger Wilatbeit am Slufbaue bed Sieidb'  ^ ^etanjujieqen.
Snf ben gbara{ttr--<nu6 entfcbeibenbet 5Bett gelegt aetben ; in biefet Stiicbung 
bcb&tfen bie bi@b"igt" Qualiritationibeiidble, menu fie au<b im SlUgemetnen bie ein)tlnen tic^tig 
beaiteilen, bet Qrgdnjung.
<S< fommt nicbt nut barauf an, bie (eiftungdfdbisften Ofpiiete ju bebalten, fonbetn 
cbcnfo nutb biejenigtn, bie baî o ^  bem tc:bi‘ >) 5^*^ Ij'^ben. OJut pe metben ben neuen 
Seiblitniffen poll geaa^feirunb in bet Üage feiit, bie ÿetien i^ te t Untetgebencn ju geatnnen.
Urn bie Unletiagen fur eine gteidbmdB'Se Cntfdbeibung ju  geainnen, ip ed notaenbig, 
bop bie Seutleiiungen nai^ aniiegenbem SRuflet aufgefteQt metben.
9udge(iiQle STIufiet o il Üinbatt liegen bei.
3m  Hebtigen finb fût bie ^eiit^teiftattiing bie "ÿ.» unb Qu.<9epimmungen mapgeb;nb.
gum 10. 8. 15) fiitb bent fitiegSminifiEtiiim
• 1. bie iBeutteiluitgcn in jrocifaiber îliiâfertiguiig,
2. bie t'ifleii II, III, IV , V, VII, VIII, IX, X, XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV, XVI, XVII
gcmflp g iffe t 18 bet 58eftimmuugen iibec 'j3etfana(- unb Oualififaliondbetit^te non ben becid^ *
tenbcn Offijietcn unniittelbot soijulegen.
gn  bem na^ SHuPet C bet unb Qu.>5Beftimmungen aufjufleQenben SOetjeii^nU 
pub biefenigen Dffijiere, bie jum Sluèfcbeiben uotgeftblogen locrben (pelje gtagebogen 9lt. 16 
unb 17) t o t ,  biejenigen bte [teiioillig audf^eiben mcUen, g tu n  ju  unteiftveii^en.
SH. b. 2f- b. ©. b. Jîr.SJlin. beauflragt:
235Unjûrl^ ,
Obetjaeutnant.
Sn, Slo. (Vnlclttiiin I I I  je o in v .) .......................  40
('•Bej. JiDul. It I)
Z7. t in .  ('{Jectcilung b il H o in p .) ....................... 10
« L W ...........................................................   1
l î t f .  in fill. 'B u ll. IJ  H im .....................................  1
Wacbr. UliiKii. 13 mit icaTpeuacl)cici)(tnpaTf, gunten»
fidlioii 'B iiih iu ,t(n ................................................ 1
nilcgctljuiri 'Bobliiincn............................................  ]
I .  komp. b. Bitlifd). IS. i Qritbcicbei)3|<n . . . .  1
Rea. 13 S tiittaae t.................................................... 1
2iain>qibl. 1 3 .......................................................  1
flcatmtlcitmia bet Z. R. 'JBJttt. (HJetl. b il Rsrap.) 30
flt l l .S tp in  Uubminsbiira......................   1
UtL* u. ZtJinbeput tit. c lu i tg a K ..................  1
2tainbci>ot SnbiuiQoburg.....................................  3
SUiittt Dirt, t tp o l U l m ......................................... 1
81cbiib3Itiiacti(bcpi}t ë t u t l ia t t .............................. 1
R (bn .2TainbipoC lU m .......................... ■. . , . 1
fiinitnfpitiiimitbmilut W ......................................
fctiegil,\ff-i-‘ii«et Ulm unb tu tap . tSatcJbeim,
Ijolicunfpctii unb S/liingngen tjt  1)......
fflouD. G lu i lg a t t ..................................................
Sbtr. l l l n i .............................................................
Otoup. U tm .............................................................
kb it. S lliiu lin a tw ..................................................
Nt. %)(!(. q im t.........................................................
Qnfptgiinalamc...................................... ...
Sftflunflsnefiii.iiii* U lm ............................................-
U'on.E- Utbttoiup. 1— 3 lie 1) ................................  3
G ânill Htbt b. Kr.aJJin. (jc 1 ) .............................  20
B (I), A (3), WK (3)
g ttim .'ilb l. f ia a l ......................  30
SRrid)ln>tbtbtigabe 13 .  ..................................  60
Wefctst.......................... 60
APPENDIX B 
OFFICER CANDIDATE INTRODUCTION COURSE
This course was designed primarily for non-commissioned 
personnel who qualified to attend officer candidate school. Regular 
officers of subaltern rank were included in the course also, particu­
larly if they were commissioned during the war. Of interest is the 
speaker on the Peace of Versailles scheduled Monday, January 26, 1920, 
from 2:30 p.m. to 5:00 p.m.
Source: Bayerische Hauptstaatarchiv München, Abt. IV, Band 20,
akt. 1(1920), Gr.Kdo. IV, München, 8. Januar 1920. From Chapter V, 
p. 178, ff.
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•'cX'
^etrÇstocÇrgrup^Jcunommrtubo 4
b f t  flo a lsB ù rg e ttitÇ fn  ÿ o t iB ifb n n g s fm tfe  I 'J iO .
SRùntÇen, 8. Qanuar 1920.
•ettnnfdûmg fnr ben I. ^ur$
(18. I .  615 81. 1. 2 0 ).
Zoa Strnibf S e b t a b t c i l u n g  A Stunbe S c ^ r a b t e i l n n g  B
Sifitftag 
18. 1.
9»
sotm.
iPftièten m b Suontbm b tl ÏRcicfiSBttinnanneî otJ 
StaatJbûrgtT. (oauotmann im (stuctalimb Oltûii). 
O il: SabettmloipS. SSrfaa! 190.
•  9»»
n o m
'Eie Sebrableilung .4.
. a -^ «
ao4nu
3)te gcmabttdie iCtcbutllott brt btiu ii^tti _3o[(tl. 
I. 2 t i l :  (iirunblaata (mil Sitblbilbttn). i jt t ib it i 
non tUcibmann.
O rt: $ b o iilb b *o l bn ailillerietibult PBaopenbrimiir.).
0— 40
nadun.
Siotula, $anietgeib (Dr. Sutget).
C rt: SabcUeutom-l. cbtioai 343/344.
' 3HUm«4 
-.14. 1.
9—11»
nom.
î te  genjnbliibc 'Probnttion bd  bmtfdint SJolte-S. 
n. 2«it: Cigoiiiiotion (mil Sicbtbilbtra). uK'bctt 
non $c(bmann.
Oil: 9ibi)RII)6tiaal btt Slttillnieiibute.
9—110
uotm.
T ie Sornefdiiciite be-5 9ticge3 OJSrofeitot Rati ÎUeianbec 
non 9)1 i l l  let'.
C tt: âôifaal 313.344 RabettenIor;3.
S -4 «
itn^m.
Sü5ning im boutfdim ÜJhifeum.
Som ittlL 9—11»
nom.
.
2 ie gtm ttbliie ^robuttion bî4 beuti^tn 3oîîrf. 
lU. 2eil; CrgecTiiie (mil CitSlbilbtra). Steiljen 
non Setbmonn. 
oil: TbolitW Aal bet Slttilleriefibuie.
9— 110
oorm.
Tie Setfaiîmig bi-j beuliieti SReicReS Qntenbanlur 
Slfiei'oi ÿa:tb '-.
C tt: .Fiijrfaal 313 344 Sabetlentoisl.
2— 10
naiim.
5ü5rung im beiilftben 3Jlafeiin.
. gating 
16. 1.
9 -110
nom.
Setufsftonlitilen unb iStnif-Sbngiene. I. 2eil (mil Sidjb 
biibetn) (Ol’ctmebijinalrot Sloeltdj).
Ort: îtibeitermufeum, Çfanik. 3.
9—11 *
Dotm.
Süljmng ini SIrmecmufeum.
S—60 
ac4m.
î i t  Robtenftagt (Sebeimtal Dr. iÇ t in j)  (mil Siiit- 
bilbeni).
Oil: Ëbcfaal 107 bet te^nil^en fioiR'tbuIe.
3—60
noibm.
23te Cebtableilung .1.
■ÇbmSlag 
17. 1.
'^V
9 -110
nom.
Senifsbronrbeiten unb 3?enif?6t)aiene. _ II. 2eil (mil Si4b 
biibetn), Cbctmebiiinalial J loe lirf).
O il: Stbeiletmufeunt, $ fa ttlit. 3.
9—110
oonn.
Scbrcn aii4 ben gt.'sen DJeooIiilionen bet 0ef4i4te.
(Drcieiiot Rati tlletanbet n. IR ü IIe tX  
C tt: SStfaal 343 3(4 Raberten-RoipO.
. Stoatag 
• 19. 1.
9—110 Satula. iCaoietgelb (Dr. S u tg e t). 
C tt: Sotfaal 343/311 RabcltenlocnS.
9—110
n o m
Tolltlranlbeiten i i-b  ibte SelSmnfung. I. 2e il (mil 
Sidjllillbetn), '.I*;,;itf.5atjt Dr. S e n f f e t t  
O rt: Slebciletmuicunt. 91fatiflt. 3.
vsr ...
Sfniatiig 
SO. 1.
9—n o ' 
nom.
H e  !Dotgef4i4te btS Rriege!. CCioieiiot Sail Stleçanbet 
non iüîa ile t.)
Ort: SStfaal 343/344 SabettenIotp4.
9—110
nom.
Tie gemetbliijeT'icbttftion bcS bculidien SoHeb I. Zeil.
@runbIonen(i»:b n.ICeAmann). ’.'JJIit Cidjtbilbetn.) 
C tt: TboiilbStfaal bet blniHetiefdjuIe.
S -4 »
;«ai5m.
gubiung im îlimeemufeum. 030-^0
na*m.
So.)ian-3mu.5. Soli.temifmub, S i|nb lk li8ntu«.
(Dr. S u tge t.)
O rt: batiaal 120 SabetttnfotpS.
Smunoiÿ 
SL 1.
9—n o  
nom.
H e Cebten auS ben gtosen ffieoolutionen bet Sefdjiibte.
CPtcfefiot Sail Sileranbet non lU uIIe t.)
Ort: Ë iifoa l 343/344 Rabclienlotnl.
9 -110
. n o m
Tie aenietblidbe Tt.'bullion be4 beuticien Tolleb II. TeU.
Cigamiation (.Itb n. gedimann). ('JRit S iiltilbetn.) 
C rt: Tbonlbbeiaai bet îltlilletieiâule.
. , • . 2— 40na4m.
Sûbtung hn T e u rtim  OTufeum.
tDsnnciit. 
83. .L
9—110
nom.
BoH'lltanlbeilen unb ibre Selâmofnng. I. 3eil.
('üe iitlîa iit Dr. saenffett.) olfiit Sicblbilbetn.) 
Ort: Ztbtiletmuieum. $(att|tt. 3.
9—110
uoim.
Tie generbliâe Ttebullim i be# beuticbeu ToIleO III. Tcil.
(btgebniite (5th r .  üeajmnnu). (Dlil Sidubilbem.) 
C rt: iPbdlilbiitfaal bet blrtiUctiefdiuIc.
J«_60
’ muBn..
Rullnt unb Rioiitialion. OlninttfiliHstofefiot 
Dr. IBuibnet.)
Ort: CStfaai 343/344 SobellenbtpO.
2— 40
nodbm.
RObiung im T eu tfim i SRuIeura.
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7«g Shmbe
1
ü c b r a b t o i l u n f l  k Slunbc S e | r « b t ( 4 l « B C ' B
1 9-11®
23, 1. . sann,
f
{ 9 - 4 *  
1 u 4 s l
1
SotWronlbrirrn unb tlirt 3<tômpfnna II. Z ril. CStjirlS* 
Sltît Ur. St i j f fctO. mit Cidjtbilbnn.
C rt: îlrbritttmuîtun.
nûbruna in bnt $inalotb(kn.
9 -11»
oorm.
2 “ -5 «
nar&m.
Uniere mirtirfaafiliâc Rogr unb Me beuKcbt &anbrorrt(4»H 
(Dr. SotlarbcrX 
O rt: Sbrtool 343,344 Rnbettenlorpl.
Rullut unb Simlifaliondlnioernt-Çrofeiîor D r.3 u t i  n et, 
C rt: 6bt(aal 313/344 Rnbettenlorp*.
1
Comjtna 9—11® 
24. 1. ooim.
Unftre ro ittfia fa liit Sngt unb bit bnitfcbe Canbrairtfefaoft 
v.Ur. jjo rlo iiie r).
O rt: ÿbtioal 343/344 RabcttrntorpS.
9 -1 1 »
oorm.
Serafîfranlberltn unb ifare Selamofamg I. Zeil (n it 
SidiibilbemX Cber^DIebiiirmlrat Roelfrb.
Ort: Slrbeilcnnufeum
IRnntaa 
26. 1.
,
■
9—11»
oonn.
*Baqm.
.
SBerfaimitg bc3 bcutfcbnr iRrirfatJ (QnlrubnntunSlüeîiot 
Sotib).
Ort: Cbrt'oal 343/344 Rnbrirrnlorpl.
3fibruna fan Slrbtiltrmuffum (ffitrctrbtrol Rotfdi).
9 -11»  
,  oorm.
•200—50
umfam.
Sollëlrnnlbeilen unb ibre SeKmofima II. 2erl (mit 
Sidubilbem). ScjhlSarsi Dr. S egfte it.
C rt: Slrbeilennufeum, $ ia rrik . 3.
Ter iJrtebe oon ScrfniHeJ (6- S illie r):
C rt: SSn'aoiI 343/344 Rabeltenlorpd.
X im tiss 
27. 1.
9 - l l «
norm.
.
îtrluitcrldiiis I.2 til, mit2idjlbiIbtinCSra«bctatSloridi). 
Ort: fibrfonl BtbntemmKuiii.
9—11»
oorm.
2—4»
no6m.
Tie poliliidjen^atleien unb iirtSebeutunj(S.6 i l tU t.)  
C rt: Sbrfaol 343/344 Rabeltenlorpt
üûbtmij.fat ben îiinalolWea, ■. 1 -
3R tW i5 
S3. 1.
.
9-11*5
oorm.
2 -5 »
ondim.
Slrbriteriiub II. U til (.mil Ciifalbilbtrn), ®cmetb«ot 
S n tid ).
Ort: Ôorfaul îtrbrilrrmuicuni.
eo3i.iIi}n iii4, SoliieraiJmuJ. Sçnbifa!i4mu5 
(Ur. ï l u rg r r ) .
Ort: Ôôn'aal 343/344 SnbttteiilorpS.
9—11»
norm.
4»narfam.
Tie Seitfaîaefit (Crgamforian. roitlitbcftTKfae Î(iû iï4:œ ) 
Ôauphnanu ira (Ser.erainab S r itn .
Ort: Sôrfaal 313/344 RaSetlenlorpJ. .
üübrung ira Btbeilermufeum (Semerberot Rar f tb i
®onnet3t 
29. 1.
9 -11»
potm.
l ie  KeidjSracbr CCrgaiiifaiion, EirtiJiofiiidje BiiJiimlen) 
Üaupmtaim im (seneralflnb S t i tn .
O rt: Ôôrîanl 343/344 Rnbetteulorpl.
9—11*5
oorm.
2 -4 0
nodim.
îlrbeitrrîdinb. I. Seil (rail Cisfalbllbem) 
(Seaerberat S a t i i x  • • ‘ 
C rt: îlrbeilermufeum. j .  > ’ • ,
iû^nu ia  Ira SRallonalmufeura. . “
SnilsQ 
80. 1.
9-11*5
oorm.
2 -4 0
nn^nt.
Die oolitiirbcn'Horteicn unb ibtc ülebeuluiig. (5 .6 i t l lc r .)  
Ort: Ôôtfaol 343,314 SûbellenfotsJ.
SORruna fan îlaltonalmuîeum. . |
9—11*5
oorm.
SltbeilerttuS. H. Teil (mit Cfablbilbetni
Seracrberal Ratfcfa.  ^
C rt: îlrbeiletrauîeua. . . . . . . ' _____  .. .
SamStoa I 9—11 ®
31. 1. uotm.
■ i
Ter Sriebe non Scriaillti. (6 . S illie r.) 
Ort: Sbtinol 343/344 Rabellenlorpb.
9—11»
oomr.
IBetufsIrniilbeilcn unb ibre Sefdmpfung. II. Teil 
Siifaibiibern). Cbermebijinalrat SSoeli^
Ort: Slrbeitermuîeunt. ' '
Cem erfiinscn: 1. StuS«tbtm iiiibct ju no(6 {enjufcljtiilier 3«>t Rail: ijCRntnij butcS tincn arSsnen StilKnaSotrfaa. SsfueR uonl^eatenj unb Sonjtrten.
2. Bn im non 3o«inacn unb SUIjcunain frtim  bnlbeii Zngcn isnbeii but4 bcfonbcien Suibbefcbl SlibeiUfhiubcn nngAgL
.^ursfcifung
®nln
. butptnunn fan GcinnlRnb. .
f
APPENDIX C
PARTICULARISM AND OFFICER SELECTION: THE BADEN EXAMPLE
From the beginning of the demobilization of the Imperial Army 
the south German states, especially Baden and Bavaria, sought to retain 
only native-born officers for their contingents. The following letters, 
one from 1926 and the other from 1927, show the perniciousness of this 
effort by Baden military officials. The first letter, dated December 12, 
1926, clearly demonstrates that certain officers were unacceptable to 
Baden officials primarily on the grounds that the person came from out­
side the Land. The second presents an equally strong reaction in favor 
of officers who were native Badener - Landeskindern.
Source: Generallandesarchiv Karlsruhe, K 7374, microfilm,
Badischer Landeskommandant, Ila, Nr. 48/26, Canstatt, den 12.12.1926, 
"An das Badische Staatsministerium," and Generallandesarchiv Karlsruhe, 
K 7374, microfilm, Badischer Landeskommandant, Ila, 4/27, Canstatt, 
den 20.1.27, "An das Badische Staatsministerium." From Chapter V, 
p. 187 ff.
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, Badischer Landeshomnandaat^  ^ C&anstatt, des 12,12.1926.
Ila. Hr.
DAü.StAHiw..Mi-»ISfErttJM
das Badische StaateainiBterlus
K a r l a r u h a .
Dem Staatsaiinlsteriur telle Ich ergebecBt folgende Xnderung in 
dsr Stellenbesetziing der Koaaandeure vos B&dlschan Iruprentellen 
stltx
Oberatleutnant M u f f ,  bisher Komaandeur des II.Bataillons 
Bad.Jnfarterie«Reeinents 14 In ICbin&en, 1st alt dec 1.12.26. *ur 
Haores» Priedenskornlssion In Berlin versetzt worden.
An seiner Stelle 1st Oterstlentnnnt N o a o k, bisher Ir. 
ReichswehrniniBtar-lup, zua Koraandeur d»» II.Bataillons Bad. Jsf. 
Keglrents 14 ernannt eorden.
Oberstl eutrant N o a c k 1st nlcht gel orerei" Bedtr.er.^-'
Generalra *or 'ind B«tjiS.ch»r
Lnrdef V'"' '.irdpn I.
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Badischer tandeshor-naBdont. .  ^ Cannstatt, den 20.1.37.
lia. Hr.
22JAN.I5)27 {}i)727
An
das Badische Staatsninisteriun
K a r l s r u h e
Des Sttatsninist.l'iur. telle ich ergebenst rolgerde Xnderurg 
ir der Steiienl -^ f.ot;:urt, "ei- K'.;rrariUeiwe \<>r B 'ùJscT.er Trupper.- 
tellen rit:
Oberst Prhr.v.Hotborg, Kcrnandeur des 14.(Bad.) Jnfanterle» l*
t
«erinents 1st rit den 31.1.27 dsr Abachied bevinigt worden. ;
.!
An seiner Stelle 1st Oberst Vaenker von Danher.schwell, bisher : • 
beir. Staba des 14. (Bad.) Jnfartarie* Reglsenis, zun Korcandeur ‘ 
des Regiients ernanrt worden.
Oberst Waenker ver. Dsrkersch>eil 1st getcrertr Bader.er. _
,(
Qeneralr.rt J.-,r und vV er
Lardeskorr«rdant.
/
APPENDIX D 
OFFICER SELECTION QUALIFICATIONS
The first letter from Major Wemer von Blomberg, Chief of Staff 
of the 5th Division in Stuttgart of July 2, 1921, to the Baden State 
Ministry outlined in detail the qualifications for entering the Reichs- 
wehr whether as an officer candidate or not. The second presentation, 
from about 1927, demonstrated that the qualifications and procedures did 
not change significantly over the intervening years.
Source: Generallandesarchiv Karlsruhe, K 7374, microfilm, 5.
D i v i s i o n ,  Abtlg. Ilb Nr. 1408, Betreff: Einstellung im Reichsheer,
Stuttgart, den 2. Juli 1921, date stamped 4- Jul 1921 14483 and undated
pages from Army Regulations Gazette, circa 1927, entitled "Merkblatt fur 
den Eintritt ins heer." Chapter VI, p. 226,ff.
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8. 0 i V 1 a i. o  a Stuttgart,dan .Jnll 1»31.
ÎXbtlR.IIb ?Tr. y J ' T l / i . - . .  . ;
ttraff.lElnntallnog. in Raiohaliaer. i
A  Dam tadisoban Staataminlatarlnm
K a r l a r n h a .
' Zn dar Baapraohnng das Chefa daa Stabaa dar B.Dlvlolon mit dai
Barra StaataprSaldaataa wind argabanst mltgatallt.mla sloh in
«aaaatlieban dar Qaag dar Blnstallnng fdr dla Fraiwllllgoa Im
Baiohshaar voUslaht.
.. . '
' Oar jnnga Uann,walohar in daa Raichshear aintrataa will,ana
'
folganda Bedlngnagah arftH'len.' .
Z r  mnO 1 .  gaanad aain,
8. im Alter von 17-23 Jahran etehan,
S. die dantocho Staatsangehorietait besitaeh, d. ar noli Last and Llebe xun Soldatanbernf haban.
.AnsBeBohlosaea von den Eintritt In daa Raichahear nindi
a)mar dla dentsche Stcatnangahoriglsoit nioht-bacltx4b)nar n&eh S 114 doe Biirgsrllcben Gesetzbnchss In dar Oa> soh&ftsfthig^elt baaohr&nkt let,o)var tregon Ongeeignetheit odar Degradation ana dar tahrm naoht,do& friibarea Heer,dar frUberan Marine,dor frfiberen • Sahntztrappe,dan friihoran anerkanntan Fralwilllganver»b£bden,dar vorl&ufIgon Helobsirobr und vorl&afIgen Roieba»-. mnrlno odar anf Grand frlstlosar Eundignag odar infolga Srkanntnin dar Fehrborafskanmer nuegasahladan let,d)ver wagon Battalno odar Lnndstralcbons wiadarholt baatra. 
lot,
a]war wagan Vergaheao odar Verbrechena alt alnar Fralhelta— 
strafa von S. Uonatan and cehr bestraft int.ohna Rüokslchu 
darnaf,ob dla Strafe vorbil3t let odar atdhi, •
f)war motor 17 and Ubor 23 Jahra alt lot,
' g)war varheiratat 1st.
Zur Aamaldung muO dar Fralwilliga folganda Papiora mltbrlngaat
_a)Gabarte%angnln, *. .b}poliseillcbo8 FahrunRssaagnis odar Laummagezaagnim mit ;  ^ polisaillch gaotempoitcn Llchtbiid,.o)aina pollsailicha Eaaohoinigang darübar,ob and la waleham Arbeitovarhbltnis dor Fralwilliga in dor Zeit von dar VollanCinng den 17.Lobenc.lahres bis %a sainar freiwllligaa ' Baldang goatandan h&t,ln3basondere,ob ar atwa baraits fr&her dar Fobrneobt nnrrehbrt h&t,f»raar ubor seine 7a» 
millenvorhaitnlose and solnan aigoaan Fsniliaoatsnd(lodig odar vorhoirntat). 
diZengnisEe der Arboltgobar,m5gllobot tbar dla latstan 8' J*hra,vor SohQlar dna latzta Scbulseugnia, ajKillttrpaplere neben dan aonatlgoa Anawalspaplaran.wann mia baraits 1b nlten Haara,dor Usrlna odar dor Ralobswebr - «sw.gadiant hsban,
n m  Tih,. %
A.
300
f)*lnderjRhrlRe:Dl# eeAriftllch»,>atlioh begl&nbigt#
. w fT T ly u n g  a«s gee*t:llch#R Vertr#t#r8 in* Bintritt In dl« 
##hrm&oht(nloht In #ln#m bcstluitsn Irnppsntall) •
Dar Bavarbar naldat alob bal dan Imppantall,bai dam ar aln-
sntratan vUnapht odar bal dam Ihm sun&obat galaganaa Trnppantail,dar
dla DnrobfQhrong aainar Bavarbnng bal dam gawunsobtan Imppan'tail
bevirkt. . ^
Dla Anirarbttngen erfolgan im kllgemeinen dnroh die Kompagnia»*
mam«Ohafa,bai danan aich dia Bawarbar snn&ehst aobriftlioh nntar
Sinraiehung Ihrar Papiara odar parsSnlioh nntar Vorlaga ihrar Pa*
1piara vorstellen. ■
Dia von.dan Kompagnian nsw.vorl&ufig ale gaaignat bafindanan
Angaworbanan vardan dan Bmtl.baxm.Abtlg.anr Dnrohfübrnng der Annahaa
■ i
sngafQbrt.Der Annabmaoffi:ier dee Batle.pp prdft die Papiers noob-
i
male. ’ ;•
I - ■ . ■ • • • - !
Ja naob dam Anefall dar Pr&fnng varanlaflt' dor Annahmoofflxlar J
die Ablahnnng doe Freinilligen odar die allitdr&rztlleha Uatsr»
enohopR dnroh don znat&ndlgan Ulllt&rarzt.
Das nntarsnohnngeargebnis anf Qrnnd beigafagtar Richtlinlan anr
Banrtailüng der langliohkoit für das Reicbehaar I:ann Ian tant
. a.tangllch fdr-dae Hear,
b.xeitlg nntnuglicb fur das Rear nnd 
o.nntangllob fiir das Hoar.
. Zeltig Untangliobe kSnnen ibre Maldnng ernenern *nnd vardan
’ bieranf bingaviasan. *. ' *•
• • ■ ■ ; : :
Die snr Annabma Gaelgnatan warden nnter Angaba dae Untarenob-
nngsbafnndas in Listen olngetragen nnd haban don•Verpfliobtnngs>
eobein zn nntorsobraiben,dar sn den Aktan kommt.
. Die ale gaaignat Befnndenen erbaltan sodanni ainan vorl&nfigen
' f : ■ ■ !
:• Annahnagahein. . (
Dan mit dan vorl&uflgen Annabnosohoin vereabanan Fraivilligan ! 
. vird erOffnat,daO eia die Entsobaldnng ihrar Sinetallnng absnvartan - 
haban and Yobnnngsv.er&ndernngan dam Annabmatrnppantail lanfand mit- 
cntailan babon. - . - - j
Bai Untorauchnngen für elnan andoren Irnppontail flbaraandat 
der Smppantail,bai valoban die Bntersnohnng vorganoamon vird,elnan
Aasawg
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Asmmng an dan Yarbatmppentall*
Fttr die badlsehon Fraiwilligan kann der groOan Bntfarnnngan 
halbar anr Donanesclilngan,Vllllngen -und Eonstanx für Südbadan, 
Lndwlgsbnrg^f&r Hordbadan in Batraoht konnen*
Xs iet gapr&ft worden,ob eine Untareuobnng enflerhalb dem 
• IrappenteilB bei einen VertranenGarxt,atwa bairn Versorgungeamt 
Eailbronn erfolgen kann.Bolder mnO davon abgesaben warden,wail 
diese Xrwaiternng der Beetlmmnng aiohorlicb von Faindbpnd ale 
Mobilnaohnneevorbereitnng ansgelegt nnd verbotan warden würda.
Dia Bingtellnhgea erfolgen,abgaeehan.von ainselnea Ana- 
nahmen,Anf ange April nnd Oktober jeden Jabree.
Die Preiwilllgen der Jnfanterie*,Ploniere*,Machrlohten*,Fabt‘^  
nnd Kraftfabrtrnpppn warden snn&chot bei einea Ansbildnngebatl. 
l/£ 3ahr infanterlstlscb,die der Beiter-Hegiaentar nnd Artilleri< 
bai den Ausbildnngs-Esk.und Batterien ausgebildet*
Die Beordernng der Froiwllligen zna zuat&ndlgen Anebildnnga- 
tmppentall arfoigt saitens dee Annabaotrnppanteils aibtale Oe- 
• etcllnngottnfforCernng. Bela Eintreffen wird der Froiwilliga 
. noohaals allit&r&rttliob nnteronobt*
Sr erb&lt dann don Verpflichtnngssobein ansgab&ndigt nnd let 
won dieeoB Zaitpankjk ab dor Bsginn dor •Heereaxngebgrigkait er- 
. . Colgt,-
9 ;
8 - Den.Blob bel dar Division aeldendpn Frelwilligen wird bel--
folgandes Merkblatt nnd Garnlsonverzelohnle aitgegeben bexw.ait- 
gaecbickt,
Haoh Verabschledung doe YabraaQhtsversorgnngsgasetzae 1st 
eiaa Hananfatallnng dee Korkblattee beabsicbtigt.
V# s* d. D i v i s i o n .  
Dor Chef das Stabas y,
/ V
ObarstlantL-ant LÇ
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ÎKerîblûtt
für ben €intntt ins ^ c e r
^  3etipnnbt ber Sinftelbiog.
Qebetjeif, in ber Soupifaâe ont 1. 4. unb 1.10. jebeS QabreS. SJJelbung 
ieberjeif, ;mcdmôBig mebrere SJionatc uor 1. 4. unb 1. 10.
aller.
SoIIenbelcâ 17. bü soUcnbeiei 23.3s^ r, beootjugt 19* unb 20 iô^ rlge Çrei»
•®“  ï:-; Jîr
Seblngnngen, '  - - -  y j  c
... 12ifi§rige ÎDîenftoerpfli^ hing, lômerlt4 taugliâ, unbefdjollen, minbeiten»
' '  ) ;0'Mn groÊ, unDet^eirotet. ©lô&ere greimiHige reerbcn in etftet Sinie berüd*
pt^figf.
aielbefteQen.
SDion melbet (iib bei bem ïntppentfil, bei bem man ju bien en munfcbt.
SB« einen fallen ntt^i iennt cber bott nitçt angcnommen rcetben fonnte, melbet 
pi^ bei ben iDioiüonStommanboâ. 6fanborfe ber 3iciponen |lnb:
6. Sioipon 3)lûnf(cr i. HB.,
7. „  fflünâcn,
1. Ran.*2ioipcn Rranffurt a. C. 
a . „ ,  SreSlau
8. ,  .  ffieimot
1. Dioipon RSnigSbeig,
а. ,  Stettin,
3. „ Setlin
4. • ,  3)ie4ben
б. ,  Stuttgart
.1
ansmeispaplere.*
®ebutt8jeugniS ; polijciliibc8 SûbrungSjeugniâ ober fieumunbsjcugnig mit 
poIi|eiIi(b gcftcmpeitem Sidjtbilb; Jeugniiye ber Stbeitgeber, mcglitbil über bie 
lejten 3 ga^re; Bon S^ülcm  bas icgte SâuljeugniS.
gteiroiHige untcr 21 Sa^een müiîcn baneben bie amtiitb begiaubigte 6in> 
miâlgung beS ge{e$Iiqen Sicrtretert (tUaler ober â3otmunb) jum 12jâ|tigen 
Sienp im ^ee: beibringen.
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-I SDie po lijtili^ tn  geugni|ie mü|icn iantioc ouafprc(5en:
i )  Db unb reeb^ e Slwfen oorlifgen; *
b) ob llmflS.ibe befannt finb, bie b tr qeiftigen 3u« j j
re^nungfifâbtgfrit begtünbcn (}. 3 . gttifpnicb ouâ § 5 L Si S tr. S.); i
c) cb bet Seraetber einer flilfâfcbule ongegott %at obet gûrforge» 
unb 3n>ong8jôgling gemefen ift;
d) ob bee greimilige lebtg ober oertieiralet i|i,
e) ba§ bet îîreiœittige ficb polittfib ni<bt in ncrfa)Tung8fetnbIi(§ent &inne 
betârigt ^
Slenftlanfbabn.
CinfleHung eifoigt a ll S<büge ufio. Sluftûden finbet natb SJJaBgabe bet™ 
gS^igleilen Pctt.
5Die greiroiQigen tiinncn no t 3 Sobren |um Obctffbiiten, Cbcticiter ufa. 
ttnonnl unb bei frcien SleGcn naa minbci'tenâ 4|ôbtiget Sienftjeit juci @c= 
freilen unb nac§ minbcftcnâ Siü^ctger Sicnftjeit }um Caergefreuen _befôrbert
metben. ;
Sîa^ einct 2icnpjeit oon 3 gaijrcn îônnen fid) tie greireiHigen 'einer 
Çrûfung jum Untcroffijier unterjieljen. SBer fie befteij!, o itb  »utn tlnieroffi;iet» 
onroarltt ernannt unb glciéiàtig junt Geireiten befotbcrt, mcnn GefrcitenficUcn 
fret pnb. SBcnn eteilei: frci finb, [onn ter UitterotfijictanmSrler bann nacb
4iâ%riger Gefamtbienfljeit junt Unteroifijier, nad) afagriger Sienftjeit alS f
Unterofrijier jitm Untctfelbaebcl, no4 4;àbriger CCicnftscit clâ Untetofpsicr 
]Uin gelbmebel beforbert nierbcn.
SBer Dberfctoraebcl merben mid, hub neben ber Un lero ffiji^ riifung eine 
bcfücbete ÿtûfung ablegen. SBer fie btitc^i, fann nseb ajabrigcr 2ienfljeit
oU Unterofrijiet junt Oberfelbmcbel befotbert metben. :
SBer tie  noiigen Senntniffe unb gâbigîeitcn nacSmeip, fann fitb ju r - :
Hbleiftung ber Cifi\tcianra5rterptufung melben unb wcnn et fie beftc^t, nadj
Sefu^ ber SBaffcnfcbuIen Officier mcrtcn. SotJuSfejung fû t bie gulaffung ^
ju r DfTijieranioâtterlaufbabn ift bet SiefiS bc3 'Hbgangsteifejeugmuea einer -
Sllafjigen bô|ctcn S!ef|tanftalt (ilbiturcntencroinen) ober bet 'Jîaibiraeiâ einet 
entfpre^enben 33ilbung but<  ^ SIbiegung non îptûfangen.
Slie Soibaten pnb in bo9 SleicbêbeüintenbefoIbungâgefeÇ einbegriffeit. " '
Gie metben befolbet: ;
H olS Gcbüge ufm. nacb Gruppe I. ’i"  f
i olft Gefreiter unb Cbetgefreiler nacb ©tuppc II, "'• ^
al9 Unteroffijier unb Untetfclbmebel nacb Gruppe III, r
a lt gelbtoebel nacb Stuppe IV, 
a lt Dberfelbmebel nacb Gruppe V.
i c.
\ ' :? . !
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{CXmeBcn nrrben frété Selleibiuig, ftcte orjilicfie Sr^anblung, freie jfianfen» *rj—
Ç^outpflege foiuie frété jgeil* unb geaâfirt. ÿ
Unlnttmft unb aerpflegung n^ erben oom Staot getoô^rt gür fie miib |
<in Sbjug oon ber 9efoIbung gcntadit. y
{Dos SJKnbcfieinfominen etneS î^eutnants emfpridjt bem eineS Cberfelb* ^
mebels. J
SSe gamtlienmtfglieber oerbciratelet Solbatcn ^oben in Rronl|etlSf5IIen .
Xnfprui^ ouf freie miliJ0r5tjtltt|e Se'gonblunB-
i
Sorbenitung fQc ben bSrgerlitben Sernf.
SBâ^renb ber iDieitfljeit crfinlten Untcrofr.;ictc unb îJîannft^oflcn eine 
^toeilere ScbutouSbilbung uttb eine facbUie Sotibcrausbilbuttg, bie i^ntn ben 
fpSteren ûbcrfritt in ben ïïccmtcnbenif ober einen geirerblicen ^er.tf crIctcSicit. 
âe i ber gttfatttcrie. RaccCeite. blrhllerie unb ber gobnruppe ftnbcî eine 
SotSerciUina ouf bte Scatr.tcnloufbabn unb juin Scit audj ouf ben iJcruf ois 
flouftnonn ober Sonbmtrt flett. Sutcb Sbîoinmonbicrung ouf eine ^cereS» 
bonbroerîetft^uie fann autÿ eine Siuôbilbunq lu cincrn ber gebrüui^litfiftcn jjanb» 
merle bis jt ir  'iîeiïtcrprüi'ung ctiolgen. àei ben tcqnifÆcn Zrtg:pen n-irb ntir 
bie SJJcgIidjfcif gebolen, eine Üuibiibung ats ^anbticrfer, nie ouf ben ^eeres» 
^nbtocrferfdjulcn, eine SIuSbilbung fût freie !cd;nifcic üerufc unb eine foldie 
fur Je^niftbe SBcamte *u etlongcn. Gs entpfiel)!t (ici), boB ber gtcitoilligc ficb 
«or%er erfunbigt, roeltbe ïïfcglidifcitcn jïcb jur ï3otfailbuitg für ben fpâtcren 
Seruf bei bem ïruppenteil feincr Sa!)t bieten.
{Die ouB 1er £anbminf(i)oft fommcnbcn Solbafen fônnen fitS in fanb* 
mirifi^ofUit^cn ©tbulen, bencn bâucrlirfje Setricbe ongcnUebert finb, toeitcrbilben.
SBer (t<5 ois felbftânbigci Sanbinivt onfaufen roiiî, fann ju r ïïcftbaffung tjon 
{Dorle^en oon ber Sleicbsburgfiboit Scbraucb madjcn. gur Slnfieblttng toerbcn 
niebrig ocrjinSli<§e Arebite geioâ§rt. (6ie%e outb legie êeite). J
Urfoub.
geber Solbat ei^ôlt mâbrenb ber erfien 2 2)icnftia|re iâ |r li4  14 Zoge 
€i|oIungSurfcub, oom 3. Sa^re ab 21 Zoge. iDaneôcn mirb wonberurlaub
*) |U ©portjtoeden,
b) ta biingenben gomUitnangetegen^ eilcn unb
c) on ben geftiagen 
geioü^tf.
SOo^lfa^rtseinrlc^tungen.
3n Jfanterabfàafts^eitnen, Scfcjimmem unb Sûôereien iff çjrfcgenbeit 
gebofen, bie bicnftfreie geif in jroanglofer 'ü-eife ju ocrbnngen. Sutb beitcben 
©nricbtungen, bie ben iüejug non i.'ebenSmit(eIn ju  angcmeffeiicn if)reifen 
ermSgiitÿcn foücn.
(?
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Setfotflnna.
lintetoffiji«e unb SD!annt4cftai, bit no# atlauf >^«r jisaiiic^rigen © itn f l* ^  
wtpfHe^mng fowic folt^e, bie oorhcc ober nacb einer 2)ienft}eit oon minbeiten* 
s te  Sobren megen Sienflunfôbisîeit entlojien merben. bnben Snfptuib ouf:
1. n b e rg a n g lB c b u b m iffe , bcren Soucr unb Sôbe oon ber Sange ber 
$Dien[tieit unb bem juleçt jufiegenbcn tubegebnltsfabigen SDienftrinfommtn 
obbSngig ill.
5. t fn e n  3« o ilb ien flf< be in  ju t (Srlongung einer Secanfen» obet Zn« 
gepeDtenfteile,
8. eine g u lo ge  ju  ben ttb e rg angS geb iib tn iffen  roenn ber gioi(« 
Wcnflfcbein niibt erfeilt morben ijl,
4. A inber» , groaen-- unb S e u e tu n g iju fc b la g e  ju  ben ObcrgongS.p 
gebûbmiiîen, ^
6. eine e inm a lige  ttb e rg o n g s b e ib ilfe , beren $8be oon ber Sange 
ber SHenftieit cbbôngig i|i,
6. eine e inm a lige  U m j u g S e n t f ^ â b ig u n g .
Den ootbejei^nefen UnleroRijieren unb 2!ann{^ajtcn fo3 ouf Snirog 
geœâbrt merben:
1. gin ScrftbuS bis jur collen $êbe bet ttbcrgongSgebubmiffe unb ber gu.
. loge bietju, menn ber gioilbienfticSein nidii ficroubll moroen unb eS ju r 
Cegrûnbung ober Siqcrung beS rcinfôiaitliâcn gortfommcnS norig if l 
unb bie nûgli^e ÎBeiroenbung geroâ^tlei[tct critbcint.
8, gine 5lei(b«bûrgi^aft sur grlei^terung ber iûnbiic^en Snfieblung, roenn 
ber gioiibienfl(4ein nidjt Rcmâ%il morben ifl.
SJorouafegung fur eine flurgicbatt beS Sîeiibs ifl bet Slodbmci* beS 
StnlragfteHerfl, bog er f i^  jur lànblièen SlngcbUmg eignel. DoS Siefcb 
bdrgt bis jum boppelten Sclroge ber non ben betveffenben Unieroifirieren 
unb SRonnfcboften auS cigencn 'JJlitleln (^riootoennogen unb gemibner 
Sorfcbug) bereitgcflelllca Summc. gn befonbcrengiUcn bûrgt baS Sieicb 
für S.iebtungSjroeie bia ju SO p. $ . bea Dormcrtcs. bts Sieblung6guteS.
. Der ISnbli^en SInjicblung mirb ber 6rmerb einer Ueinbauerlic^cn ' SiJirt* 
fc§ttff (Memoirung) glcic^gefteSt.
Seim Sorliegen non Dienftbefcbôbigung finben ouf bie eit:gangS cnoobnien 
Onleroffijiere unb ïïionnfcbaitcn ouÿerbembie Sorfciiriftcn beS HeicbSoetforgungS» 
gefe$eS (Sienfengeioabrung, l^eiibebanbiung ufm.) binmenbung. Sirgcn t6efunb*
ÎieilSflôrunmen oor, bie n iit ouf cine Dicnilbcfdjabigung jurüc!jujùbren finb.0 metben */, ber no4 bem SicidUoctforgungagefclje juftc^enben Seirâge gemû^rt.
ïlu f Unlerofffjiere unb 3J2annf(boitert mil Iiirjerer olS oieriôbriger Dienfl» 
jeÜ finben lebigti  ^ bie Sorforiitcn bcS SieicbSDcrfotgungSgeieçeS (3ienten« 
geroi^rung, 6eiibe%onblung ufm.) Sinroenbung.
gür bie .^iulerblicbenen von Solbolen ift geforgt.
APPENDIX E
THE COMMAND STRUCTURE OF THE REICHSWEHR, 1923
Administration
Civilian "Command Authority" 
(Zivil Befehlsgewalt)
Army Command Leadership
Military "Command Authority" 
(Militarische Kommandogewalt)
Reichstag Reichspresident
Commander^in-Chief
Reichswehr Minister
Chef der Heeresleitung 
(as part of the Reichswehr)
Chef der Heeresleitung 
(as head^f the Army) *
Re^hstæhr
(Army)
*After March 23, 1921, direct commands from the President to the 
army required the countersignature of the Reichswehr Minister.
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APPENDIX F
EXAMPLES OF THE VORPRÜFTJNG AND NACHPRÜFUNG
The VorprSfung and Nachpriifung were administered in April and 
October of each year to candidates attempting to establish their educa­
tional qualifications for officer candidate school. Successful comple­
tion of the examinations brought the candidate to the level of a 
secondary school matriculant. The first example depicted subject areas 
and the appropriate time limits for individual examinations. The second 
was more comprehensive and provided instructions for the materials 
required to take the examinations, the actual schedule for the tests, 
and indicated a number of persons in charge of the various subject 
areas.
Source: Bayerische Hauptstaatarchiv München, Abt. IV, Band 144,
Akt.4, Gr. Kdo.IV, Ila No. 2189, Berlin, den 24, Februar 1922, Reichs- 
wehrministerium, J n s p e k t i o n  des Erziehungs-und Bildungswesens. 
Nr. 383/2.22. Jn.l I., Betr: Vor= und Nachprüfungen gem. Ziffer III
der Off.Erg.Best, and Bayer. Wehrkreiskommando VII, Hpt. Nr. 8991/ Ila 
Nr. 2189, München, den 9 Marz 1922, "Entwurf," Betreff: Vor= und
Nachprüfungen nacb Ziffer III der Offizierserganzungsbestimmungen.
From Chapter VI, pp. 233-235.
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. ,,LA!umrr y, '
VLazjer^t^éhrKretskorvtandô V I I  ^ —  Uunohen,den,if- liiirz  1922.
y  - t / —  —
: \  UpX.Hr.S991 /  I l a  Hr. 2130 f
den Jnfc.nt?.riejiii\rer'ier-V.DioisionflM ncKen  
dc& J n f^ n le ric re jim n t 19,!Iil:ichan. .
dài. Jnfunzerisregir.cnt 20,2cgenstiura •■ .•,■ «
dcZiJr.fcrzcriereclr.cnt 2 1 ,l.’Urnberg f
das .flcn isrbc îc illon f.H ünchcn . i d -  dae R e ite rre g in e n t 1? BanielTg>'‘‘
den A r t iH e r ie führer der '/.L io izion .funchen .
^as d rtiiie rle regU nent 7 ,Nürnberg .
d ie  Ncc'nricKlenabtelluno Y.NUnchen . . . . . '
‘d ie -K rc jifchrcb te ilung  ÿ.fiinchen i '  • ■
d ie  Pionierschule Nünchen i / '  • • ■ • ■ . . .
d ie  KcruccrJcniur con 2 u n o h e n { ^  . ■ ■  ■. '
'jiic  Ncnicnicntur üon J n g a ls îû it 'ty  .
'Ate Sorr. r^:rnic.ntur oon Grafemoh.r.i'-' "
fiehr'nrels<or:mrjio: ^ r r
' S e tre ffz :
'.,Vor=uni Nachprüfungen nach \  «
p 2 i f f e r  I l l  der O ffiz ie rseT r  ‘ . ‘ ■ . ' / • ■ • ■ - ;
'■'gar^unàûuesti!r.r.unaen . - • '. . - .
■'' j t f i  'Itf£sensc'na ftlic h e n  Voro rü f'unaen nach Z i f f e r  I I I
K rv -
ÏÏer-Offizlersergünzungsbestimniungen fln d e n .ln  diesem 
■ Jahre con 19. bis 22 .A p r il ,  ■ • - , : •  ;
d ie  aisacnschaftlichen Nachcrütiincen con 2 4 .bis 23. \
■ - -. • -f.k
frtlheres Krlegsp.lnicterium, Eincang
r % . SchSnfeldsir. 7,Sitzunosscal Z irm erN r.. . . . . .
:
I.VororUfuncen :
'= b no jexa r ,
w m m -
.« « * .  » I % . ? /  « V \  ^ ^ .  * ’ •» *' •  \
i^ -,4  .I.-'* ■■s' f  'à)Dte Priifungsfdcher Sind: , '
L ^  e u t s .c  h, 2.Ceschichte, 3.Erdkunde,4,Rechnen,’'-
. P i p œ s i r . : / : , ' '  ■■: : : ?  q
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■- •. ; , • S.Rqiaüehre, C. Phys i \ ,  7. Chemie.
-V ,v -l';  ' g fg  Prüfungsfdcher .1. -^7 sthd oerttn d lich .
■ • V  ■ ’
' • : ■ V.’,- ** AÛBerdem Xonnen sich d ie  Pciîflinge zu r Verbesserung(y,: 
f:-
Y — ''A-  ^ des.'Ergebnîsses e in er Prüfung'im /?anzbstecheH oder
X i ' ' ^ K - ‘\ : , - - \ ' . ' - . \ , t ; . . e f l g l l s c h e » u n t e r z i e h e n .  - !
Jn dg/i fycAgTA 2 ,2 ,4 . und 5  und in  der Fremdspradhe
, . fln d et eine s c h r îf t ltc k e  unf\mlndl iche Prüfung s ta t t ,
//r': v'J: . - . ' '
-tn  àen Fachern 3 ,6  un i 7 nur eine mündliche Prüfung.
4 \ .
A'yV ' / . Tf.... ' ^ b \)Z e lte n = u n d  Reihenfolge ■
,45 "inuten^B Uhr- 8 ,4 ^ ^  
■
, 3 Sîunden, 9 ~ 12 Uhr cora.'
f / ■•
' •
V . V - , . • Frerdaprache Diktat^ 1 Sîunde, 3 - 4  Uhr ncchm.
' T x x"- '' % . .29.4 / Deuts'ch llie d e rs c h rlft,
• - . .
J x 'i  : -"i - v . /  .-.V ' ; ■•■-. '! :. c • • ps^tsçh. Aufsatz '
i S S ‘W î S E > : -
Obersetzung^ 1 Stunde  ^ 4 - 5  Uhr " h
i f i  ■ '. ■.\ \v 20.4. Rechnen und liaumlehre ' V ‘ >
; C. .•. . :-- - ---- —^ —  . • %
<  gchrf/fj.X u /gcbgn , 3  Sîunden 8 - 1 1  Uhr Vorm.':
...
L  .: . -  ^ Geschichte Aursatz . 2  Sîunden 3 - 5  Uhr Uachm,
M  ‘   ' ■ . 3
mündliche Prüfung
I nach ndherer mündlicher Anorduung des D ic is tn s * 'V -5 > . . V ' - A l -  ••
' U n îe rr ic h îs le H e rs . 'i-
. . .  ■■■ '.;g
Tf. '  .y'- . - C-JPrüfunosCusschiiû ' ■ ;*
.. . . . - -T i;.,.; . .uVv v-.C.» .. •. . .
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■^Uttglteder des PrüfimgsausschuSes: . c y
' ' r.-•■;'■ ''*• -■: l û e u t s c h
•W tece*it^i«a- < ............ * ............................................lîechnen,
«  Raumlehre und
., 3 ...... . ........... .. ErdKunde ■
y' ' fwmhgaW. fü r  Geschichte /'
J ■'
( f i l r Ph l^Ku.CheeSs^
r - / ‘ '■•. , '  / Ü r  d is  / ’re n d - :;
' " " " ' . « I
: "d)'O ùer die  Einberufung der P rüflinge fo ig t  nach Snt-&eb^
• •;»•-;■ -4unfr sobàld a i le  Anneldungen/bein ^ehrlcreiskoiruncndo .■‘':
: ■  ■ ., - y
/'.y "'-21; .. ; -  ^' y (^ f / n t a :<
, i y - 1'' ' Ï - '  ■ '.tM/cgehende Vorlage der Annel^jngen'/Urd daher gebeter^\
Z:.:'.. W Z  ' : ' . .  '  Beilagen:2îQrjv.rollenauszuge,D isnstlcUt-ur.gszeugr.isse  \  
. . , , .-v . . .  , . , u rji etiuc oorhander.e Schulzeugnisze. . :
V - - ■' .• ■ • ■• ' ' - I I .  fJachsrü funcen:
, ►- a) Bie Prdfuncsfdcher
'■t;
' A:
sind;
■■■-.■.' . A
■ ■T.Deütsch,2 ,Geschichte,3. Erdkunde,4.i!athematih,S, Fhÿsik, 'i 
' . J ri'a llen  Fiîchern f in d e t eine s c h r if îltc h e  und mindllche--.
# # # % - -   ■ ' . ■ ; ' v . : |
v!^/r--r-Yv" d ' h lZèiten  und Reihenfolae . .  . '-j*'
 ^V'/; V " ) - : ' ' ' ' • ' ''À
'  ^ Deutsch Aufsatz ' 3 Gtunden 8 - 1 1  Uhr 7orm, "f
. . . .
■ GeschtchterAufsatz y  2 Stunden. 2 ,1 5 -4 ,1 5  Uhrliacha -^.
%;»;.. ' •■-• •’ ■• , . A:
' Cheni'e ' s c h r i f t l .  1^ /ë  Stunàen 4 ,3 0 -6  Uhr ' / l i
*< '  J ',■ . . ' . f
v'. /  ' %, . . . . _ • ••,-•; • • •' i ■-. r*J
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.•i. ■ . 25,4 , Uathemattk s c h r i f t l .
V - ; , ; - , Aufguùen 4 Stunden ^  8 - 1 2  U h r  Yorm.
f • V '^ -  - /  ’ PhVsik' sc h r i f t l . . 1 ^/2 Stunden,3,S0-5 Uhr Kachm.-
Aufgaben/ *
f ',\; • . ' ..... ■ ■ .i . • . .
r • '
‘ ’ 26^4. ErdKunde Aufsatz 2  Stunien. 8 -  10 Uhr Yorm.
 ^ '* ■ • • • » .  . « » » »   . . . .
Enaltsch Überset2ung^2 Stunder^ 10 -^12  U^r '  
/
    - ' ji-- ' * Franzb'sich: * . 2  Stunden. 3  -  5  Onr nachm.
:r .' ' ■
L:',èi-v 2 7 .4 :) Mündliche Prüfung nach riüherer mündlicher
Anordnùng des J lto is io n su n terrto h ts -
\  PrüfunosausschuS : - .
•. .. l.Y o rs ttzen d er: D ic ts to a s u n îe rr ic h ts le lte r  f ü r  den a l l -
f ' V ' - '  '■ ••• .geaetn itisseaschaftlichsn Unterr4cht,
 ^  ^ ■ <
2. m tg lle d e r  des PrüfungsauschuSes:
............. f ü r  Beutsoh.
•* ......  ' GescMchù
m m H c u p ta m t l f rc h
Erd'ifurde .
' \ .d )  Ober_die  Einberufung der Prüflinge fo lg t  nochSnt^.. 
sakeidüm ,sobald a i le  Armelduizgen)'Séïm üehrhreisHommandi 
- \^::'--0Q rltegen.. . . r . ;
y-. ... •ri: ”. . ... Ç ÿ f a / < - s ^ ' f
uK$ehgn<(g Vorlage an das 'iïehrArelskommndoyulrd . _
i;.'. I.' ■».."*"■ .%••*, V. ■■•■•.■ - :' ■• BellàgencStàmrollenauszüge,Liens tleistunaszeugnisse  , •.
: . . A : ; / ; %,
fC> -  V - ^ . . .ûnd èîaa oorhandene Schulzeugnlsse.
'% : V1'. .. , '. : ' :
^  -•.V.'* T.T.i. . . . . .,....■ ■ -
312
n ' - • IZI.AllgemeinSS:
\ . Die  ausaHrttgen Teilnehaer tre jfe n  an 18 .4 . unf
■•.••■ :• ■ . . a
. V. . 2 3 .4 .2 2  tn 2  U n G h e n e tn  und aerden oon der 2.£cr.p.
c : \  .. -
• • ;- c i ;  - ; , Pt'onlerùataillons 7 in  d e r Eisenbahnerkarserne unterge^
und perpflegt.^  ’ .1  . -.vc
in  den Standovt e rfo lg t an 23 .4 . und 29r.
. *r .‘•V .
:z ' '  ' ■ ' ■  ^ - i
'' à)D’ie  Prüflinge brtngen folgendes M a te ria l n i t :
t.-; • ' -
t,,^  . r ' / ' i ,  .' Z fr% el,K nea j mit cm und mm S inte ilu n g , ^
1 ■ ■ > 
Trdnspotteur, LogauthmentafelCnur bei der Nachprufung) ' •
" .- i  Papier ( l in le r t  uied eapfohlen).
: : ., ;  
r  efnfge çüo/drfgrzen _Ap6grs,
K  - V' ausschl i ôBl i ch T ln te . .■ ' /
- C ■ FUf B eré itste llung  con T in te  und des Prüfuncsziimers
X  X ' - . . - - X ^ ' Z - ' X - d o r g t .  der Soamandant des B lo is ionsstabsquartiers .
- : - - . - 
i t : ; ' ' D i e  Anfertigung oon Enttiurfen bei den Prüfungsarbeiten '
- . V  w
i  v'- f .: ' ;^ A'. 'i'- ;-Zur. Azpierersparnls d ie  Arbeiten n lcht auf
" ' . : ' ■ ' 
-V.'-y y  ' Ji". AolAgfArocAengfi Bogen a n g e fe rtig t u.erden,es genügt-sin-
h - . C ; : >  . '1 /4  Bruch f a r  d ie  Anbrlnguna d er Korrekturen.
fei- '... :'» • i  »■ • V '* ’-', ■ Huster fü r  d ie auSere Form der A rbèiten  tilrd  durch
: %  ' ■•>  
' •: '-  ■ '' \  den D io is io n s u n te rric h ts le lte r aufgelegt, \  )
'Cr. ;
■S;;
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55=www.»!.4as
c) Zu den Vorpriifungen kommndtert I  /
xu den nachprüfungen P lo n terb a ta tllo n  7
f-
1 Oberleutnant oder Leuînant,der d te m llttà rts c h e  Auf-
■ atcht fü h r t ’, '  Ber betreffende O jf iz ie r  e rh o li s tch  am
. y -
. i^ . \'18^4,und 2 3 ^ -  telefonisch ndhere het'sung betjn. ü/eÿ^rfcreis
Zk'i. y 4'.
s V . : -  kcamndo (Abtlg . l i a ) .
Ber Àufetçhtsfiihrende o f f  net u rm ltte lb a r oor d er P r ii- ,
\ M 9  î>eir^f.
i'v
I S B ; ÿ
'/fung .im betreffenden Fach d ie  oon der Jnspektion Uber- y  
sandten.ümschldge mit den Aufgaben;nach Sch2u2 der i
i
a ch rf/IK ch e n  Prüfung in  den einzelnen Fachern überglbt ! 
V ' - j ' - ; '  ■ •' er - di e  eingesamrr.elten A rbeiten dem B io ts ionsunterrich ts-,
■ - - . ■ .-j
\  \
^\'''-'-{l7ïZum  Sè^^^elden die Truppenteile Zahl und .Vamen d e r '
: i.;>V*'' 'i ;■ -Ÿ-. - ••.. v-'. ’>• '
x-'-]\:-/'^JJ:^:j^A:r‘'} .\ÿ y F ré tu .t llig e n  mit RelfezeugniSidle bis J u li 1922 ihre . 
c - ' ; * ' V .  . 1  '
*;• ■ vr,';>. ■ . . : , 7 ■ * ■  ^ . •- • •
6 y r  2 . - / 4  Jahrtge D ien s tze it .nach Offlzierserganzungsbe~j ■
- : '  ' -  '
• B: : i'' 'r< ’çtirmungen Z if fe r  I I ,  oollenden ooraussicht- ‘
-X - -T : ^ " -A
■' ' l ic h  zur O ffiziersanwdrterpriifung zugelassén aerden, , r
'^2m A ): i:Ô f f lz ïe r \  x i E a r j î î -  . Generalleutnant. -  ^ '
An Pers'lxzurück. - ..;■ =
:
f   ........................... .
-Y ;■ ' ■; ; .
'■ ••'t' - î*''»».» ■'
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♦ ■-
J • ■ • . î o h s T J e h r n i l n i a t s r i T m .
% J n B p e i c t i o n  
te irsiehungs- 'und Blld'uagsseaena.
J ï .  3 3 3 / 2 . 2 2 .  J n . l .  1 .  .
i  7 : l ' t r »  T o r ®  t i n d  f f a a b p r u n a i g o a  g e m .  
i  * "  . . . .  Z i f f e r  I I I  d o t  O f f . E r g . E e a t .
Berlin, déni
- . "y
" i.i' 
; »•••.
i--
r i - - :
,■: ;  D i e  w l s s e p B c h s f t l l P . h e n  T o M r ü f n p g e n  g e n . Z i f f e r
' f i n i  d e r  O f f  . E r g .  H e E t . ,  f i n d e n  i n  d i e s e a  J p h r e  v o m  1 9 . b i s  
‘  2 2 . ,  d i e  T » l 9 0 9 D 8 c h a f t l i P h e n  T 7 « ' c h p r ' i f u R g g n  v o m  2 4 -#  b i s  2 6 . 4 .  
b e l  d e n  D i v i s l o n e a  s t a t t .
Z e l t e n  n n d  R o l h e n f o l g e :
Y o r n r t l f p n g e n ;
f , - .  - I  ; .
t ,* •'ï; -
1 9 . 4 .  B e a t s c h  H l e d o r s c i i T i f t  
•  l u f a a t z
. k- !• -  F r e m d s p r a e h e  D i k t a t
. ■ D e b e r s e t z n n g
20. 4 #  P g o h n e n  n n d  H a u n l e h r e  
•• ■ S o h i i f t l i c h e  A u f g s b e n :
■ '  O e s o h l c h t e  A a f a a t z
• 4 5  M i n .
5  S t d n .
1  S t d e .  
1  S t d e .
5  S t d n .  
2  S t d n .
. H ■
2 1 . 4 . )  E U n d l i c h o  P r U f n n g e n  n a c h  n B h e r e r  A n o r d n n n g  d e r
2 2 . 4 . )  D i v i s l o n e n .
B a o h p r ü f n n g e n ;
2 4 . 4 .  D a n t s o h  I n f a a t z  
g a a o h l o h t e  A n f s a t z  
C h e m i e  S c h r i f t l .
r-ii
n'1
25. 4.  M a t h a m a t l k
S c h r i f t l .  A u f g a b e n
l'bgaik
S c h r i f t l . .  A u f g a b e n
2 6 . 4 .  E r d k u n d e
A u f B p t z
F r a f f l d a p r e c h e
U e b e r a e t z u n gM B : '
X ■ . t T e h r k r e i a - E d o .  I - Y I I  j e  2  »  ..........................   f .  . 1 4
: . - . K a r # D i T .  1 - 3  j e  2  • ............................................  6
J n . l  -  7  j e  2  ® .....................     14
N . . X .  ............
3 s t d n .  
2  S t d n .
l i  S t d e .
4 S t d n .  
l i  S t d e .
2  S t d n .  
2  S t d n .
2 7 . 4 . )
2 8 . 4 . 3
H d n d l i c h c  P r ü f u n g o n  n a c h  n a b e r e r  A n o r d n ù n g  d e r  
L l ' v i s i o n e a .  D i e  K o v .  D i v .  h o b a n  d i e  P r l i f u n g e n  b a ­
r e  i t a  m i t  d e m  2 7 . 4 .  z u m  A b s c h l - u a e  z u  b r i n g e n .
T A - . WjA.J 1 - ................
| \ ! . . i T A  . S t o e t a a e k r f )  
k  '  .  T e r r a  t ...................
D i e
r> H'ày
10
315
- 2 -
. r-K.':
•. Die D&hete Zeiteinteil-ung für die ■ Prüfungen (Be- 
glnn, P'ausen tian.) crdnen die Divisionen en. Die gegebene 
Eelhenfolge 1st jedcch inne zn halten.
Die von der Inspetticn su stellenden Aufgsben ge- '
_ hen den Diviaionen rechtzaitig in varochlcsaenan UnscblS- /
' gen zu; eie sind erst unnittelbar vor dar Prüfung in dem 
• bgtr. Pech vom AufsichtsfUnrenden zu offnen. ,
' Die durch Einberufung und Htlchsendung der Prüf-
iinge und durch die Bestellung des Prüfungseusschusses ent-.. 
Btehenden Scsten sind mcglichst zu beschranken.
■ - Den vollbescnsvtigten hpuntamtlich engest.eilten
■ leitern und lehrern krnn fUr die Prlifungsthtigkait und die . 
Durchaioht der Prüfungsnrbeiten eine besondere VergUtung 
nioht geu&brt warden. Die Hersnziehung nebenemtlicher \ 
Hiifekrafte ist' oogliohst zu beschrSnken.
.Pür die Durchsicht der Prüfungsarbeiten dUrfen 
, keina bes'onderen Tage angesetzt uerden. Die Prüf.Tags sind 
voU auszunutzen. ,
ïïegen Eeronziehens euswartiger Lehrkrafte usw,
8. Offz.Brg.Best.Anl. 1, Abschn, B.
-y:.......
APPENDIX G
THE WEHÏIKREISPRÜFUNGEN
Sample questions from the various Wehrkreisprufungen from 1922 to 1932 
in each subject area were as follows:
Formal Tactics
What advantages and disadvantages persent themselves in the 
transportation of a division by motorized vehicle as opposed 
to foot march? (1927)
Applied Tactics
Normally several problems were presented to the candidate 
concerning the operations of a reinforced Infantry regiment to 
be evaluated from the position of a regimental commander with 
' dispositions of troops, orders, implementation of a solution
and the reasons for such actions.
Weaponry and Equipment
A wide variety of questions were given which the candidates 
from the Infantry, Artillery and Cavalry were required to answer. 
A number of these related to other service areas.
Infantry
Why does the Infantry require the Infanteriegeschiltze
(integral artillery) and what dispositions must be made
for their employment? (1924)
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317
Cavalry
Technical engineering problems of a modem Army cavalry.
Is our German cavalry sufficiently equipped and prepared 
for it? (1923)
Artillery
How can the artillery with the advent of a new structure 
combat enemy artillery? What firing procedures are changed 
as a result? Short review of success probability. (1923)
Pioneer
What dispositions are necessary in the new times for a 
combat bridging apparatus? How would you order its installa­
tion? (1923)
Communications
What possibilities are produced from the technical charac­
teristics of the 20-watt apparatus for utilization in the 
area of high and middle command leadership (in the field)? 
(1927)
The non-military questions on the Wehrkreispriifung were equally broad- 
based and included:
History
Describe the influence of the foreign situation on the course 
of the French Revolution. (1922)
Discuss German unification-aspirations in the 19th century. 
(1924)
318
Civics '
The legal (staatsrechtliche) position of the Reichstag 
after the old and new Reich constitution. (1929)
The legal position of the Reichspresident after the consti­
tution of 11 August, 1919, compared with that of the German 
Kaiser after the constitution of 16 April, 1871. (1928)
Economic Geography
Discuss Germany’s waterways and their importance for commerce. 
(1924)
Physics
Describe a method for measuring heat. (1923)
Chemistry
Describe the manufacture of sulphuric acid. (1922) 
Mathematics
One to three problems in algebra, geometry, trigonometry 
and higher mathematics.
Source: Hans-Georg Model, Der deutsche Generalstabesoffizier,
Seine Auswahl und Ausbildung in Reichswehr, wehrmacht und Bundeswehr 
(Frankfurt am Main: Bernard & Graefe Verlag fur Wehrwesen, 1968), p. 37ff.
From Chapter VI, p. 236ff.
APPENDIX H
THE WEHRKREISPRÜFUNG PHYSICAL EXAMINATION 
(FIELD TRIAL)
Source; Bundesarchiv/Militararchiv Freiburg im Breisgau, RH 37, 
V.  778, Bayer. Wk Kdo VII (Bayer.7.Dlv.) Nr. 8721/Id 1231, München, den 
25.3.1924, Betr.: Wehrkreispriifung 1924. From Chapter VI, pp. 237-38.
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Hr.87a/Id 1231.
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Anlaga zu  N r. SO geJi 2€  T 4  I I
No eh T iiùht a l l y a a i n  auapebtn! 
ffbar V e rte ilim g  aiaha Z i / f a r  5  o b ig ar Varjügung.
W ahrkraiapriifung in  Laibaaübungan,
: 7(r
! ■ ■ —  —  -* j
; ée
1 55
I SÛ-
!
1 W
i
1 ^
1
1 Z(T
Î
■m,
I .  v r a k t i s e h a  P rd fu n a .
2 ) ,  ffandgranatem aoitsurf.
Gaaorfan a ir d  m it seharfen Handgrenaten, ana denen 
ZU ndp illen  imd Absugsoorrichtungen a n t fa m t  a in d . A nJauf 
b e lia b ig , VitrJ m it Umdrahung n io h t g a a ta t te t .
Wartuna: 
bta 15 m -  ungonügand 2 .
» 2 0  VI -  / a s t  ungeniigend 2 .
25  n -  m angslhajt 3 .
30  m - m itta lm iW ig  4 ,
35  n -  genzigend 5 .
40 m -  a ie m lic h  gut 6 .
45  m -  gut 7 .
SO m. — aehr gu t 8 .
55 n und darUber v o rz iig lic h  9 .
V
0
0
w
t
0
0
D ie  Wurjhabn i a t  wta f o lg t  ansulegan:
M it  T ress iarband j K alkm ilch  Oder Gipa toird von a in a r  
3  ~ 4  a  b ra ite n  Ab’o u r f l in ie  e ine Sankrachta fa a tg a le g t ,
An dlasa aind von 15 m b ia  55 n , in  Abatdndan von Je 5 m, 
IÇ u era tre ifen  au a iehen . D ia  '-^urfbabn i a t  von d ar Sank - 
rjc h te n  nach rachta  und lin k a  a u f Ja 10 n bagrenzt. S in  
ffbaraohraiten d a r A b vru rflin ia  beim A b v u rf, Oder e in  Ûber~ 
f l ic g a n  dsr Handgranate aua der Wurfbahn macht den ' ^ r f  
u n g ü ltig , D ar haste von d re i V iirjen w ird  ga ioarta t. Gamaa- 
aan toird dar e ra te  A ufachlag,
2 . )  Wei ta p runo m it A n lm if  
fohna B r e t t ) .
.Nertzma; 
von 3 ,8 0  m bia 4 ,0 0  u - I
4 .2 0  » -  2
4 .4 0  ” -  3  
4 ,6 0  » -  4  
4 ,8 0  •  -  5  
5 ,0 0 " - 6
5 .2 0  " -  7
5 .4 0 " - a
•5,60 und dariibar - 9.
/• 26. Na/t III
3 .J  OalOndalauf 3 oqq 
Ve rtttn o '
4 .0 0
4 .2 0
4 .4 0  
4 ,6 0  
4 ,8 0
5 .0 0
5 .2 0
5 .4 0
0
0
H
0
0
0
0
Ner'iuna-
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Werttma :
von 25. U in . bia J4,30 Min. - 1
24f30
m
m
m
m
»
14 •  -  2
14 •  •  23 ,30 * - 3
23 .30  • •  23 *  —  4
13 " " 22 ,3 0  " -  S
: : ?i,ao : : ?
12.30  • •  22 ' “ o
11 f  a 10 xxnd boaser -  » .
4 . j Garâtaübunpari:^
a l Rmaf!. f aprungltoeh)
1.-} KniaaufaehiBung, (L b M .V .S . O .Z i f f .B . )  Zurüek "  
*v ra iza n  daa S itzb o in a a  in  don S e tta tû ta  vor 
A n g a ,fL b J I.V .S .1 0  Z i f f .  8 c .)  Falgabzug ab . 
(L b J i.V .S . 2 7 .  Z i f f .
■ 2 , }  Folgm ifgug (L b . H .V .3 .1 7 .Z i f f .1 4 . )  Wanda ab .
(Lb. H . V . S . 24 Z i f f .  2 4 . )
Wartunoi L b . H . V. S . 7. Absata 1 ,
D ia  Ubungan 2 und 2  warden a im a ln  g aw arta t.
D or D urohacbn itt a rg ib t  d ia  I/o te .
b) Bdrron fs c h u lte rh o c h ).
- 1 . )  Arnbeugon und S trecken  in  S tre c k a tU ta  d re i - 
n a l (Lb. H . V. 3 .  -28  Z i f j .  2 7 )  Ausgrdtaahan  
ruelBodrta (L b . H . V. 3 .  3 4 . Z i f f .  31 Nr 2 . )
2 . )  E ingrdtacban awa G rd ts c h a ita  vor dan Hdnden,
(Lb. H . V . S . 32  Z i f f .  2Qa) Einschwingen xvm 
S trach s tU ta , Zioiachansohwung (Lb . H .V .S . 30  
Z i f f .  28a ) Wanda a b .(L b .H .V .S . 33 Z i f f .  3 0 ) .
. / Wartung: eiaha Rack.
o i P fe rd  (brusthoah)
2 . )  Aua dam S e ita ta n d  v o r lin g a  Sprzmg in  dan 3 tra c k -  
o tU ta . (L b .H .V .S , 43  Z i f f .  4 5 a ) E in a p ra ia a n  
. 2in?u n i t  LU ften  dar lin k a n  Hand, n i t  a in a r  V ia r. 
teldrahung in  den l i e i t s i t s . ( L b . H .V .S . 50 Z i f f .  
48d und b) Schwingen rüekw arta aweim al, Wande 
a b . (Lb , H .V .S . 50  l a t s t e r  A b a a ta .)
2 . )  Booke n i t  A n la u f (L b .H .V .S . 46  Z i f f .  4 6 . )
Wartung: a . Reck.
D ia  p n k tia e h e n  Prüfungen a ind  in  d e r  
R a ih a n fo lg a : Handgranatanwei tw u rf, W aitaprung, 
Gardtaübungan, CeliLndelauf abzuhaltan .
iSSSia f a r  acm tliche Ubungan: Bportanaug.
J _ I. Thaoratiaoha P rilfu n o .
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f t  T h » t > r a t i a c ? t f t P r a f u n Q .
Ausgaha der Aufgabe cn d ie  W ehrkreiee e r /o lg t  nach 
Z i f / e r  6 der Hauptverjugung,
T i l .  Vorhereitim(70n,_
F a r  d ie  Vorbereitungen: - Aueeuohen, A b i^ a e ^ ^
D iv is io n e n  v e ra n tv o rtlio h .
Zur Durehführung der Prüfungen e ind  von den D iv i  
aionen Je nach Anzahl dar P rü fu n g so rte ,  e in  Oder
L e i t e r t  f ü r  Jades cfbungsfach 2 ,  f u r  den G elHndelauf 3  O f-
f i s i e r e  a ls  R ic h te r .
Bs a ind n u r -a irh lic h  gaeignate O f f iz ie r e  h ie rzu  aus-  
suwShïan, d ie  mb’g lic h a t  einen Lahrgang f ü r  Leibesübungen
T . i tE r fo lg  bosucht haben.
Ubemahae dar R ic h te r td t ig k e it  in  nehreren Hbungs - 
fd c h e m  durch denseIben O J f iz ie r  i s t  g e s ta t te t .
D ie  D iv ie io n an  vieiden b ia  zuth 1 5 .2 .2 4  d ie  PàTuen und 
'A nabhriftan  dar La i t e r  und R ic h  ta r  an R eichsvehrm inista - 
riuiu (E aaresauabildungaabteilung. )
IV .  CaaaTXtbe'jyarixcna.
F ü r d ie  Gesa^ntbavjertung z a h lt  daa D urchschn ittaer -  
gebnia der p raktiachen  Prüfung zw e ifa c h , das der iheore - 
tiaohon Prüfung etn fach . D ie  h ie rb e i e r z ia l t a  Sunir.3 e r — 
g ib t — g e t e i l t  durch 3 - d ie  l/a ta  in  Leibasübungen.
D ie  theoretiachan A rb e ite n  wardan oTme V orkorrektu r  
von dan ffahrkr. Kdos. dem Ra. - Afin, übersandt, wo a ie  
bew ertet warden. D ie  'gehrkr. Kdos. a te lJ a n  somit nur das 
\ D urchachnittsargabnia der p ra k tia c h e n  Prüfungen f e a t ,  
wlihrend das Gesantergebnia in  R a . -  U in . a m i t t e l t  w ird .
F ü r d ie  E m it t lu n g  das D urchschn ittaergebn iaaaa der 
p rak tiach en  Prüfungen sjnd d ie  Ûbungen an Reck. Barren  
Pf^^ü a im a ln  a le  Ubungafach zu bawarten. baa Durch^ 
echntttaargebn ia  d o r'p rak tiach en  Prüfung i a t  in  a in e r  
D ia te  in  Sinne der Anlaga 3  D .VJ>1 . 52 zu g la ic h  n i t  den 
th eo re tiach an  A rb e iten  den Rw._ _ U in . vorzulagsn.
B efre iung von a inzelnen  Übungan kann n u r a u f Grund
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V . ) '  S in a  Bekam tgabe d a r p ra k tia c h e n  Prüfungen  
> «ol2  nur in a o u a it  o rfo lg a n , a la  nur d ia  Prdlfungo - 
. fd o h a r, n io h t  a b e r d io  s u r  Pj'üfung auagevdhlton  
' ‘ Vhvngen porter bokcmnt g&gehon toorden.
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APPENDIX I
THE OFFICER CANDIDATE'S EXAMINATIONS FOR THE INFANTRY
Source; Bayerische Hauptstaatarchiv München, Abt. IV, Band 144, 
Akt. 4, Gr. Kdo. 4, Reichswohrminlsterium. HeeresleitunR. Nr. 1159. 3. 
22. Jn. 2. I Tn., Berlin W. 10, den 6. April 1922. Bondlerstr. 14. 
il.-indwr 11ten noto-Ila No. 3666, Betr. : Of flziernnwnrterpriifimg he 1 der 
Infanterie. Vorgang: D. V. B. Nr. 29 Offz.-Erg.-Best. IV S. 18 and
Reichswhcrministerium. Heeresleitung. Inspektion der Infanterie.
Nr. 908.6.22. Jn 2 Ila geh., Betreff: Offizieranwarterprüfung Infanterie. 
Offiz.Erg.Best.Anl.4., Vorgang: Rw.Min.H.Ltg.Nr.1159.3.22 Jn 2 Ila
vom 6.4.22. From Chapter VI, p. 238 ff.
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OFFICER SELECTION IN THE REICHSWEHR, 1918-1926 
By: WILLIAM ALEXANDER ROBERTSON
Officer selection in the Reichswehr was a vital concern to both 
the government and the military. To the civilians, it was the key to the 
democratization of the army, and to the military it was a means to main­
tain their power and privileges in society. Ultimately, the military 
regained an ideological homogeneity in the officer corps based upon 
conservatism and the traditions of the past.
This study describes in detail the officer selection process 
during the 1918-1926 years along with the formation of recruitment policy. 
It also clarifies the extent to which selection procedures were instru­
mental in producing an anti-republican officer corps. Other significant 
problems discussed include the question of command authority between the 
army and civilian officials, training programs for officers and officer 
candidates, and efforts by the old Imperial command hierarchy to regain 
independence in military affairs following the imposition of civilian 
controls over the army at the end of hostilities in 1918.
Particularly important were the attitudes and values of the 
officer corps, its highest leaders, and their reaction to possible changes 
in the traditional system. Since officers of a tradition-bound, conser­
vative nature controlled officer education and training from the outset, 
selection criteria and policy had less effect in shaping the character of 
the future officer corps than was apparent at the time. The civilian 
government, in fact, had an excellent opportunity to maintain control 
over the military, but misused the chance by not supporting the head of 
the army. Colonel Walther Reinhardt, during the rightist-inspired Kapp- 
Lüttwitz Putsch. Thereafter, the military conservatives possessed a 
superior position in their relations with the civil government and 
political parties virtually by default.
